Internet Explorer 11 will no longer play the video I have posted to
this page. As far as I can tell, it plays as intended in other Browsers.
However, if you have
Privacy Badger [PB] installed, it won't play in Google Chrome unless you
disable PB for this site.
[Having said that,
I have just discovered that such videos play in IE11 if you have
upgraded to Windows 10. It looks like the problem is with Windows 7 and earlier
versions of that operating system.]
If you are using Internet Explorer 10 (or later), you might find some of the
links I have used won't work properly unless you switch to 'Compatibility View'
(in the Tools Menu); for IE11 select 'Compatibility View Settings' and add this
site (anti-dialectics.co.uk). Microsoft's browser,
Edge, automatically
renders these links compatible; Windows 10 does likewise.
However, if you are using Windows 10, IE11 and Edge
unfortunately appear to colour these links somewhat erratically. They are meant
to be mid-blue, but those two browsers
render them intermittently light blue, yellow, purple and red!
Firefox and Chrome reproduce these
links correctly.
Several browsers also appear
to underline
these links erratically. Many are underscored boldly in black, others more
lightly in blue! They are all meant to be the latter.
This Part of Essay Three
has perhaps been written and re-written more times than any
other at this site (well over fifty times -- no exaggeration!);
the
first half of it still contains rather
too many mixed metaphors and stylistic monstrosities. I
am in fact experimenting with new ways of expressing ideas that have been raked
over countless times in the last 2400 years by Traditional Thinkers.
It will require many more re-writes before I am completely happy with it; in
which case, the reader's indulgence is required here more than elsewhere.
Added
on Edit: October 2020: I have just spent the last six months re-structuring
and re-writing this Essay. Many of the 'irritating
rhetorical flourishes' that adorned earlier versions have been removed or have
been replaced by less annoying text. However, I am still not
entirely satisfied with this Essay as it stands, so it will probably take
several more re-writes before that is no longer the case.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Some readers have complained about the number of
links I have added to these Essays because they say it makes them very difficult
to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly lodge that complaint since they
believe everything is interconnected, and that must surely apply to
Essays that attempt to debunk that
very idea. However, to those who find these links do make these Essays
difficult to read I say this: ignore them -- unless you want to access
further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point, or a certain
topic fires your interest or curiosity.
Others wonder why I have added links to subjects
or issues that are part of common knowledge (such as recent Presidents of the
USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, films, or certain words
that are in common use). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays
are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't
assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally
well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit
of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies',
or any at
all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them
I will continue to provide.
Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links
connect to
web-pages that regularly change their
URLs, or which vanish from the
Internet altogether. While I try to update these links when it becomes apparent
that they have changed or have disappeared, I cannot possibly keep on top of
this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers
informed me
of any dead links they happen to notice.
In general, links to 'Haloscan'
no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to
RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As is the case with all my Essays, nothing here should be read as an attack
either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept --, or,
indeed,
on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the
working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary
thirty-five years ago.
The
difference between Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.
It is also worth pointing out
that a good 50% of my case against DM has been
relegated to the
End Notes.
Indeed, in this particular Essay, most of the supporting evidence is to
be found there. This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little
more smoothly. This means that if readers want to appreciate fully my case
against DM, they should consult this material, too. In many cases, I have added
numerous qualifications and considerably more supporting detail to what I have
to say in the main body; in addition, I have raised several objections (some
obvious, many not -- and some that will have occurred to the reader) to my own
arguments -- which I have then answered. [I explain why I have adopted this tactic in
Essay One.]
If readers skip this material, then my answers to any
objections or qualms they might have will be missed, as will the extra supporting detail
and the many qualifications I have included. Since I have been
debating this theory with comrades for over thirty years, I have heard all the
objections there are! [Many of the more recent on-line debates have been listed
here.]
In addition, it is worth
pointing out that
phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality",
"ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with
Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to
suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes
actually invented these ways of thinking or of
seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example,
Heraclitus,
Plato,
Cicero,
and
Marcus Aurelius).
They are intended to
highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise, the
interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them.
Up until
recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge has almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who
either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run
the system
for the elite.**
However, that will become the
central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is
directed
here,
here, and
here for
more
details.
[**Exactly
how this applies to DM will, of course, be explained in the other Essays
published at this site (especially
here,
here,
and here).
In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the
argument (but this time aimed at absolute beginners!)
here.]
Finally, since what follows
continues where
Part One left off, these two
Essays should be read in
conjunction with one another. In this Part of Essay Three, I take many of the points established
in Part One for
granted.
As of October 2023, this Essay is just under 124,500 words long; a much shorter summary of some of its main ideas can be
accessed
here.
The
material presented below does not represent my final view of any of the
issues raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.
Anyone using these links must remember that
they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier
sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the
"Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work!
If you are viewing this
with Mozilla Firefox you might not be able to read all the symbols I have
employed. I have no idea if other browsers are similarly affected.
I have adjusted the
font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired
vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too
big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!
In this
Part of Essay Three,
traditional answers
to the 'problem' of generality (which involved, inter alia,
the invention of 'Universals',
'Forms',
'Abstract Ideas', 'Categories' and/or 'Concepts'), and the deleterious effect
these
have had on Dialectical Marxism, will be
critically examined.
In addition,
the
distinction between "appearance" and "essence"/"reality" -- a dichotomy dialecticians have
also imported from Traditional Thought -- will be subjected to sustained and
destructive criticism.
As
Part Oneof this Essay
showed, beyond superficial
differences, Dialectical Marxists have bought into a thoroughly traditional view of
'abstract general ideas'. This Part of Essay Three with further underline their
conservative approach to theory.
In
Traditional Metaphysics,
the explanation of the nature of generality was
intimately connected with the so-called 'problem' of 'Universals'.1
RationalistPhilosophers
tended to argue that general words or 'concepts' were either anterior to experience
or were apprehended by means of generalisations
drawn, or "abstracted"
from -- or even
applied to -- an unspecified number of particulars (i.e., individual objects
or events
of a certain kind) given in experience, or encountered in 'thought'. The
'concepts', 'categories', and 'Ideas' so derived were supposed
to 'represent', 'reflect', or even 'reveal', the formal, constitutive properties
belonging to each
particular of a given type. Depending on their nature and provenance these were
variously classified as "essential", "primary",
or even "secondary"
qualities that individuals of a certain kind either instantiated or in which
they were said to "participate".
"The dispute between rationalism and empiricism
concerns the extent to which we are dependent upon sense experience in our
effort to gain knowledge. Rationalists claim that there are significant ways in
which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense
experience.... Rationalists generally develop their view in two ways. First,
they argue that there are cases where the content of our concepts or knowledge
outstrips the information that sense experience can provide. Second, they
construct accounts of how reason in some form or other provides that additional
information about the world." [Markie
(2017). Paragraphs merged.]
"The notion of a universal and with it the celebrated
problem of universals was invented by Plato.... The distinction of particulars
and universals is complemented in many doctrines since Plato with the
distinction and division of labour between the senses and the reason or
intellect, or understanding. According to these doctrines, what is given to the
bodily senses is merely particular, and the understanding or reason alone
apprehends, or constructs or derives, the universal. Many philosophers take the
problem of universals to be that of the meaning of general terms without
realising that what makes the meaning of general terms a problem is the very
concept of a universal." [Cowley (1991), p.85.
Spelling modified to agree with UK English.]
Such
knowledge was therefore "innate", or was based on 'concepts' or
'faculties' that were "innate".
Naturally, this meant that material objects and events were themselves somehow less 'real' than the abstractions
that supposedly lent them their substantiality, or which constituted their
'essence'. Partly because of this, the general -- the 'rational' -- came to
dominate over the particular, the material, or the
contingent
in the
Rationalist Tradition. So, what were in principle invisible and undetectable
'essences' were regarded as
more real than the individual objects and events in the world around us.
"If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I
say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and
apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in
no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be
regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm that to be distinct, for
they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted
in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by
true reason, the other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by
persuasion, but the other can: and lastly, every man may be said to share in
true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men.
Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is
always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into
itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and
imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to
intelligence only." [Plato (1997c), 51e-52a,
pp.1254-55. I have used
the on-line version here. Bold emphases added. The published version translates
the third set of highlighted words as follows: "It is indivisible -- it cannot be perceived
by the senses at all -- and it is the role of the understanding to study it."
Cornford renders it thus: "[It is] invisible and otherwise imperceptible;
that, in fact, which thinking has for its object." (Cornford (1997), p.192.)]
And
concerning the Rationalist Philosophers who influenced DM-theory, we read:
"Already with
Fichte
the
idea of the unity of the sciences, of system, was connected with that of finding
a reliable starting-point in certainty on which knowledge could be based.
Thinkers from
Kant
onwards were quite convinced that the kind of knowledge which came from
experience was not reliable. Empirical knowledge could be subject to error,
incomplete, or superseded by further observation or experiment. It would be
foolish, therefore, to base the whole of knowledge on something which had been
established only empirically. The kind of knowledge which Kant and his followers
believed to be the most secure was a priori knowledge, the kind embodied in the
laws of Nature. These had been formulated without every occurrence of the
Natural phenomenon in question being observed, so they did not summarise
empirical information, and yet they held good by necessity for every case; these
laws were truly universal in their application." [White (1996a), p.29. Bold
emphasis added.]
Here is Hegel echoing and amplifying these
ideas:
"The
view that the objects of
immediate
consciousness, which constitute the body of experience, are mere appearances
(phenomena) was another important result of the Kantian philosophy. Common
Sense, that mixture of sense and understanding, believes the objects of which it
has knowledge to be severally independent and self-supporting; and when it
becomes evident that they tend towards and limit one another, the
interdependence of one upon another is reckoned something foreign to them and to
their true nature. The very opposite is the truth. The things immediately
known are mere appearances -- in other words, the ground of their being
is not in themselves but in something else. But then comes the important
step of defining what this something else is. According to Kant, the things that
we know about are
to us appearances only, and we can never know their
essential
nature, which belongs to another world we cannot approach.
"Plain
minds have not unreasonably taken exception to this subjective idealism, with
its reduction of the facts of consciousness to a purely personal world, created
by ourselves alone. For the true statement of the case is rather as follows.
The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere phenomena, not for us
only, but in their own nature; and the true and proper case of these things,
finite as they are, is to have their existence founded not in themselves but in
the universal divine Idea. This view of things, it is true, is as idealist
as Kant's; but in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the Critical
philosophy should be termed absolute idealism. Absolute idealism, however,
though it is far in advance of vulgar
realism, is by no means merely restricted to philosophy. It lies at the root
of all religion; for religion too believes the actual world we see, the sum
total of existence, to be created and governed by God." [Hegel
(1975, §45, p.73. Links in the original. Bold added.]
"...only...God is actual...He is the
supreme actuality, that He alone is truly actual; but also, as regards the
logical bearings of the question, that existence is in part mere appearance, and
only in part actuality." [Ibid.,
p.9, §6; bold emphasis added.]
'Abstractions' were therefore Ideal 'objects
of thought' -- that is, they either represented each individual philosopher's
'Ideas', or they
were the 'thoughts' attributed to one or more of the many 'deities' humans have invented,
including Hegel's 'Absolute'.
As I pointed
out in Part One:
Philosophy
was now viewed as a unique and special source of Super-Knowledge -- knowledge that is
not only anterior
to, it is even more fundamental than anything the sciences could possibly deliver.
It is "Superscientific"
because its theses reveal
Super-Necessities underpinning 'Being' itself, knowledge of which is
attainable by the application of 'reason' alone. As
Immanuel Kant noted:
"First, concerning the sources of
metaphysical cognition, it already lies in the concept of metaphysics that
they cannot be empirical. The principles of such cognition (which include
not only its fundamental propositions or basic principles, but also its
fundamental concepts) must therefore never be taken from experience; for the
cognition is supposed to be not physical but metaphysical, i.e., lying beyond
experience. Therefore it will be based upon neither outer experience, which
constitutes the source of physics proper, nor inner, which provides the
foundation of empirical psychology. It is therefore cognition
a priori, or from pure understanding and
pure reason.... Metaphysical cognition must contain nothing but judgments a
priori, as required by the distinguishing feature of its sources." [Kant
(1953), pp.15-16. (This links to a PDF.) I have quoted the on-line
version which is a different translation to the one I have referenced. Bold
emphases added; link added and paragraphs merged.]
"Lying beyond
experience" implies it is superior to scientific knowledge.
Indeed, as we also saw in Part One, these
'objects of thought' were Abstract Particulars. This meant that for Rationalists, while 'reality
itself' was essentially Ideal, the physical universe was in effectashadow world, not fully 'real',
since that was where contingency, brute fact, finitude and uncertainty reigned supreme.
As Plato and Hegel argued, the 'rational
structure' that supposedly lay behind 'appearances' was the real world --
only 'God' was "truly actual" --, and that
world and these 'concepts' were accessible to 'thought' alone. If general terms -- common nouns, such
as "cat", "table", "money", "value",
"population", etc. -- are capable of reflecting the 'essence' of material
bodies (as well as their inter-relationships), then this was because of the Abstract Particulars to which they allegedly
referred, or
which they instantiated (such as 'The Form of the Cat', 'The Concept, Table',
'The Population').
Hence, these Abstract Particulars were ('ontologically', and even
'epistemologically') anterior to the objects to which we supposedly refer
by our use of common nouns. Depending on the philosophical system under
consideration, this meant that Abstract Particulars exist prior to the
relevant objects in material world, or they somehow give them their
'substantiality', their limited or temporary 'actuality'. For other theorists,
they were simply 'mental constructs' to which theorists must appeal
if they want to understand the objects and processes that litter 'reality', or,
indeed, if they want to
construct more
comprehensive and accurate theories about their nature and properties.1a
[We will see Engels, Lenin, and other
DM-theorists reach
similar conclusions, arguing that the 'concrete' is only concrete because of the
abstractions to which we have to appeal in order to render them 'concrete' -- and,
oddly enough for those who claim to be materialists, they even
asserted that
matter itself is an abstraction! In which case, these self-proclaimed,
hard-headed 'materialists' had already tail-ended Idealism by their
adoption of a core principle of
Rationalism -- i.e., that matter is fundamentally an abstraction!]
It is here we see the conflation of 'talk about talk'
with 'talk about the world' surface, a confusion we encountered in
Part One. We met it,
for example, when we saw theorists treat predicates as both the referents of general terms
(i.e., the objects, or sets of objects, in the world supposedly designated by
predicative expressions), andas general terms in language.
They were thus extra-linguistic and linguistic at the same time! This
semantic slide helped Hegel conclude that what went on in his head (as he juggled
with certain words/'concepts') also constituted the 'external' world in
development.
While Descartes
imagined there were two substances -- 'Mind' and Matter --, it soon became
apparent (in the work of
Spinoza,
and in a somewhat different form in
Leibniz's writings -- and later still in Hegel's 'theory') that there is only
one rational or 'real' substance: 'Mind'. Everything else is an 'appearance',
and hence 'accidental', 'ephemeral',
contingent.
The
traditional approach, which
particularises general terms
and
nominalises verbs, has in one form or another dominated Western Thought -- and
latterly DM -- for the best part of 2500 years. Its 'logical conclusion', in the work of Leibniz
and Hegel (and their latter-day epigones) only serves to underline the claim
advanced in
these Essays that all ancient, medieval and early modern versions of Rationalist
Philosophy are simply different forms of Idealism. And, as we will see, this
approach to generality (as well as the meaning of general terms) has spread its
tentacles into every subsequent metaphysical system --, to such an extent that it is clear that all formsof Traditional Philosophy -- Rationalist,
Nominalist,
Realist,
Monist,
Dualist,
Empiricist
and Positivist
--
are no less Idealist.
These "ruling
ideas", given life in the 'west' by Ancient Greek Philosophers, found a new
home in more recent, bourgeois surroundings, albeit with a brand new content that
mirrored the novel social and economic conditions in which they found themselves.
Even
when this 'theory' is flipped "right-side up" (or "put back on its feet"),
supposedly
in DM, material reality is still regarded as secondary, derivative, dependent,
and not fully real -- once again, where we are told by erstwhile
materialists that matter is just an "abstraction". The material world, as the latter is viewed by
dialecticians, requires the rational principles encapsulated in
DL to give it
life and form. After all, underlying "essences" 'contradict'
"appearances", and in that philosophical wrestling match, it is "essence"
that always finishes on top.1aa
Here, for
example,
is Lenin:
"Logical concepts are
subjective so long as they remain 'abstract,' in their abstract form, but at the
same time they express the Thing-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete
and
abstract, both phenomenon and
essence, both moment
and
relation." [Lenin (1961),
p.208. Italic
emphases in the original.]
"Thought proceeding from the
concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get
away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter,
the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all
scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more
deeply, truly and completely." [Ibid.,
p.171.
Italic emphases
in the original.]
Notice that it is abstraction that drives thought closer to the truth. Moreover, as
we saw in Part One,
according to Lenin and Engels, the concrete only emerges at the end of an
infinite process. In that case, nothing could ever rightly be said to be concrete.
[We will
also see later that Lenin is even less ambiguous in the other things he had to say about
this mysterious process (here
and here).]
This helps explain why DM-fans
find it impossibly difficult to tell non-believers (or even each other, for
goodness sake!) exactly with whatit is in reality that their 'abstractions'
actually correspond. [Here
is a recent example.] As we also saw in
Part One (and as
we will see in more detail In Essay Twelve Part Four), if therewereanything in
the universe for these 'abstractions', these 'rational principles', to
correspondwith, it would imply that nature is 'Mind', or the product
of 'Mind'. On the other hand, if there isn't anything with which they
correspond,
what use are they? To boost the morale of DM-fans?
As the
Book of Genesis noted, in an Ideal world it takes the 'word of God' (or
something analogous to it) to give life and form to matter, creating both out of
'nothing'. Without that, everything would
remain
lifeless, chaotic, and might even cease to exist --, or, indeed, might even failto
begin to exist:
"And the earth was
without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the
Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be
light: and there was light.... And God said, Let there be a firmament in the
midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters. And God
called the firmament Heaven.... And God said, Let the waters under the heaven be
gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear: and it was
so. And God called the dry land Earth; and the gathering together of the
waters called he Seas: and God saw that it was good. And God said, Let the earth
bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit
after his kind, whose seed is in itself, upon the earth: and it was so...." [Genesis,
Chapter One, verses 2-11.]
"1In the beginning was the Word [λόγος
--
logos],
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 2He was with God in the beginning. 3Through him all things were made; without him nothing
was made that has been made. 4
In him was life, and that life was the light of all mankind." [John
1:1-4. Bold added.]
In like
manner, according to DM-theorists, a 'Dialectical Logos' is required, not just to add form to formless
matter, but to call it into existence
give it life, make it
move,
and do so literally from 'Nothing'.
Creation ex nihilo isn't just a Christian dogma, it is also a DM-dogma
-- courtesy of Hegel's 'derivation' of everything from 'Nothing' and 'Being'.
Here is what
I have written
elsewhere (slightly edited):
One particular 'argument' is of special
interest here; it crops up in different forms in several places in Hegel's work,
and attempts to
connect "Being" with "Nothing" and then with "Becoming", by
magically 'deriving' all three from the verb "to be"....
Amazingly,
this 'argument' was praised by Lenin and Trotsky....
Rees summarised thus 'argument' in the
following way:
"The 'Science of Logic' begins with the most
abstract of all human ideas, Being. This is the bare notion of existence shorn
of any colour, size, shape, taste or smell. This first concept is also, in
its way, a totality. Although Being reveals no characteristics or distinguishing
marks, it does, nevertheless, include everything. After all, everything must
exist before it can take on any particular characteristics. Being is
therefore a quality that is shared by everything that exists; it is the most
common of all human ideas. Every time we say, 'This is --,' even before we say
what it is, we acknowledge the idea of pure Being…. But Being also contains its
opposite, Nothing. The reason is that Being has no qualities and no features
that define it. If we try to think about pure Being…we are forced to the
opposite conclusion, Being equals Nothing.
"But even Nothing is more than it seems. If we
are asked to define Nothing, we are forced to admit that it has at least one
property -– the lack or absence of any qualities…. This presents us with a
strange dilemma: being is Nothing and yet Nothing is something. Hegel, however,
is not so stupid as to think that there is no difference between being and
Nothing, even though this is what our logical enquiry seems to suggest. All that
this contradiction means is that we must search for a new term that…can explain
how Being and Nothing can be both equal and separate (or an 'identity of
opposites'…). Hegel's solution is the concept of Becoming." [Rees (1998),
pp.49-50. Spelling adjusted in line with UK English; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
But, there is no way that these concepts ("Being",
"Nothing" and "Becoming") could have been derived from "careful empirical work",
nor can they be "tested in practice" -- let alone abstracted from anything
that is recognisably material.
In the end, the fact that erstwhile materialists
(like Lenin and Trotsky -- or even Rees, since he nowhere criticises this
'argument') praised this prime example of linguistic mystification isn't the least bit surprising --
when their own ideas are viewed against the
class-compromised background of Traditional Thought.
This is how Trotsky
characterised it:
"The
identity of Being (Sein) and Nothingness (Nichts), like the
contradictoriness of the concept of the Beginning, in which Nichts and Sein are
united, seems at first glance a subtle and fruitless play of ideas. In fact,
this 'game' brilliantly exposes the failure of static thinking, which at first
splits the world into motionless elements, and then seeks truth by way of a
limitless expansion [of the process]." [Trotsky (1986), p.103.]
Whereas Lenin thought it
was:
"Shrewd
and clever! Hegel analyses concepts that usually appear dead and shows that
there is movement in them."
[Lenin (1961), p.110.]
However, at no point
do Rees and other DM-fans repudiate this style of reasoning, only some of its
'Ideal' implications -- which, coupled with the praise Lenin and Trotsky heaped
upon it, indicates that, for dialecticians, the rejection of Hegelian Absolute
Idealism is purely formal,
and clearly superficial.
By no stretch of the imagination have any of the above conclusions been drawn from
"an analysis of real
material forces", or anything even
remotely like one. The fact that leading DM-classicists could claim to learn
anything about the nature of "static thinking" from such woefully defective
'logic' reveals how
superficial their frequent and vociferous rejection of Absolute really is. The
'logic' of this passage is entirely bogus and thoroughly Idealist, again, as George
Novack noted:
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
The concepts
Hegel employed are the result of grossly exaggerated abstractions, tortured 'logic' and terminally
dubious assertions....
In fact, this Hegelian 'derivation' has set a
new gold standard for all forms of LIE, for from it everything in existence --
every object, thought and process -- can be 'derived' miraculously from
the verb "to be"!
So, even for DM-fans, matter
isn't sufficient to itself -- indeed, it is an 'abstraction'. Which is, of course,
why Hegel and Dialectical Marxists found they had to appeal to a linguistic form --
to 'contradiction' -- to
set things in motion and give them life. Creation, life and movement via
language (in the Bible) and 'logic' (logos) mirrored by linguistic forms
achieving the same
in 'dialectics':
"Contradiction is the root of all movement and
life, and it is only in so far as it contains a contradiction that anything
moves and has impulse and activity."
[Hegel (1999),
p.439, §956.
Bold emphasis added.]
"So long as we consider things at rest and
lifeless, each one by itself…we do not run up against any contradictions in
them…. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in
their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence. Then we
immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a
contradiction…. [T]here is a contradiction objectively present in things and
processes themselves, a contradiction is moreover an actual force...." [Engels
(1976),
pp.152-53.
Bold emphases added]
"Dialectics…prevails
throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself
everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the
opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954),
p.211.
Bold emphasis added]
"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of
nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?)
conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase,
as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a
unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).
"In the first conception of
motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive,
remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject,
etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to
knowledge of the source of 'self'-movement.
"The first conception is lifeless,
pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in
continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of
the old and the emergence of the new.
"The
unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The
struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and
motion are absolute." [Lenin (1961),
pp.357-58. Bold emphases
alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Because
of this, it isn't possible to find, or even suggest there is a single physical correlate in nature
and society for the
abstractions that dialecticians have conjured into existence (or, to be more
honest, the
'abstractions' they imported from Hegel and other ruling-class theorists) to
correspond with. But, since they form the 'essential nature' of
material objects and processes, this means that, for DM-fans, the latter must be Ideal, too.
And that is why the aforementioned dialectical "flip" was in the
end through a full 360ş.
Hence, it is hardly surprising to find that DM-fans have had to denigrate,
or at least depreciate,
ordinary language and with it the experience of ordinary workers
(accusing them of being dominated by 'commonsense', 'formal thinking' or 'false
consciousness' -- aping a tactic adopted and perfected by countless
generations of
ruling-class hacks), in order to
'justify' and rationalise the importation of Hegelian concepts into the workers'
movement, in a vain attempt to make DM
work.
[These allegations will be substantiated in Essay Twelve (summary
here).]
As we
will discover throughout the rest of this site, because of their
reliance on the traditional thought-forms they imported into
revolutionary socialism,
dialecticians have only succeeded in saddling
themselves with a host of
insoluble theoretical problems. This
also helps
explain why every single dialectician
slips into
a priori, dogmatic modes-of-thought at the
drop of a
copula --, and why
they all fail to notice this even
after it has
been pointed out to them!
Moreover,
as indicated earlier, this version of 'rotated' Idealism [DM] pictures the material
world as less 'real' than the Ideal world that lends it its
substance, its 'essence', and which in the end determines what DM-theorists
finally regard as "concrete".
And we can now see why this is so: for
dialecticians, material objects are only "concrete" in the
Ideal limit.
But, since that limit is forever
unattainable, this implies that, for them, there are
in effect
no concrete objects or
processes at all!
As Aristotle pointed out -- in reference to
Plato's
Theory of Forms and the so-called
"Third
Man Argument" --, it isn't a good idea when trying to solve a problem
to begin by
doubling it.
By
this he meant that if there is a difficulty explaining the similarities that
exist between the particulars given in experience, there is surely a more
intractable one accounting for the alleged link between these particulars and
the
Abstract Universals (The Forms) they supposedly instantiate (in Plato's theory).
Where there was
once only one problem, now there are two.
Worse still, if the solution to this age-old
conundrum implies there is a link of some sort between particulars and a 'something-we-know-not-what',
(i.e., a specially-concocted 'Universal', located in a
mysterious world anterior to experience, accessible to thought alone), then this is a
'solution' in name only.
Hence, if an abstract term
is required to account for the similarities that exist between particulars, then
a third term would clearly be required to account for the similarity between that
abstraction and those particulars themselves. Otherwise, the connection wouldn't
be rational, merely fortuitous, or accidental, undermining the whole point of the
exercise.
So, this third term
reproduces the original problem; that is because questions would naturally arise
over the link between this new term and the other two (i.e., between each
particular and this hypothetical 'Universal' that had been introduced in order to connect
them!).
While Abstract Universals
like this 'exist' in an 'Ideal World' anterior to the world we see around us,
they also supposedly enjoy
connections of some sort with particulars in this world, connections that are of a different order
to those that material particulars presumably enjoy among themselves.
Unfortunately, this leaves the 'abstract' side of this family of proposed 'solutions'
shrouded in mystery.
Hence, if the introduction of
Universal/Concept, C1is required in order to account for the common features shared,
for instance, by objects A
and B, then a new Universal/Concept, C2,
a third term, will be required to account for the commonality between C1
and A, and between C1
and B, and so on. The whole exercise thus threatens to generate an
infinite regress, leaving nothing explained.
"In one dialogue
or another Plato tells us that the forms are not perceived by the senses, but
are objects of the mind; that they are imperishable; that they are indivisible;
that they are superior to material objects; that they are norms by which we
judge material things; that they have a certain creative power (the form of
wisdom 'makes' Socrates wise). Material objects participate in, resemble, copy,
or are modelled by the forms. Problems arise because some of these
characteristics of the forms turn out to clash with others. If material things
resemble the forms they instantiate to various degrees, then material things
have something in common with any form they resemble. If a well-drawn circle
resembles the form of circularity, it must be because both the particular drawn
circle and the form of circularity share the property of circularity; but then
what the particular and the property share must be still another form. Scholars
of Plato have puzzled over this problem, the problem of the 'third man,' because
it seems to lead to an infinite regress." [Davidson (2005), pp.78-79. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold
emphases added.]
Of course,
Davidson goes on to argue that
Plato appears to have 'solved' this problem by arguing that it is a mistake to think that shapes also have a shape, or that Socrates resembles the
concept of a man. This may be so, but it isn't easy to see how the Forms could be
exemplars of the particulars they supposedly instantiate if they share nothing with them.
Indeed, why call something the Form of Circularity if there is nothing circular
about it? Or if there is nothing in common between this Form and circles that
have been drawn, or could be drawn? Why aren't they, perhaps,
exemplifying the Form of
Squareness, or of Triangularity, with which they also share nothing? Of course, a rule (if
this is what the Forms are) in no obvious way
resembles the objects to which it is, or can be, applied; but
there is little in Plato that suggests he regarded his Forms as rules. Moreover,
if
the Forms are supposed to work as exemplars, there would have to be a rule of some
sort that informed those who implicitly (or explicitly) use them, or their
linguistic counterparts, as exemplars how to apply them correctly. But, there are none,
or none that Plato considered. An
object, a Form, can't tell anyone how to apply it. An interpreted rule can and
typically would. Chess pieces, for example, won't tell a novice how to
move them, the rules of chess, once understood, will.
[There is a sophisticated defence of Plato in
Meinwald (1990, 1992). The reader will have to decide for herself whether or not
it is successful.]
Well,
this might be to misinterpret the nature of Plato's Forms,
perhaps even anachronistically. In fact, Plato talks as if we just 'see' or 'remember' the
Forms (on this, see Note 6a),
and that is all there is to it.
But, if we are to recognise the Form of Circularity and distinguish it from,
say, the
Form of Squareness, then there must be something about the former that doesn't
apply to the latter, which it shares with examples of circularity we see
in this world that it doesn't share with
squareness in this world. And what can that be? A name or label of some sort? But, names can't
express a rule, either, nor can labels. We already know what circularity is, so our
understanding is already biased (so to speak), but just looking at the
alleged Form of Circularity in Platonic Heaven before we were born (which is how
Plato conceived of this Cosmic Drama) without knowing what it represents or how
to apply it would tell
us nothing. Maybe we were all given a guided tour, or presented with an
'Empyrean User's Handbook' of some sort? If so,
that would make this a
social
theory of knowledge, and all the problems Plato associated with
banausic theories like that would now surely apply to a
'heavenly' version of it.
What, for example, would be common to The Form of Dog,
or the Forms of Cat, Lion, Horse, Rat and Crocodile that would make them all partake in the Form of
Animal? That question would clearly re-introduce Aristotle's Third Man Argument, only now applied to the
Forms themselves!
Maybe
Platonic Heaven works in 'mysterious ways', and Cosmic Knowledge is different
from ordinary, boring earthy knowledge. But, that is precisely the point at
issue, for Plato's theory kicks this 'problem' off, not into the long
grass, but into a fundamentally
mysterious arena, the clouds....
Of
course, this 'difficulty' resurfaces in Hegel's theory, but in a different form
(no pun intended), for he had no way of knowing whether or not his apprehension of the
concepts of interest to him were genuine copies of those processed by the
Absolute itself --, or, for that matter, whether or not they were the same as
anyone else's. Indeed, he would have no way of knowing whether or not
he had interpreted them correctly, or even what they
really meant. Having the name of a concept (such as "Being") would be of no more use to Hegel
than seeing the Form of Circularity would be to our allegedly pre-existent
selves in Platonic Heaven. The name of a concept can provide no clues
how it should be applied -- or even what it meant -- certainly no more than
'the
word' "Meskonation" would help you, dear reader, if you simply stared
at it, or
thought about it for weeks on end.
[Don't look
that word up! I invented it, just like Philosophers invented "Being".]
Of
course, it could be argued that Hegel inherited a range of concepts from previous
generations of philosophers (such as "Being", "Nothing", "Form" -- or
even "Concept" itself), which isn't the case with "Meskonation". That is
undeniable, but it misses the point. Hegel could stare at the word "Being" all day long
and that would still fail to tell him that what he meant by that
word was the same as, or was different from, what previous thinkers had meant by
it -- or, indeed, that the meaning of any of the words they had used in their
explanation of what they meant by "Being" were the same as, or were different
from, what he now meant by those words -- without a social theory, or
explanation, of meaning to help him, or them, out. The fact that Hegel processed these ideas
'in his head' undermines any attempt on his part to formulate just such a
social theory, or explanation. And it is little use pointing to his many
writings, or those of previous thinkers, as a way of extricating Hegel from this impasse (because those ideas,
expressed in print, are plainly not locked inside Hegel's skull, or theirs) since
those writings merely record the results of their private musings, they don't in any way alter their
provenance, meaning, or legitimacy.
This is precisely where Hegel's non-social theory of knowledge
-- aka bourgeois individualism, for that is what it is; after all, Hegel worked it
all out in the 'privacy of his own head' -- landed his theory of 'conceptual development'. Simply grafting a temporal component onto Plato's Theory of Forms is no solution. Time cannot add a dimension of meaning
where there was none to begin
with. [I have said more about this here
and here.]
Any
who doubt this need only ask themselves in, say, a few months' time if "Meskonation"
now means something to them, and then whether or not it means the same
as it does to anyone else as it does to them.
Be this as
it may, Davidson makes the point that even if Plato managed to circumvent these
'difficulties', his theory falls foul of another, even more intractable infinite
regress: the problem of predication and the unity of the proposition -- covered in
Part One of this
Essay.
However, this
Platonic doctrine immediately
demotes
the 'evidence' that sense experience delivers to the 'knowing subject', rendering it only of secondary importance
(or even of no importance at all) compared to whatever is contributed by 'thought', or
by 'tradition' -- as, indeed, Plato's
Allegory of the Cave confirms.
[Indeed,
we will soon see, a number
of
DM-theorists argue that facts are an impediment and are misleading! After all,
they contradict 'essence'. In Essay Two, we saw
CLR James arguing much
the same.]
We find this Aristocratic depreciation of the
material world and its associated contingency in the later
Platonic and
Neoplatonic traditions, both of which found
a clear
echo in Hegel's work, and thus in DM. [On that, see O'Regan (1994). This
theme will be explored in detail in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here).]
In which case, if "What
is rational is real, and what is real is rational" [Hegel (2005), p.xix.],
then both the 'real' and the 'rational' must be inaccessible to the senses,
andthe outward appearance of things can't possibly match their real form. That
is because only 'the Mind' is 'rational', and since material things aren't 'Mind', they
can't be 'rational', either -- nor can they be governed by rational principles.
Or so this theory would have us believe.
[The various responses that could be made to that
seemingly dogmatic assertion will be considered in detail in Essay Twelve Part
Four.]
Or, perhaps better: matter and 'mind' can only be reconciled if
the material world is viewed as an aspect of 'Mind', an "abstraction", or even as
an Ideal entity in its own right. Hence, the logical conclusion of this approach to
'knowledge', as indeed Hegel seemed to believe, is that despite appearances to
the contrary everything must be 'Mind', an aspect of
'Mind', or a reflection of 'Mind' in 'self-development'. Hence, for Hegel,
every single philosophy was merely a different form of Idealism:
"Every philosophy is
essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the
question then is only how far this principle is carried out." [Hegel
(1999), pp.154-55; §316.
Bold emphasis added.]
"If
abstraction is made from every determination, from all form of anything, what is
left over is indeterminate matter. Matter is a sheer abstraction.
(Matter cannot be seen, felt, and so on -- what is seen, felt, is a
determinate matter, that is, a unity of matter and form).
This abstraction from which matter proceeds is, however, not merely an
external removal and sublating of form, rather does form, as we have seen,
spontaneously reduce itself to this simple identity." [Hegel (1999),
pp.450-51, §979. Bold emphasis alone added.
(Typos in the on-line version
corrected.)]
Here is Engels:
"Matter as such is a
pure creation of thought and an abstraction. We leave out of account the
qualitative differences of things in lumping them together as corporeally
existing things under the concept matter. Hence matter as such, as distinct
from definite existing pieces of matter, is not anything sensuously existing."
[Engels
(1954), p.255. Bold emphases added. I
have dealt with this issue in much more detail,
here.]
Here is Lenin:
"If
abstraction is made from every determination and Form of a Something,
indeterminate Matter remains. Matter is a pure abstract. (-- Matter
cannot be seen or felt, etc. -- what is seen or felt is a determinate Matter,
that is, a unity of Matter and Form)." [Lenin
(1961), pp.144-45. Italic emphases in the original; bold added. The original
passage from Hegel has been reposted in
Note 57.]
While we might expect an Absolute Idealist like
Hegel to consign matter to the dustbin labelled "Abstractions in here please",
it is quite shocking to see erstwhile materialists agreeing with him! I
am sure the reader will now be able to see what a pernicious influence Hegel has
had on Dialectical Marxism -- materialists who think matter is an
abstraction! At this point I'd be tempted to say "You just couldn't make
this up!", but you don't need to, so I won't.
At best, this means that 'appearances' are indeed misleading; at worst, they are 'contradicted' by
underlying 'essences' -- as dialecticians
are happy to tell us. In any such clash between the 'evidence' that the
senses deliver and the rational principles upon which the 'Mind' supposedly
relies,
Traditional Thought has always privileged the latter over the former, as the
following authors point out:
"Empirical,
contingent
truths have always struck
philosophers as being, in some sense, ultimately unintelligible. It is not that
none can be known with certainty…; nor is it that some cannot be explained….
Rather is it that all explanation of empirical truths rests ultimately on brute
contingency -- that is how the world is! Where science comes to rest in
explaining empirical facts varies from epoch to epoch, but it is in the nature
of empirical explanation that it will hit the bedrock of contingency somewhere,
e.g., in atomic theory in the nineteenth century or in
quantum mechanics
today. One feature that
explains philosophers' fascination with
truths of Reason
is that they seem, in a
deep sense, to be fully intelligible. To understand a necessary proposition is
to see why things must be so, it is to gain an insight into the nature of
things and to apprehend not only how things are, but also why they cannot be
otherwise. It is striking how pervasive visual metaphors are in philosophical
discussions of these issues. We see the universal in the particular (by
Aristotelian intuitive induction); by the Light of Reason we see the essential
relations of
Simple Natures; mathematical truths are
apprehended by Intellectual Intuition, or by
a priori insight. Yet instead of examining the use of these arresting
pictures or metaphors to determine their aptness as pictures, we build
upon them mythological structures.
"We think of necessary
propositions as being
true or false, as objective and independent of our minds or will. We
conceive of them as being about various entities, about numbers even
about extraordinary numbers that the mind seems barely able to grasp…, or about
universals, such as colours, shapes, tones; or about logical entities, such as
the truth-functions or (in Frege's
case) the truth-values. We naturally think of necessary propositions as
describing the features of these entities, their essential characteristics.
So we take mathematical propositions to describe mathematical objects…. Hence
investigation into the domain of necessary propositions is conceived as a
process of discovery. Empirical scientists make discoveries about the
empirical domain, uncovering contingent truths; metaphysicians, logicians and
mathematicians appear to make discoveries of necessary truths about a
supra-empirical domain (a 'third
realm'). Mathematics seems to be the 'natural history of
mathematical objects' [Wittgenstein
(1978), p.137], 'the physics of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1976), p.138; however
these authors record this erroneously as p.139 -- RL] or the 'mineralogy of
numbers' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.229]. The mathematician, e.g.,
Pascal,
admires the beauty of a theorem as though it were a kind of crystal.
Numbers seem to him to have wonderful properties; it is as if he were
confronting a beautiful natural phenomenon [Wittgenstein (1998), p.47; again,
these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.41 -- RL]. Logic seems to
investigate the laws governing logical objects…. Metaphysics looks as if it is a
description of the essential structure of the world. Hence we think that a
reality corresponds to our (true) necessary propositions. Our logic is
correct because it corresponds to the laws of logic….
"In our eagerness to ensure
the objectivity of truths of reason, their sempiternality
and mind-independence, we slowly but surely transform them into truths that are
no less 'brutish' than empirical, contingent truths. Why must red exclude
being green? To be told that this is the essential nature of red and green
merely reiterates the brutish necessity. A proof in arithmetic or geometry seems
to provide an explanation, but ultimately the structure of proofs rests on
axioms. Their truth is held to be self-evident, something we apprehend by
means of our faculty of intuition; we must simply see that they are
necessarily true…. We may analyse such ultimate truths into their constituent
'indefinables'. Yet if 'the discussion of indefinables…is the endeavour to see
clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that
the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness
or the taste of a pineapple' [Russell
(1937), p.xv (this links to a PDF); again these authors record this erroneously as p.v;
although in the edition to which I have linked, it is p.xliii -- RL], then the
mere intellectual vision does not penetrate the logical or metaphysical
that to the why or wherefore…. For if we construe necessary
propositions as truths about logical, mathematical or metaphysical entities
which describe their essential properties, then, of course, the final products
of our analyses will be as impenetrable to reason as the final products of
physical theorising, such as
Planck's constant."
[Baker and Hacker (1988), pp.273-75. Referencing conventions in the original
have been altered to conform with those adopted at this site.]
"Already with
Fichte
the idea of the unity of the sciences, of system, was connected with that of
finding a reliable starting-point in certainty on which knowledge could be
based. Thinkers from
Kant
onwards were quite convinced that the kind of knowledge which came from
experience was not reliable. Empirical knowledge could be subject to error,
incomplete, or superseded by further observation or experiment. It would be
foolish, therefore, to base the whole of knowledge on something which had been
established only empirically. The kind of knowledge which Kant and his followers
believed to be the most secure was a priori knowledge, the kind embodied
in the laws of Nature. These had been formulated without every occurrence of the
Natural phenomenon in question being observed, so they did not summarise
empirical information, and yet they held good by necessity for every case; these
laws were truly universal in their application." [White (1996a), p.29.]
But, as we will see in
Essays Ten Part One
and Twelve Part One, not only is
the above search for a priori knowledge a charade (in that it can't deliver what had been
advertised all along for it), it destroys the capacity we have for articulating any ideas at
all.
[We saw how that actually worked out in
Part One.]
Even worse: Dialectical
Marxists have
from the beginning shown that they were only too willing to adopt this
anti-materialist, ruling-class, view of 'reality'. These 'ruling
ideas' certainly now rule what are supposed to be
radical minds. The sad truth is that the approachto knowledge that dialecticians have imported into Marxism ironically has the
opposite effect: it delivers
no knowledge at all.
In fact, if 'true', 'dialectics' would
undermine science completely.
This
means that while DM-theorists have hocked the 'materialist cow', they haven't even
received a handful of
beans in return.
[This also helps explain why
DM-theses collapse so readily into incoherence, as the next ten Essays
will demonstrate.]
Davidson then turns his attention to Aristotle's non-solution (and, since
Hegel adopted and adapted Aristotle's theory -- albeit buried under a mountain
of gobbledygook --, the following also applies to his version):
"Aristotle again and again reverts to
the claim that if the forms are to serve as universals, then they cannot be
separate from the entities of which they are properties. Aristotle agrees with
Plato that universals, like the forms, are the objects of scientific study....
Where Aristotle differs from Plato was in holding that universals are not
identical with the things of which they are properties, they exist only by
virtue of the existence of the things of which they are properties. If
universals existed independently, they would take their place alongside the
things that instantiate them. Separate existence is just what would make
universals like other particulars and thus no longer universal. But doesn't this argument show Aristotle to be confused?
If universals can be talked about, they can be referred to. Yet whatever can be
referred to is a particular. Confusion seems to have set in: universals are both
particulars and at the same time necessarily distinct from particulars."
[Davidson (2005), pp.89-90. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]
The
'necessary' connection that was supposed to exist between these 'forms' and the
particulars they allegedly exemplified in the end reduced them to the
level of particularity, too, thus vitiating the whole process -- since it
destroyed generality, the very thing the 'forms' had been introduced all along to explain.
But, if C1
(from earlier) can't connect A and B directly on its own, what then is the point
of introducing it?
Of course, it could be
argued that C1
belongs to a different category to A and B, so the
above argument is misconceived.
Well, it would be if
'Universals' hadn't already been transformed into Abstract
Particulars
-- or, rather, the words we use to refer to them transformed into the Proper Names thereof
--
as a result of the syntactical segue exposed in
Part One of this
Essay (alluded to by Davidson, above). But, because Traditional Theorists have been doing
precisely this --
at least
since Plato was in short trousers -- Aristotle's point (suitably adapted in each instance)
surely applies to every
known version of this theory. In which case,
'Universals', 'Concepts',
'Ideas' or 'Categories', as they feature in Traditional Thought (and, alas, in
DM, too), can't be general. They are just particulars of a rather
peculiar sort -- ashamed, perhaps, to come out of the Idealist closet.
Hence, the
'philosophical' question
remains: Is there a general term, or any term, that is capable of linking
ordinary objects and processes given in experience with these Abstract Particulars?
That is
just one of the reasons why this 'problem' is addressed in the way it was
in
Part One of this Essay. There,
the discussion was aimed at exposing the syntactic and semantic moves that
originally created
this ancient conundrum --
whereby predicate expressions were transformed into the Proper Names of Abstract
Particulars. To be sure, Aristotle himself half recognised this problem (as we
have seen), but the logic he constructed wasn't sophisticated enough to account for
its source (and thus for its resolution), and he ended up
accepting an early form of this very error, in what turned out to be a precursor of the
Identity Theory of Predication,
discussed in Part One (this links directly to a downloadable .doc file).
On the
other hand, if the aforementioned "third term" (i.e.,
C2from earlier) is superfluous, if a new general term isn't needed in order to
connect an abstraction to each material particular, then it is difficult to see why particulars
themselves need a second term (i.e., C1) to link them, in the first place. This is especially so
if it turns out that this
'general term'
(C1
again) is itself incapable of doing the job assigned to it -- once more, because it has been transmogrified
into a particular itself, or the Proper Name thereof!
But, if
objects in the world can, and do, relate to one another without a whole gamut
of abstract
intermediaries (which are, after all, the metaphysical equivalent of the
Crystalline Spheres or the
Epicycles of Ptolemaic Astronomy) -- or, perhaps better, if speakers manage to use general terms with ease
every day of their lives without all this fuss --, what need is there for
these 'abstractions' to begin with?1bb
Alternatively, if the relation between
Universals and Particulars isn't one of resemblance (i.e., if C1
fails to resemble A or B), then the relation between each
particular and its Ideal 'exemplar' must itself be mysterious. If Universals and
Particulars don't resemble one another, it what way can they possibly be
connected; how could the one connect the other two?
Indeed,
it is far from clear what a Universal could possibly supply a particular
that our use of general worlds can't provide, anyway -- and that worry isn't helped when it
is recalled that, in Traditional Thought, Universals were pictured in
a way that deprived them of the capacity to fulfil the very role that had been
assigned to them -- i.e., accounting for generality.1b
There
is a 'more important' logical 'principle' buried in the detail here, the problem
of self-predication, which arises in this context when we ask whether, say, the Form of
the Small is itself small, or the Form of the Heavy is itself heavy:1bc
Here
are the above few examples, translated into quasi-Plato-speak in P1a and P2a:
P1:
Small is small.
P2:
Heavy is heavy.
P1a:
The Form of The Small is small.
P2a:
The Form of The Heavy is heavy.
It is
argued that in P1, for example, the predicate, "small", is predicated of the
other predicate, "Small" (now misleadingly acting as the subject term), which results in
'self-predication'. But, the first "small" in
P1 is no longer a predicate; it now functions as the Proper Name of the
abstract particular, 'Small' (indeed, as we saw in
Part One). Of
course, what we actually have here is a predicate expression, "ξ
is small" attached to a subject term, "Small".
[As we also saw in Part One,
calling "small" a predicate, as opposed to referring to "ξ is small"
as a predicative expression creates the sort of confusions that plagued Traditional
Philosophy for over two thousand years; no less so here. Readers are referred back to Note 15a of Part
One for more details -- also briefly covered below.]
Well, this
would be a 'more important' logical principle if it weren't based on
the above transmogrification of predicate expressions into singular terms, which
in turn means
that nothing has actually been self-predicated. That is because there has
been no predication applied to a predicate expression in P1 or P2 -- i.e., there
has been no self-predication. What has happened is that a predicate expression has
been
attached to a singular term that is typographically identical to part of the
predicate expression itself.
This
confusion has arisen largely because of two inter-related factors:
(i)
Those taken in by this confusion focussed on superficial linguistic factors
-- i.e., if something looks like a predicate expression it must
be a
predicate expression --, instead of examining the logical role such terms occupy in
indicative sentences; and,
(ii)
Their adoption of an Ancient Greek interpretation of predicate expressions (again, covered in
Part One of this
Essay).
If
you regard a predicate expression as an inscription of some sort (for
example, "heavy" or "small"), but not the linguistic expression of a rule (for
example, "ξ is heavy", or "ξ is small"),
then it will seem legitimate to swap their roles in indicative sentences,
inserting these inscriptions into the role occupied by singular/subject terms. So,
putting "heavy" and "small" at the beginning of P1 and P2, for instance, will
look quite legitimate when all that that move will have achieved is to change
what had been a general noun into a singular term, meaning it is no longer
operating as a predicate expression. So, in P1, for example, the word "small" at the
beginning is no longer a predicate expression but a singular term, a Proper Noun
(that now names a mythical Abstract Particular, 'Small').
[The
word "inscription"
applies to physical marks on a page/screen/wall/blackboard/whitescreen/cavewall...
that aren't considered random, but are held to be the product of intentionality, part of a natural-, or even a formal-language -- or perhaps
even a work of
art, no matter how 'primitive'.]
On the other hand, if the above were examples of self-predication we would have
to have something like the following:
P1b:
ξ is small is small (sic).
P2b:
ζ is heavy is heavy (sic).
That
would make this 'logical principle' all the more obviously nonsensical.
And
that is why I haven't considered this 'fundamental logical principle' in my
criticism of Plato.
[The
use of Greek symbols and why a predicate expression is the linguistic expression
of a rule were explained in Part One of this Essay,
here and
here.]
Unfortunately, this 'antediluvian error' has been passed
down the centuries to later generations of traditionalists, this ancient fall
from linguistic grace traducing the entire population of flawed
'solutions' that have descended from it by unnatural selection --, including its
'poor relation' in DM.
Philosophers of a more practical, and maybe more worldly or
empiricist
frame-of-mind, approached this 'problem' from a different angle; they held that
general terms were 'constructions' of some sort, cobbled together somehow by the 'mind'.
[It is worth
noting that this approach also
implied that the 'mental' side of the exercise takes precedence --
i.e., with 'mind' holding primacy over matter, once more. As we will see,
the 'high road to knowledge' (Rationalism) and the 'low road' (Empiricism) both
motivated Traditional Theorists
to adopt one
form or other of Idealism -- indeed,
as Hegel himself noted --
they were all working within the
Cartesian Paradigm. The
heyday of Empiricism coincided with the rise of the Capitalist Mode of
Production, but that had no noticeable effect on the Idealism explicit, or
implicit, right across the entire spectrum of Traditional Thought in early
modern Europe.]
This line of thought held that the 'mind' was somehow able to 'apprehend' the 'common' elements supposedly
shared by particulars given in experience, which 'mental' ability manifested itself
internally in the production, or the 'processing', of "ideas", "images",
"impressions" or "sense data" -- but, more recently, "qualia"
and "tropes".
Theorists working in this tradition tended to disagree over whether
'universals' were genuine features of reality or were simply a by-product of an
overactive mind --, or, indeed, whether they were merely 'empty terms', and thus perhaps just
"useful
fictions". That view tended to dominate
positivist wing of Empiricism.
As things turned out these differences of opinion mattered little; given this overall view, general words
(common nouns) were once
again demoted, having now been transformed into the names of 'mental particulars' of one sort or
another -- i.e., they were in fact the Proper Names
of ideas located in each head). Even though
Berkeley saw
the importance of escaping from this theoretical
cul-de-sac -- these 'abstractions' -- his 'solution' only succeeded in sinking the Empiricist Tradition deeper
into the same old Idealist quick sands.
Unfortunately, there were far more serious problems over and above those bequeathed to empiricist thought as a result of the syntactical sins of their
philosophical forebears (covered in
Part One), which this tradition also shared with the Rationalists, namely:
these 'general' ideas were in fact particular
to each mind. [On this view, that had to be the case since no two
individuals share the 'same mind' or had the same experiences.] In that case, these
'ideas' couldn't be
general across an entire population, not just in fact, but in theory! This
meant that each supposedly general idea was exclusive to each individual.
As Bertell Ollman pointed
out, this approach to abstraction and generality only succeeded in creating
a private language unique to each lone abstractor, which in turn would mean that
inter-subjective communication was impossible.
The 'process of
abstraction' as it had been conceived by these Empiricists simply created yet moreAbstract
Particulars --, or the Proper Names thereof
-- just as earlier versions of the
'same process' had manufactured all those Rationalist Abstract Particulars. The Empiricist Tradition seemed quite
happy to accept, and then elaborate upon, these ancient mistakes. This particular set of "ruling ideas" (i.e., a
commitment to abstractionism and the existence of 'abstractions') now succeeded
in colonising early modern, petty-bourgeois brains.
So:
assume thinker, T1,
has formed the 'general
idea', G1,
of whatever it supposedly represents -- call it "g1"
--, and thinker, T2,
formed the 'same' 'general idea', G2,
of supposedly the 'same' property, object or process, g1. Now, in order to say of these 'general ideas'
(G1
and G2)
that they are indeed ideas of the
same things (or, indeed, were even the same general idea), a third term will be
required to connect them. That is because, in this case G1
and G2
would both presumably be exemplars of the same general, general idea (that is no
mis-print!),G),
so that it could truly be said that these two were instances of the same
'concept', 'idea', or 'impression'. Of course, as noted above, if this weren't
the case (if there were no general term linking the general terms in each head),
communication would be impossible. [More on that
later.]
Hence, if intrepid Abstractor, A, forms an
idea of green1,
based on her perception of a series of 'green objects', and Abstractor, B,
forms and idea of
green2
in a similar way, then in order to determine that these were in fact two ideas of 'green
itself' (or were 'the same idea of green', whatever that means), a new term will be needed to connect them, namely
"green itself". Without that, there would be
no way of deciding that these two had formed a common idea of green, but had
instead formed two different ideas of 'green'. Worse still, if there were no third connecting term,
there would be no way of deciding they had any idea at all of green, or
even if there were two or more occurrences of what might even be taken to be green1,
that they were actual occurrences of green1.
The same problem also plagues each abstractor with respect to their own ideas
since they would need a linking term connecting the idea they had of 'green'
yesterday with one entertained today.
[For those
who think colour terms, and other 'secondary
properties'/'qualities', are subjective and don't exist in the 'outside
world', just replace
"green1"
and "green2"
with
"table1"
and "table2",
or
"flat surface1"
and "flat
surface2".
In order to connect them we would need a third term, such as "table
itself", "tabularity", or "flat surface itself". The rest follows as before. I
have dealt with the incoherent idea that colours exist only in 'the mind' in
Essay Thirteen Part One, here.]
So, for this
theory to work,
a third linking term would be required -- but where that might have come from
is a
mystery given Empiricism, since it can't have come 'from experience' without the same problem
arising.
Plainly, this 'new term' is now susceptible to
Aristotle's objection, which means that every single 'solution' concocted by those working in the Empiricist Tradition suffered from the same
fatal defect that blighted those that had been dreamt up by the Rationalists.
Without this 'new linking term' (which once more can't have come from experience)
all communication would flounder. But, since we do
manage to
communicate nearly every day of our lives, this theory isn't even plausible.
[It could be argued that human beings regularly
fail to communicate, so the above conclusions are misguided. I have batted that
objection out of the park,
here.]
As we will see, this not only makes it
impossible for every single Traditional Theorist -- indeed, those drawn from right across the
philosophical spectrum -- to account for inter-communication,
representation and learning, it also emptied generality of all content,
vitiating the whole exercise.
[Exactly how this approach to knowledge would make communication (etc.) impossible will be
re-examined below, but in more detail in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
Of course, it could be objected that such
ideas had intentional
generality built into them --, whereby their inventors intended they
should refer to general features of reality. But, as should seem obvious,
'intentional generality' is similarly trapped in a
solipsistic
universe, since it is itself the Proper Name of a particular.
[To see this, just replace "G1"
with "intentionally general idea, G1"
in the above argument; the rest
follows.]
Indeed,
simply gluing the word "general" onto the word "concept" (perhaps
as part of
an 'intention' to refer to a "general concept") would merely saddle
prospective users of that word with a term born of the same defective logic, for
the phrase "general concept" is the Proper Name of a yet another particular.
In fact,
given
this family of traditional theories in this area any attempt to derive
generality from the atomised conceptual fragments that float randomly into each
individual head via the senses (or which are cobbled together in 'the mind') will always hit the same brick wall:
abstraction only succeeds in creating the Proper Names of abstract
particulars --, whoever
indulges in it, whenever it is practiced, and with
whatever 'noble philosophical intentions' it is
performed.
Fortunately for genuine
materialists,
the logic of predication (as it features in
ordinary discourse) has already loaded the dice and fixed the result in their favour --, and there is
no leave to appeal its uncompromising verdict.Generality is a feature of the way we use words, not a property of those words
themselves -- or, indeed, a property of the 'images', 'ideas', 'impressions' or 'signs' that supposedly
underpin, or are represented by, such words.
It could be countered that
inter-communication isn't in fact threatened by empiricist versions of abstractionism,
since communication with others is not only possible, it is actual; manifestly, people share their ideas.
But, quite apart from the above response
assuming what was to be proved, it runs aground almost
immediately. That is because it reproduces Aristotle's original problem --
only now greatly magnified. It is an even worse idea to multiply one's
difficulties by a factor of several billion -- right across the entire human
race -- in an endeavour to account for generality by an appeal to the
abstractions forged, and now trapped in each socially-atomised skull. [On this,
see the next sub-section.]
[To see this, just replace the "G1"
or "G2" with"G3
toGn",
where "n" can take any value from one to six billion, or more, in the
above argument, and the rest will still
follow.]
In that case, we wouldn't just have the
two
theorists mentioned above with their two
(supposedly) individually-formed 'general' ideas of 'green' ('table' or 'flat
surface'), we would have billions of 'minds', with countless
individual ideas of 'green' ('table' or 'flat surface') to interconnect.
And the same
difficulties will confront anyone who sought their own general solution to this
spurious problem. A
strategy along these lines is doomed to fail because any explanation of how the particular ideas of
general terms located in each separate head actually resemble the same
general features of reality they allegedly express, reflect or mirror -- or even the
same particular ideas of these (supposedly) general terms located in anyone
else's head --, would require its own linking term on the lines explored
earlier. Accounting for them
would, of course, make squaring the circle look like child's play in comparison.
This
pointless task
would simply create yet more abstract
particulars locked in the individual mind of anyone foolish enough to
try.
Struggling to escape these metaphysical
quicksands will only suck the trapped Philosopher deeper. Given
the traditional approach, Abstract Particulars are required at every turn as yet more Abstract Particulars
are required to account for the last batch that had just been introduced.
Since none of them is capable
of evolving into a higher general form by its own efforts, this approach to
knowledge simply creates an endlessly ascending series of
Abstract Particulars.
Just as
Rationalist ideas grew out of aristocratic notions concocted by Greek Philosophers
-- concerning the 'natural' or
divine hierarchical order that underpins the Universe that was itself motivated by the
pressing need to
'justify' ruling-class power, social stratification, exploitation, oppression
and inequality --, the origin of more recent Atomist and Empiricist theories of 'Universals'
were connected with the novel ideological landscape created by the rise of post-Renaissance, early modern Bourgeois 'democracy', with its characteristic emphasis
on "possessive
individualism". [On that, see also Note 2.]
If this new social
and political order was meant to be
democratic (but only "within certain limits"), founded on the presumed
psychology, or the self-serving 'rationality' of the fabled
Bourgeois Individual,
then private ownership in the means of 'mental production'made eminent
good sense.
The fragmentation introduced into society by
the break-up of Feudal relations of production and the rise of Capitalism was mirrored by an analogous
splintering of
the old Aristotelian 'Universals', now rebranded as just so many 'ideas' scattered across countless
epistemologically-isolated bourgeois skulls. Out of the window went the 'necessary' connection
presumed to exist
between an object and its properties, or a subject and its predicates, by Ancient
Greek Rationalists and some Medieval theologians. Along with that went the link between a general term and what
it supposedly represented, or reflected, in 'reality' and in 'the mind'.
But, these moves threatened the 'rationality' of the universe: if
the connection between an object and its properties is merely
adventitious, then nature can't be 'rational', and that meant 'God
Himself' couldn't be rational, either. If the cosmic, and, therefore, the
political order, which bestowed 'legitimacy' on Kings and Queens, as well as on
hierarchy, was
still capable of being justified, this 'necessary' connection had to be restored as a
matter of urgency.
[I have said
more about this metaphysical aspect of Christian Theology,
below.]
This
helps explain why Hegel adopted the Identity Theory of Predication (mentioned
earlier), since that theory (alongside its
associated concepts) sought to re-configure and re-establish these
'necessary' connections, which then formed an integral part of his
response to
Hume's criticism of
rationalist theories of causation.
Just as capitalism increasingly 'freed' workers from the land and from feudal
ties, so Empiricism 'freed'
bourgeois ideas from all those 'oppressive', aristocratic Platonic 'Forms' and Aristotelian
'Universals'. The old
ontological pecking-order began to fall apart as new market conditions swept all
before them. Despite this, the need still remained to 'justify' undemocratic,
hierarchical state power, and then rationalise the newly emerging class relations that began to crystallise in
early modern Europe. This meant that
ruling-class theorists
now had to find novel ways of conceptualising
'bourgeois reality', showing that it too was 'god'-ordained or 'natural'.
In this respect,
Empiricism couldn't
cut mustard. A fresh wave of Rationalist thought was urgently needed in
order to: (i) Counter thisdangerous fragmentation of knowledge,
(ii)Re-configure
the sort of
Metaphysical Holism required by the
newly-emerging,
Absolutist
Nation States, and (iii) Rationalise
'god'-given, regal sovereignty. The theories concocted by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz,
Wolff,
Kant
and Hegel proved to be exactly what was required as fresh waves of Metaphysics
flowed freely from the pens of these ruling-class ideologues.1c0
As part of
this, it
wasn't just workers who got screwed
by this 'market economy' (but now in a new way), general ideas were similarly
shafted (but in the same old way).1c
However, this return to Rationalism was philosophically futile; the fragmentation of general ideas
(accomplished by Ancient Greek theorists) can't be reversed --
whoever tries to do it -- unless and until the syntactic sins of
yesteryear have themselves been addressed, and reversed.
No surprise then that, despite countless
claims to the contrary, these newly-concocted, 'modern' theories found it equally
impossible to account for the very thing they had been invented to explain:
generality.
If generality is
merely an aspect,
or a consequence, of
'the mind's operation' (but not a feature of 'things-in-themselves' -- as some
rationalists at least claimed), it was far from easy to see what it was about
each particularidea of the general that actually made it general, or even
appear to be general, especially now that they had been
re-located
in each individual bourgeois skull.2
Given this 'modern' approach, there would be
nothing but
individual ideas loosely tied together in a manner that became increasingly
difficult to fathom, let alone explain, floating about in each socially-atomised head.
[Recall, it
was assumed by early bourgeois theorists (both empiricist and rationalist) that we
construct our own knowledge of the world as individuals. It is also worth
pointing out that I am not arguing that they were actually socially-isolated,
only that as far as their theory of knowledge was concerned, they might
just as well have been.]
At a
minimum, given this theory, even a general idea like this (i.e., that
which apparently concerns "every individual", and which tries to tell us what
takes place inside each skull -- soon to be re-Christened "Thought", "The
Understanding", or even "Speculative Reason") is devoid of any clear sense. If
philosophers couldn't account for generality -- largely because they had killed it
stone dead a good two thousand years earlier --, they
had no way of accounting for its appearance anywhere else,
either in the general population,
or in the privacy of their own heads. How is it even possible to
speak about "every head" with anything other than an empty
term if
generality had already been laid to rest, including the general nature
of the term "head" itself?2a
To be
sure, some attempt might be made
to
attachanother, yet-to-be-explained term to the word "idea" -- i.e., "general",
as in "general idea" --, but, if all
meaningful words in circulation have to be backed by genuine 'mental
bullion' (i.e., if they all have to be cashed-out in terms of 'ideas' held in the
mind', as this family of theories consistently maintained), then a
phrase like "the general idea of..." would itself still be a
particularin 'the mind' of whomsoever had used it, whatever
associationist or "clear and distinct", incantations had been uttered over it.
Given the results of
Part One it should now seem reasonably clear that because the
traditional analysis
of predication turned general words into singular terms (Proper Names and
Definite Descriptions), each of which named an
Abstract
Particular, then the sentence, "This is the general idea of F" must
suffer the same fate, since the phrase, "the general idea of F",
is yet another singular term designating anAbstract Particular! The definite article, of course, gives
the game away.
So it was thatin the
Empiricist
Tradition there followed several more centuries of
a priori, 'science-on-the-cheap', this time backed not
even by printed currency, just more empty words.
[It might be
objected that Empiricist
Epistemology is a
posteriori, not a priori. Well, so the official brochure would have us
believe; but it had always been predicated on
rather fanciful, a priori psychology, supported by what was in effect science fiction. (I
have said more about this in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.)]
To suppose otherwise
-- that the
word "general", or any other term, for that matter, is capable of creating generality by its
own efforts -- would be
tantamount to thinking that words themselves are capable of determining,
and then projecting, their own meaning across the whole of 'semantic space' (with this trick miraculously coordinated
inside every single epistemologically-isolated bourgeois head), as if they
were autonomous agents, not the individuals who used those words. But, unaided
-- as a simple mark on the page or
even as an "idea" in the head -- the word "general" seems
utterly incapable of rising to the challenge, creating generality out of thin
air.
On the other hand, if general
ideas are capable of representing, or of "reflecting", "things-in-themselves" (that is, if there are
indeed 'real universals' that exist 'somewhere', to which general words supposedly
'correspond' or 'refer') -- as the scientific realist
wing of this traditional approach to epistemology and ontology maintained -- it would surely prove
difficult to explain the
mode of signification of
the term "general idea" without admitting it was no longer general, as we are about to find out.
If each general idea,
or word, does indeed refer to
something, somewhere, in reality -- in Platonic Heaven, Hegelian Hell, or
anywhere else, for that matter -- they could only do so if they functioned as
Singular Terms.
But, as we saw in
Part One, if that
were so, general
ideas/general words, couldn't in fact be general, justsingular.2b
As Donald
Davidson remarked with respect to Aristotle's theory -- but it might well be
applied to any other general term so transformed -- quoted earlier:
"Aristotle again and again reverts to
the claim that if the forms are to serve as universals, then they cannot be
separate from the entities of which they are properties. Aristotle agrees with
Plato that universals, like the forms, are the objects of scientific study....
Where Aristotle differs from Plato was in holding that universals are not
identical with the things of which they are properties, they exist only by
virtue of the existence of the things of which they are properties. If
universals existed independently, they would take their place alongside the
things that instantiate them. Separate existence is just what would make
universals like other particulars and thus no longer universal. But doesn't this argument show Aristotle to be confused?
If universals can be talked about, they can be referred to. Yet whatever can be
referred to is a particular. Confusion seems to have set in: universals are both
particulars and at the same time necessarily distinct from particulars."
[Davidson (2005), pp.89-90. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]
Even
if each 'bourgeois mind' had its own idea of a given 'general name', and one that was particular to each
individual head, the
universality that post-Renaissance theorists sought would forever remain
elusive, fragmented as it now was in the socially-isolated skulls of all who played this
futile game.
[I have
explained what I mean by "socially-isolated",
here.]
As Davidson
noted, if
anything that is supposed to begeneral is capable of being given a Proper Name,
or referred to by means of a singular term, it can't be
general, but must be particular.
And
generality,
rather like virginity, once lost can't be
restored.3
Empiricists attempted to solve these
intractable 'problems' by the simple expedient of diverting attention from
them. They
invented an irrelevant 'mental' capacity, an ability the 'mind' supposedly
possessed that 'enabled' it to 'discern' resemblances between the various 'impressions',
'images, 'ideas' the senses
sent its way -- or which were subsequently cobbled-together from them.
But, once again, Aristotle's objection rears
its annoying head: if there is a problem over the 'resemblances' that exist
between objects of a certain sort in
'external reality', it is a bad idea to retreat from the Real into the Ideal in
an attempt to resolve it. Indeed, if this process is hidden
away in
the 'mind', the philosophical 'problem' this approach sought to resolve will now
only
resurface in a completely intractable form, since inner processes like this
are beyond both objective and subjective investigation.4
Generality, driven inwards
in this way,
is even more difficult to coax out of solitary confinement.5
Platonic
Realism,
Aristotelian Conceptualism
and Bourgeois Empiricism (along with a host of other metaphysical doctrines that
attempted to address this pseudo-problem) all
ran aground on these unyielding rocks.
By way of contrast, ordinary language enables the expression of generality when
it is
left to social agents to use it. But, the general nouns they employ soon lose their
generality when they
are replaced by the abstract singular terms introduced by Traditional
Philosophers.6
However, by placing all the emphasis on
an
individual's apprehension of generality (howsoever that was
conceived in the 'mind'),
theorists found they could only account for generality by surreptitiously
re-employing it elsewhere.
This unfortunate turn-of-events arose largely
because Traditional Philosophers tended to conceive of this conundrum
epistemologically, perhaps even psychologically. Unfortunately, the logical fall from grace that
gave life to the
original 'problem' in Ancient Greece (discussed in detail in
Part One) was simply ignored,
buried under centuries of irrelevant psycho-babble. And there it largely
remains entombed to this day.6a0
As Empiricists conceived
of things, if
experience presents the 'mind' with
particular ideas, then generality must be constructed from whatever
resemblances the mind 'notices' in each assumed exemplar (the mind now replacing
the individual concerned; more about that surreptitious move
later). This made the whole 'problem'
look as if it depended on an individual's inner 'recognitional capacities'
(echoes of Plato here), as if the fragmented contents of
the 'mind' -- these 'ideas', 'impressions' or 'concepts' -- were like the
faces of long lost friends and relatives who had wandered fortuitously into the same room, and
in some sort of order.
Friends one can recognise;
but how
could anyone recognise an idea they had never seen before?
Worse still, none of these
impressions or ideas would resemble the next in line without the use of the general terms this
'theory' was itself meant to explain.
"Ah, here is yet another (impression of a) cat!" could never legitimately be uttered by an
empiricist at the beginning of their associationist career, since, at best, what they
really meant was "Ah, here is yet another impression/image/sensation of something
I haven't yet got a word for...". And, as that empiricist's career progressed,
all they would be able to do is give their 'idea' of a cat -- but, where that
word had come from
was left unsurprisingly mysterious -- the Proper Name "CAT",
thereby neutralising its generality.
Of course,
the usual response here is that each individual comes to associate words
like "cat" with their ideas/impressions of that animal. I return to discuss the
defunct, 'associationist psychology', that lies behind this theory
later on in this Essay. It is
sufficient to point out here that such associations would be triggered by the
word "mammal" and "animal" as much as they would be by "cat". There are also problems
with co-extensive terms, for example, "red" is co-extensive with "colour"
which associations can't discriminate between. [On this see, Cowie (2002) and
Mandelbaum (2020).]
Anyway, given this family of theories,
general terms had to be distilled painstakingly from a manifestly finite
range of examples, those that confronted each lone abstractor, or observer, as
the whim took them, or as their 'mind' processed them.
But, if each
socially-isolated 'mind' is supposed to extrapolate
successfully from the few particulars fortune sent its way, then, in
order to construct from them the relevant 'abstract general idea', each 'sensation', 'impression', 'idea', or 'quale' (singular of qualia)
would have to be given a suitably general make-over.
In order to do that,
the 'mind' would have to re-connect each epistemological atom (these 'sensations', 'impressions', 'ideas', or
'qualia', again) with others of the 'same
sort', using whatever similar features it happened to notice in each. But, not only
does this make it difficult to explain how any two lone abstractors could ever form
the same idea of anything, it makes the whole process dependent on suspiciously loose notions
of "similarity", a term whose use depends on generality itself.
So, if
two 'impressions', a and b, are said to share a "similar"
property, designated by the use of a common noun, F -- so that it might
be judged that a is Fandb is F, too, and hence
determined that a is similar to b in so far as they both share
F -- plainly that would only be possible if F were already a general term, otherwise it couldn't be shared,
or collect a and b together in its "extension".
This new
twist only succeeded in introducing a
generalidea through the back door while failing to explain either
the general or the particular that had just slipped out the front. If the two
'impressions' mentioned above are indeed similar, then that would be so with respect to some feature,
F, that they
both held in common, which feature (of necessity) can't itself be
another particular (or it couldn't be held in common).
Hence,
in
order to rescue generality from such radical particularisation a new general term
had to be smuggled back in while no one was looking.7
However, just as theologians discovered
long ago -- in relation to their Doctrine of the Trinity (expressed in, for example, the
Athanasian Creed: "Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the
substance") --, empiricists found that with regard to their fragmentary ideas of
generality, it was impossible for them not to confound the particular
without dividing the Universal.6b
Hence, if each individual shares exactly the same universal ofresemblance (call it, G), then that term will be both particular
and unique to that individual
abstractor,
as we found was the case with "CAT", earlier. The 'general' having thus been distributed
over the entire set of novice abstractors can't fail to inherit its already fragmented nature.
Hence, G will be now be fragmented. So, for example, each abstractor will
have their own unique, 'mental' idea, 'CAT', which would resemble no one else's
idea, 'CAT'. So, unless someone (call her, "NM") had access to the
content of every 'mind' involved -- but who could also by-pass these
'abstractive processes' and declare every idea
was the same as every other,
that judgement not having been based on NM's
own 'ideas', but on 'reality itself' --, no one would be able to declare that
all these abstractors had the same idea, 'CAT'.
[NM
would have to by-pass these 'processes', otherwise her ideas would be locked
in the same epistemological dungeon, and would therefore be no use at all in
this respect.]
Conversely, if the
above distribution of
generality hadn't been carried out in a perfectly egalitarian manner, the
relevant particulars wouldn't have been collected together under the same general term,
shared
equally between all.
However,
if, say, Ghad been shared equally across an entire population, so that every
abstractor had exactly the same idea (for example, of 'CAT'),
individuality would be lost.
So, in these
terms the general is either divided (and is unique to each abstractor) or the particulars are confounded
(since their ideas are all identical).
[These points depend on an
earlier argument, and might not be fully
appreciated by
anyone who hasn't read it.]
In that case, the choice between confounding
the individuals or dividing the substance (i.e., dividing the general) plagued
Empiricists and Rationalists alike, just as it had the Trinitarians -- and for the same basic reason.
That is because this entire family of doctrines
descended with modification from same ancient
syntactic screw up we met in Part One.
These problems don't, of course, stop there.
Nor do they become any the less intractable.
Answers to questions that
focus on how the 'Mind' sifts through the 'ideas' or 'impressions' of
particulars that the senses supposedly send its way, or how it manages to place them correctly
in the
right sortal groups, would surely have to appeal to a previous grasp (of some
sort, at some level) of general words by the individual concerned in order to do just that, as we saw
in the previous sub-section.
This is
something that Kant certainly began to realise in his own
confused way (confused
since he located this 'sorting' faculty in 'the mind', ignoring the public use of
language):
"Our cognition arises from
two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception of
representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second of the faculty for
cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts);
through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is
thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the
mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our
cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in
some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition....
"Thoughts without content are
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." [Kant (1998),
pp.193-94, A51/B75. Bold emphases in the original. By "intuition" Kant meant
something like "immediate experience" -- Caygill (1995), pp.262-66.]
"Our knowledge springs from
two main sources in the mind, first of which is the faculty or power of
receiving representations (receptivity for impressions); the second is the power
of cognizing by means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of
conceptions). Through the first an object is given to us; through the second, it
is, in relation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the
mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions constitute, therefore, the elements of
all our knowledge, so that neither conceptions without an intuition in some way
corresponding to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a
cognition." [Online
version of the above. As we saw in Part One,
Hegel also made a similar point,
except he claimed what Kant called intuition was already conceptualised.]
Absent this necessary pre-condition (i.e., the public use of
language), inter-subjective 'objectivity' would be an vacuous notion.
Indeed, this is just another way of saying that 'impressions' and 'ideas' can't
be expected to sort themselves neatly into groups (as if they were
autonomous agents), since
they have neither the wit nor the intelligence to do so. Even for Kant, they
required
some form of regimentation, externally imposed on them. [That is,
regimentation external to these 'impressions'.]
However, in the age-old battle between the
One and
the Many, the Many have always shown themselves to be far too 'uncivilised'
and unruly, so to speak, to marshal
themselves voluntarily in the required manner, while the One was itself far too Ideal (and thus
far too weak) to crack the
whip. Even so, if
some form of regimentation is to be considered possible, 'principles'
external to these unruly 'impressions' and 'ideas' (the Many) must be found
in order to lend the 'Mind' (the One)
a helping hand. Never was care in the community of ideas more needed than
here. And yet, if these 'impressions' and 'ideas' are to become more than a heap of
'conceptual dust', 'care' must be sought elsewhere.
[Henceforth,
in order to save on needless repetition, I will just refer to 'ideas', but
readers should assume I also mean 'impressions'.]
As seems plain, the
sortal
'principles' necessary to keep these disorderly 'ideas' in check can't be self-explanatory, nor can they be
self-regulating. If they were, then there would seem to be no reason
why that couldn't also be the case with these 'ideas' themselves --, or,
indeed, why 'ideas' couldn't be expected to troop unaided into the right metaphysical categories, certifying their own inter-subjective 'resemblance' with others of the 'same
kind', without a 'drill-sergeant' to whip them into shape.
Indeed, if every 'idea' were
indeedcapable of self-regulation, or of self-sorting, that would
surely remove the need for a 'Mind' and its
attendant goons to do the regimenting.
Clearly, the first of the above
two options would see the
'Mind', or it's 'principles', as some sort of 'drill-sergeant', thus anthropomorphising it/them; the second
would throw this 'sergeant' on the scrap heap, implying these 'ideas' were
autonomous agents (anthropomorphising them, too).
[There are
faint echoes of both halves of the above dilemma in
Cognitive Psychology and
Behaviourism;
the former anthropomorphises the brain (picturing it as some sort of diminutive
human being lodged inside each skull, an
homunculus), the latter scraps the 'Mind' altogether, leaving ideas to
fend for themselves. (There is much
more on this in Essay Thirteen Part Three.)]
Of course, Empiricists claimed that the
'Mind' was somehow capable of extrapolating way beyond the limited number
of 'ideas' the senses sent its way, extending all theway toward
general ideas, which 'resemblances' supposedly motivated. However, this
'solution' left it unexplained exactly how these 'extrapolations' might be carried out without the 'Mind'
already having some notion of the general to guide it.
And, as Kant
might have wondered: Where on earth
could that come from?
Nevertheless, if particulars are to be
marshalled, or 'cognised', into the correct sortal groups by the 'Mind' and its
'principles', there would seem to
be only two ways this might be achieved:
(A) The first
involved a reference to specific 'mental faculties' (these days called, "modules")
that every novice abstractor supposedly possessed, or to which they have
automatic, even privileged, access, to do the regimenting for them -- mental "bodies of armed
men", as it were. Bourgeois Ideas, supposedly born free, would
everywhere have to be clapped in chains. This is the 'mental' equivalent, perhaps,
of the Absolutist State.
(B) The
second appealed to the 'natural propensities' that 'ideas'
supposedly possessed, which meant that they were capable of regimenting themselves,
marching
'voluntarily' into the right boxes with no outside assistance. This
is the 'mental equivalent', perhaps, of an
Anarchist 'Utopia'.
Taking each in turn:
(A) One
version of this alternative postulated the existence of "innate
principles", 'programmed' into the mind, activated or guided either
by the "laws of thought", the "natural light of reason", or
some other handy a priori 'mental architectonic'. [Caygill
(1995), pp.84-85.]
[Modern analogues
of this bourgeois 'mental assembly-line' have these factors 'hard-wired' in the brain as a sort of "transformational
grammar" (now called "Unbounded
Merge"), or even a "Language
of Thought." On this, see Cowie (2002).]
An older version of
this
specific alternative held that 'innate
ideas' were capable somehow, at some level, of motivating aspiring abstractors
themselves, allowing
them to classify each particular under the relevant. 'correct' general term.
How each individual knew what was 'correct' and what was 'incorrect', and how they
might agree with one another across an entire population, we must pass over in silence
-- largely because those who adopted this alternative passed over them in silence,
too.
Of
course, this places Option (A) squarely in the
Rationalist Camp, and perhaps because of that the temptation became
irresistible to bury the source of these 'innate principles' in the mists
of time -- boosted of late with a barrage of
Neo-Darwinian
fairy-tales back-projected into the
Pleistocene
-- original
syntax now based on Genetics, not Genesis.8
Other versions of
alternative (A)
weren't even remotely Empiricist, either; they made a confident appearance in the
Cartesian-Leibnizian-Kantian-Hegelian tradition of a priori myth-making.
Nevertheless, each variant shared the same
fundamental premiss: abstract concepts/ideas were alive and well, and were
either living in a skull near you, or were perhaps camped out somewhere in
'objective' reality waiting to be enlisted to the cause -- presumably,
by merely being thought-about by a suitably well-motivated 'abstractor'.
Even more convenient
was the additional fact that
although abstract ideas were held somehow to be real, they also
transcended actual or possible experience; indeed, in
this they resembled the
'gods' of yore. And, as was the case with those
Ancient Divinities, these abstractions underpinned, gave substance to, or
even created the material world we see around us -- for example, when
they 'self-developed' in
Hegel's Hermetic House of Horrors.
Given this approach, abstract ideas
are
in fact more real
than the material objects and processes we encounter every day. The latter were debased, lowly,
contingent
entities
-- fit only for destruction,
according to Hegel
--, hardly
worth mentioning in Ideal company.
Moreover, since these abstractions could be given
--
and had been given --
rather
grandiose
names they
mustsurely exist somewhere. Linguistic
reification
now transformed them, somehow rendering them Super-Real -- since
their 'ontological' status was, of course, above and beyond that of those unreliable
'appearances' -- meaning they alone were capable of generating and then
guaranteeing the
Super-Scientific
Truths of Traditional Metaphysics. As James White pointed out (quoted earlier):
"Already with
Fichte
the
idea of the unity of the sciences, of system, was connected with that of finding
a reliable starting-point in certainty on which knowledge could be based.
Thinkers from
Kant onwards were quite convinced that the kind of knowledge which came from
experience was not reliable. Empirical knowledge could be subject to error,
incomplete, or superseded by further observation or experiment. It would be
foolish, therefore, to base the whole of knowledge on something which had been
established only empirically. The kind of knowledge which Kant and his followers
believed to be the most secure was a priori knowledge, the kind embodied
in the laws of Nature. These had been formulated without every occurrence of the
Natural phenomenon in question being observed, so they did not summarise
empirical information, and yet they held good by necessity for every case; these
laws were truly universal in their application." [White (1996a), p.29. In
fact, Rationalists since Plato's day had already concluded this.]
Even better,
our ancestors had helpfully, if not playfully, buried these 'abstractions' in the subject-copula-predicate
form, even if this cosmically important linguistic device onlyshowed its face in the
Indo-European
family of languages, rarely anywhere else.
As we saw in
Part One of this Essay,
science-on-the-cheap like this has dominated practically all forms of Traditional Thought since
Thales and
Anaximander
both
walked the earth -- it is, indeed, one of the "ruling ideas":
"The ideas of the
ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the
ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual
force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has
control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby,
generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production
are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal
expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material
relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one
class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals
composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and
therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine
the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its
whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of
ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age:
thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Marx and Engels
(1970), pp.64-65, quoted from
here.
Bold emphases added.]
(B) The
second of the above two Options implied that 'ideas' congregated 'naturally'
of their own efforts into the 'correct' pigeon holes. However, if they are capable of
assembling themselves into classes under their own steam,
they must possess a 'herding instinct' of some sort. Clearly, in order for them to
gather together correctly, they must either:
(B2) Be capable of
'obeying', or being 'guided by', certain specific natural or logical 'laws' of
some sort.
As far as (B1) is concerned, ideas were not
only capable of automatically 'recognising' those of 'the same kind', they were bright enough
and compliant enough to flock together with no further ado. This in turn implied that they
were able to:
(B1a) 'Detect' the resemblances
they shared with others of their clan -- which meant that they
were really
surrogate minds, skilled at identifying their own close 'mental relatives'
correctly, and unerringly. [Echoes of Plato again.]
Alternatively, these spontaneously gregarious
ideas were:
(B1b) 'Programmed' to behave as if they
could act this way.
In short, these two sub-options (B1a and B1b)
traded on the further belief that:
B1a(i): Ideas were just minds writ small, or
B1a(ii):
Minds were little more than Incarnate
Ideas.
B1a(i) found a safe haven in Leibniz's mind -- whether it was his own idea or he was
programmed to think it was his, is somewhat unclear -- where everything in
the universe was 'really' composed of countless pre-programmed, inter-reflecting
little 'minds' (the "Monads").
B1a(ii), in a much grander, if not grandiose, form
parasitized Hegel's brain. There, Mind was self-developing Idea, the
final Supreme Controller of this Metaphysical Mystery Tour.
To be sure, Hegel certainly
thought he was the engineer of his own ideas, but if he was
right, he was merely theoily rag.
However, in relation to (B2), the implication
seemed to be that natural 'laws' operating on the contents of the 'Mind' could
account for the regimentation of the ideas on offer in strict battalion order -- a theory that
has resurfaced these days in
naturalistic theories
of 'the mind'. Once again, this merely reduplicates the very problem it was
meant to solve, for it implied that an
external 'Will' of some sort ran both the 'inner' and the 'outer' world, as
everything in this 'Mental Cosmos' obeyed
its orders as if they were
law-abiding citizens.
[I have covered this option in more detail in relation to neo-Hegelian ideas
that have coalesced to form the diverse strands of
Critical Realism in Essay Thirteen Part Three,
here.]
Clearly, in order for something to be
capable of obeying orders it must be intelligent (otherwise, a used of the
word "obey" in such contexts must have a different meaning). In like
manner, these 'ideas' must be intelligent, only now they were supposedly
controlled by the 'laws of thought', or some form of cognitive architectonic.
None of these 'ideas' is a
passive lodger in the brain, but an active citizen in this (internal) Cognitive State. In that
case, the Inner
Microcosm
is deemed capable of reflecting the Outer Macrocosm (and
vice versa) -- as mystics never tire of telling us. Accordingly, the 'Mind'
was held to be well-ordered because the Cosmos is (and vice versa;
indeed, this is where the word, "rational", comes from -- on this see Dodds
(1951)).
The Inner and the Outer ('Thought' and 'Being') were capable of knowing or reflecting each other because both were
fundamentally the same, both were 'Mind', or the product of
'Mind'. [There is a distinct echo of this in Kant; a deafening clap of thunder in Hegel.]8ao
Small wonder then that Traditional Theories
of causation (and, indeed, theories of the nature of 'physical law') are shot through
with anthropomorphism, mysticism, and animism, and which can only be made to work if inappropriate
modal terms (like "necessary" and "must") are press-ganged into service.8a
This in turn suggested that
these 'objective laws',
and, indeed, the objects and processes that 'obey' them, were in effect both a reification and projection of the subjective
mental capacities and dispositions of the individual theorists that had been indulging in all this
armchair speculation. These individuals peered into a deep well of metaphysical speculation and,
unsurprisingly,
saw their own faces reflected back at them.9
Conversely,
it implied that the
human mind was intelligent simply because the universe was -- this notion can
be found echoed in the odd idea that the universe became 'conscious of itself' as a
result of the emergence of humanity (a doctrine implicit in Hegel, but openly
propagated by
Teilhard de Chardin,
Bergson, and, more surprisingly, several Marxist dialecticians;
Ted Grant,
for example) --, which conclusion was itself a consequence of the tortured 'logic'
that supposedly mirrored the thoughts of the Superhuman Alter-Ego that allegedly
ran the entire show: 'The Absolute' we met in
Part One.
Given this
set-up, not only was the
Real Rational, and the Rational Real, there was in fact only the Rational,
only the 'Mind'.
Be
this as it may, these two options readily collapsed into one form or other of
Idealism --
Subjective
or
Objective --
indeed, as we have seen.10
Traditional 'solutions' to these bogus
philosophical 'problems' -- "bogus" because, in the 'West', they had
originally been based solely on a
class-motivated misconstrual of a small, unrepresentative grammatical
feature
of Indo-European grammar (as we saw in
Part One of this Essay, and
in
Essay Two).
Unfortunately, the
'solutions' on offer only
succeeded in creating
two further difficulties for Traditional
Philosophers.11
Oddly
enough, both of these 'problems' also re-surfaced in a modified form in the DM-theory of 'abstraction',
as we are about to discover.
In
Traditional Philosophy, the first of these 'difficulties' subsequently came to be known as the "Problem
of Induction". The latter involves the (presumed) theoretical possibility that
future events might fail conform to what might ordinarily be expected of them --
or, to put this another and perhaps more accurate way, future events could fail to be constrained by the conceptual straight-jacket traditional
theory had hitherto set for them.12
This
'problem' is based on the assumed fact that generalisations about the future
course of nature -- when they rely solely on how
certain objects, processes or events have behaved in the past --, can't provide a
deductively
sound basis for the inference that future objects, processes, or events will
always behave in the same way. Or, more generally,
that the course of nature will remain the same (howsoever that is
understood). So, for example, just because
water has always frozen at a certain temperature that doesn't mean that it
will always freeze at that temperature (always assuming the water has the same level of purity, is
cooled at 'normal' atmospheric pressure, etc., etc.). Or, to use David Hume's
example, just because bread has always nourished those who consume it, that
doesn't imply it always will. In that case, there is no
contradiction in supposing it won't.
"All the objects of human
reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, relations of
ideas, and matters of fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry,
algebra, and arithmetic, and in short, every affirmation which is either
intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypotenuse is
equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a
relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of
thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers.
Propositions of this kind
are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is
anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle
in nature, the truths demonstrated by
Euclid would for ever retain their
certainty and evidence.
"Matters of fact, which are
the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor
is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the
foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it
can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same
facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun
will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no
more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain,
therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false,
it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the
mind." [An
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Part I. Link added.
Some paragraphs merged.]
This
idea was brought out rather well
by the following passage:
"But there is a price to be paid for this new
methodology. About a hundred years after
Bacon,
Hume
(1711-1776) pointed out the problem.
'The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me;
that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time,
endued
with such secret powers: But does it follow, that other bread must also
nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be
attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems nowise necessary.'
[This passage is taken from Part II of Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding and can be accessed
here -- RL.]
"If we want to be very careful and not lump
things into the same category, if types are not real, if the only real things
are particular individuals, then there are no general truths about bread. We can
describe the colour, shape, texture, taste and so on of this piece of bread, but
if the general kind 'bread' isn't real, then whatever I learn about this piece
of bread won't help me learn anything about the next piece of bread. That is the
crucial usefulness of real types: if 'cat' is a real type, and not simply a
nominal
type, then whatever I learn about this particular cat will help me understand
all cats. I can learn and know something about how to cure a problem with your
cat if I have studied other cats, as long as they are identical in nature. If
there is no reality to their unity as cats, then every new particular is just a
new thing, and we can learn about it only by studying it; nothing else we study
can possibly help us. So the existence of universals turns out to have a very
profound impact on scientific methodology and epistemology." [Quoted from
here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site; spelling modified to agree with UK English. Links added.]
[I hasten to add that the above doesn't represent
my opinion; I am merely
making a point about the traditional approach to this topic. Where Hume went
wrong was to overlook the fact that if something that is assumed to be bread
fails to nourish us (all things being equal!), we would have good reason to
question whether it was indeed bread. Furthermore, Hume's point borders
on science fiction, which I have dealt with in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
However, as we have seen several times already, traditional 'answers' to the 'problem of Universals'
only succeeded in transforming it into another conundrum involving Abstract Particulars, which, of course, may or may not
themselves behave the same way
the next day as they did the day before. Although these Abstract Particulars might be
Ideal --, 'Heavenly Creatures' of some sort, 'mental entities', or, indeed,
something else -- there is no guarantee that even if they
faithfully tow the line today they will do so tomorrow.
Some might
argue that these are changeless abstractions (although it isn't too clear
that a DM-fan can consistently champion that response), but even if that
were so, the words used to express that very idea aren't abstract, and there is no guarantee
that they will mean the same in the future as they have done in the past -- or even that
our memory of these 'abstractions' will even remain the same. [On that, see
here.]
In short, an
appeal to 'Universals' is no help at all if they turn out to be particulars,
too, which, because of
that, can't guarantee their
own future behaviour without another hierarchy of 'Universals' to do it for them,
and so on ad infinitem.
Of course, any theory
based on the
Heraclitean
Flux (such as DM) only succeeds in sinking itself even deeper in the mire, for if there
is indeed a universal flux, the future can't
resemble the past! And what is worse, the word "resemble" can't even 'resemble' itself!
[The 'relative stability'
argument, which is often wheeled out in reply, has been neutralised
here.]
This 'problem' partly originates in the
mistaken belief that scientific theories are themselves a special kind of truth.
When that idea is abandoned (i.e., that scientific theories are the sorts of
things that are capable of being
either true or false), a solution to the 'problem' of induction soon
suggests itself. [Notice the word "theory" here. I am not impugning scientific
facts -- to state the obvious, facts aren't the same as theories.
These rather controversial claims will be expanded upon and defended in Essay Thirteen Part
Two.]
Nevertheless,
if this 'problem' is posed a little more
acutely, pushing it much further than is usually the case, several remarkable
conclusions soon follow: Since both the
flow of ideas 'in the mind' (or even those 'in the brain' of an Über-Rationalist, like Hegel)
and any sensations that accompany them, are also
events, 'subjective' experience itself can't avoid being thrown into doubt,
which in turn will raise questions about the future behavioureven of 'mental events',
themselves.
In that case
--
but only if we accept this approach to knowledge --, our experience of
anything that
has yet to occur, and this also includes our own futurethoughts, might fail to
'resemble' what it/they had been, or seemed to have been, in the past. Even the
nature of our sensations and ideas could alter from moment to moment, given this
approach to knowledge. If we
experience an idea now as an idea of a certain sort,
it could be experienced or thought of as something totally different
tomorrow, even
though it might prove impossible to say right now what that might be -- either
because we haven't yet the language available to us to do so, or because that language
might itself change before we succeed in uttering anything at all.
Recall,
'abstractions' were invented to provide
some sort of philosophical -- or even
scientific -- stability to the deliverances of the senses. They were supposed to
help provide a secure foundation for knowledge, a basis that transcended the
particular by 'ascending' to the general, which was held to be far superior to ephemeral,
contingent, transient facts based on experience or on 'appearances'.
However,
if we now have to appeal to 'Universals' ('Concepts', 'Categories',
'Principles', 'Ideas' or 'Rules'), all of which have been privately processed,
in order to help guarantee that the aforementioned instability won't affect
knowledge, then because these 'abstractions' are also particulars they are
manifestly no use at all in this regard. That is because these 'Universal' particulars
(for want of a better term!) are subject to the very same questions about
their own future behaviour that already confront ordinary material
particulars. In that case,
no particular -- abstract or concrete -- can provide a secure basis for a
single general conclusion about the future behaviour of other objects, events
and processes. There are no self-certifying ideas to be had here, given this way
of conceiving the 'problem'.
Worse still: any 'solution' to this 'problem'
(should one ever be found!) could itself be experienced as a non-solution
the very next day -- especially if we are foolish enough buy into the Heraclitean Flux.
Naturally, expressed in this way, and
in relation to the thoughts of
theorists who are only too happy to employ the language and concepts of Traditional Philosophy,
any attempt to solve the 'problem' of how the
present 'binds' the future has already lost its way. In fact, as should now seem
obvious, phrases like "The present" and "The future" are particulars, too (or,
they 'refer' to Abstract Particulars alongside with another Abstract Particular,
'Time'), and as such they are incapable of preventing anyone who accepts this
approach to knowledge from
sliding off into fathomless scepticism.
Not even the anti-materialist,
Aristocratic Philosophers who invented it could make head or tail of it.
As we now know --
mainly because it was exposed in Part One of
this Essay -- the original source of these 'difficulties' was a syntactical
blunder committed by Ancient Greek metaphysicians, logicians and grammarians. In
which case, the dissolution of over two millennia of monumentally wasted effort
(mentioned above) recommends itself.
So, if any single 'mind' is capable of experiencing only a finite number of
exemplars from which it has to piece-together the general ideas later attributed
to them, subsequent experience could
always refuse to play ball, metaphysically 'rebelling', as it were.
In that
case, the future might fail to resemble the past in any meaningful sense. Not
only might the Sun fail to rise (tomorrow), and water fail to boil at a given
temperature, but cats might even refuse to walk about on mats -- and
Hegel might even begin to make sense.
Of
course, as noted above, some philosophers have argued that
these 'difficulties' might easily be neutralised if the mind was capable of gaining direct
access to these 'abstract' ideas (Real Universals, General Concepts or Categories, etc.), which were
supposed to be fully capable of regimenting
contingent nature (or, perhaps, the 'impressions' the senses sent
its way), so that the future could be guaranteed to resemble the past -- or, at least,
resemble our previous experience and knowledge of it.
However, in order to control these potentially
'rebellious' ideas, something a little more
robust
than Locke's
Social
Contract and
Hume's feeble
'habits of the mind' were called for. Ancient Greek notions concerning an
ordered
Cosmos
-- a limited Whole, which doctrine was concocted at a time when Idealist
theories like this seemed to make some sort of sense to the ruling-class hacks
who invented it --, didn't harmonise too well with the socially-fragmented, bourgeois world of the
17th
and 18th centuries.
As noted above,
David Hume
attempted to solve this 'problem' by an appeal to rather vague habits of the mind,
which supposedly induce in us certain expectations about the future based on
past experience. Clearly, this nebulous idea is susceptible to the challenges set out above,
as Hume himself half acknowledged.
This is quite apart from the fact that once it is acknowledged that any series of
events in this universe is subject to a sceptical onslaught like this, it is
difficult to see how even 'habits of the mind' can emerge unscathed.
The abandonment of the 'logical' or
necessary connection between a Universal and the particulars that fall under it,
between an object and its
properties (which we met
earlier) that took place
in the High Middle Ages with the rise of
Nominalism
(but the cracks were already forming in Ancient Greece in the work of post-Aristotelian
theorists; the Nominalists merely prised these fissures wide enough for
all to see), introduced radical contingency into Traditional Theories of Nature. This
development
wasn't, of course, unconnected with the decline of the power of the Papacy as
Feudalism itself began to unravel, giving way to early forms of the market economy.
Rationalist
Philosophers (like
Spinoza
and
Leibniz) attempted to repair the damage these 'revisions' had threatened to
inflict on the
'Rational Order' and 'God's relation to 'His' creation. To that end, they
concocted a series 'necessitarian' theories of their own that attempted to
re-establish the logical connection between a given substance and its 'accidents', its
properties. Unfortunately, these
theories were
themselves predicated
on the same old "ruling ideas" -- i.e., on the dogma that, (i) 'Reality' is 'rational', and (ii)
Fundamental 'truths' about 'reality' could be derived from thought alone.
[On the
general background to this, see, for example, Copleston (2003a, 2003b, 2003c).]
Here is how I have made a similar point in Essay Eleven
Part Two -- in
a brief consideration of certain aspects of Christian Fundamentalism and 'Intelligent
Design', which also seems relevant to at least one of the main themes of this Essay:
There
is an excellent summary of the two main avenues theists have taken in
their endeavour to conceive of the
relationship between 'God' and 'His' creation, in Osler (2004), pp.15-35. [Not
unexpectedly, these
neatly mirror the tensions that plague the DM-account of nature, too.]
Here
follows a summary of the relevant parts of Osler's thesis (with a few additional comments of
my own thrown in for good measure):
Traditionally, there were two ways of
conceiving 'God's' relation to material reality:
(a) 'He' is related to it by necessity, as an
expression of 'His' nature, and
(b) 'He' is related to it contingently --
as an expression of 'His' 'free will'.
If (a) were the case,
there would be a logical connection between the properties of created
beings and their 'essence' -- i.e., the logical core of each being, which is either an
expression of its unique nature, or of the 'kind' to which it belongs. In turn, this
would be a consequence of the logical or conceptual links that exist between
'creation' and 'God's Nature'. If that weren't the case, it would introduce radical
contingency into creation, undermining 'God's Nature' and/or 'His'
control of 'Creation'. As a result language and logic must constitute
reality (why that is so is outlined
here).
[Also worth pointing out is the fact that
Super-Truths like this
-- about
fundamental aspects of 'reality' -- may only be accessed
via speculative thought.]
This means that all
that exists is either (i) An expression of the logical properties inherent in 'God',
or (ii) An emanation from 'God'. That is, material reality
must be logically 'emergent' from, and hence connected with, the 'Deity'.
So, the universe 'issues' forth from 'His'
nature 'eternally' and a-temporally, outside of time, since 'He' exists outside of time. Everything
must therefore be inter-linked by 'internal', or 'necessary', relations, all of
which are derived from, and constituted by, 'concepts' implicit in 'God',
which are consequently mirrored in fundamental aspects of
creation. This idea is prominent in
Plotinus and
subsequent
Neo-Platonists, like Hegel.
Given this approach,
it is clear that the vast majority of 'ordinary' human beings can't access,
nor can they comprehend, this
'rational' view of 'reality'. Their lack of knowledge, education or even 'divine
illumination' means that, at best, they
misperceive these 'logical properties' as contingentqualities. Hence, for them,
appearances fail to match underlying "essence". Naturally, this
implies that "commonsense" and ordinary language are fundamentally unreliable.
Now, where have we heard all that before?
Option (b), on
the other hand, implied that 'God' acted freely when 'He' created the world.
So, if 'He' wasn't acting under any form of 'compulsion', logical or conceptual --
i.e., as consequence of the logical properties
inherent in 'His' nature -- then there
will be no logical or necessary connection between 'The Creator' and 'His Creation'.
Nor,
indeed, would there between each created being. Every object and process in reality
is therefore genuinelycontingent, and appearances will no longer
be 'deceptive', since they can't mask the hidden, esoteric 'essences'
mentioned above, for there are none. That being the case, there are no
synthetic a priori truths (as these later came to be called)
ascertainable by thought alone. The only path to knowledge was through observation,
experiment,
and careful study of the 'Book
of Nature'. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the foundations of modern science were laid
in the Middle Ages largely by theorists who adopted this view of 'God' --
for example,
Jean
Buridan.
In post-Renaissance thought, the 'necessitarian' tradition re-surfaced in the work
of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Wolff, and Hegel; the 'voluntarist'
tradition in an attenuated form in the work of Newton, the Empiricists, and the so-called "mechanists".
The latter stressed the connection between 'God's'
free will and contingency in nature, alongside the primacy of empirical
over a priori knowledge and the superiority of observation and
experiment over speculation and abstract theory.
[To be sure, the above categories are rather crude; for example, Descartes was a
mechanist, but his theory put him on the same side of the fence as Spinoza and
Leibniz, whereas
Gassendi
was also a mechanist, but his ideas aligned him with the voluntarists. On this,
see Copleston (2003d).]
So, when Fundamentalist Christians,
for example, look at nature and see design everywhere, they
also claim to see
'irreducible complexity' -- the handiwork of 'God' -- and they either put this
down to 'His' free creation, or they see it as an expression of logical
properties imposed on nature by the Logos (depending, of course, on how they view the
nature of 'The Creator' and 'His' relation to the world).
Christian mechanists saw design in nature, too, but their
theories became
increasingly
deistic, and later atheistic. The introduction of a contingent link between
'God' and nature severed the logical connection that earlier theorists had
postulated, making "the God hypothesis" seem increasingly redundant [Laplace
-- "I
have no need of that hypothesis".]
[On this,
see
Lovejoy (1964).
[This links to a PDF.] There is also an excellent account of these developments in
Redwood (1976). Also see Dillenberger (1988). A classic expression of these developments
can be found in the debate between
Leibniz and Clarke. Cf., Alexander (1956), and Vailati (1997).]
Much
of this controversy had been provoked, however, by the work of
the
Medieval Nominalists, whose theories also sundered the logical link between a
substance and its properties as part of a reaction to the tradition begun by
Avicenna (IbnSīnā, with his separation of 'essence' and 'existence' in created
beings),
Averroës (Ibn Rushd), and the so-called "Latin Averroists" (e.g.,
Siger of
Brabant). The latter argued strongly in favour of Aristotle's doctrine of
natural necessity, undermining 'God's' free will -- at least, so far as the Roman
Catholic Church
saw things. This reaction was also prompted by philosophical worries about the
nature of
transubstantiation and the relation between the 'essence' of the
emblems (the bread and the wine in the
Eucharist)
and their 'accidents' (their apparent properties). Here 'appearances'
most definitely couldn't reflect 'essence' otherwise the bread would look like
human flesh and the wine would smell of blood"!
The aforementioned reaction
was occasioned by the 'Condemnations
of 1277', whereby the Bishop of Paris, Étienne
Tempier,
condemned 219 propositions, among which was the Averroist interpretation of
Aristotle -- particularly the idea that the created order was governed by
logical necessity. The most important response to these condemnations appeared
in the work of
the Nominalist,
William of
Ockham, who, as a result, stressed the free will of 'God' and thus the
contingent nature of the world. For Ockham, this meant that there were no 'essences' in
nature, nor were the apparent properties of bodies (their 'accidents') logically
connected with their 'nominal essence' (as this later came to be called by
Locke).
[On this, see Osler (2004), Copleston (2003b), pp.136-55, 190-95, 437-41,
Copleston (2003c), pp.43-167, and
Copleston (2003e), pp.79-107.]
In
the 18th century,
a resurgence of the
'necessitarian' tradition motivated, among other things, the "re-enchantment" of nature in
the theories concocted by the
Natürphilosophers and Hegel -- and later, those invented by Marxist Dialecticians.
[On this, see Harrington (1996),
Lenoir (1982),
Richards (2002),
and Essay Fourteen Parts One and Two, when they are published. More details can be found in Foster (1934), Hooykaas (1973),
Lindberg (2007), and Osler (2004).
For the Hermetic background to all this, see
Magee (2008). Cf., also Essay Twelve (summary
here). At a future
date, I will publish an essay on Leibniz I wrote as an undergraduate, which
anticipated some of the ideas in Osler's book, for example.]
So,
where Christians see design, DM-fans see "internal relations". Same
problematic, same source -- same bogus 'solution' to this set of pseudo-problems.12a
In
such inhospitable surroundings, not only must the 'Concepts' and 'Abstractions' that
attempt to regiment impressions and ideas into the right sortal groups be robust
enough to organise the contents of the 'mind', behind the backs, as it were,
of their producers, they must also exist prior to, and
be independent of, experience -- or, suffer the
slings
and arrows of outrageous fortune themselves.
Initially, for "crude materialists", at
least, it wasn't easy to account either for the source or for the effectiveness of these
'sergeant-major'-like concepts -- i.e., all those 'mental constructs' ('frameworks', 'concepts' and 'categories',
etc.), which permit ofno exceptions,
past, present or future. The theoretical 'rescue' for empiricists and
materialists came from an unexpected source:
German Idealism. More specifically, and even more revealingly,
this 'rescue' turned out to be an impossibly convoluted, obscure version of
Ancient Greek
Neoplatonism, with just enough
Hermeticism
thrown in
to fool the unwary.
The systems
concocted by these Teutonic Idealists required the invention of Super-Duper
'Concepts', Industrial Strength 'Categories',Carbon
Fibre 'Principles',
and
Borazonic Ideas, packing enough metaphysical clout to control the
deliverances of the senses with an iron rod. These days such heavy-duty
principles are further buttressed by impressive-sounding phrases -- such as,
"natural necessity", "conceptual-", or "ontological-necessity".
Jargon like this is clearly required, otherwise the
semi-house-trained impressions the senses deliver
might continue to revolt and set up
their own Anarchist Collective -- wherein fires
might actually freeze water instead of boiling it, fish might break out in song, and
Dialectical Marxism might even become a ringing success.13
Furthermore, these 'Concepts', 'Categories' and 'Principles' would have to be logical
-- or, indeed, 'dialectical' --, if they were capable of exercising such rigid control
over the future
course of events -- or even the future deliverances of the senses --,
ensuring that every single impression and idea trooped into the correct
metaphysical slot, collected together under the right general
term, neveroncestepping out-of-line.
As
noted earlier, bourgeois ideas (once 'born free') were now clapped in chains. The 'free market', bourgeois 'revolution in the head' was over. The Rationalist
and Idealist takeover turned into veritable 'Mental
Thermidor'.14
However, at
least one nagging question remained: How could
something even as powerful as a 'Logical Principle' guarantee that future
events, or our impression of them, will always do as they are told? Surely these
'rational principles' are particulars themselves and no less in need of
regimentation.
The point
here is rather simple: logical principles per se can't create generality;
generality emerges
from the application of a rule, which neither words nor 'Concepts' -- nor
even 'Principles' -- can quite manage on their lonesome. It is human beings
(as part of a collective) who determine what constitutes the correct application of a rule, since, as has been
emphasised many times: words, 'Concepts', and 'Principles' have neither the wit, intelligence,
or social structure sufficient to the task.
That was, indeed, the point of
emphasising the atomisation that gave birth to the bourgeois, 'logical
principles' mentioned
earlier in this Essay. The fragmentation introduced
into epistemology (in both its Rationalist and Empiricist wings) meant that
in the heads of these socially-isolated bourgeois thinkers -- this isn't my
judgement on them, it follows from their own epistemologies -- these 'Concepts'
can only operate as the Proper Names
of Abstract Particulars,
or, indeed, as particulars themselves, destroying generality and undermining the
unity of the proposition as a result. So, for example, 'the concept of time' (in
Kant) and the concept of 'Being' (in Hegel) are no less Abstract Particulars
than anything Aristotle or Plato had ever dreamt up.14a0
Clearly, 'Logical Principles' like this could only regiment unruly ideas and
mutinous particulars if they somehow controlled future
behaviour, and were thus intelligentagents themselves. It was
almost as if these 'Logical Principles'
actually existed
in 'external reality', too, and were those very Ideas themselves in 'self-development',
or they were the 'regulative principles' which supposedly led the deliverances of
the senses by the
nose. In Hegel, this
doctrine clearly sundered the distinction between Mind and Matter -- which is
largely
why Engels thought he could argue that matter is just
an
abstraction, indeed, using a very clear echo of the very same argument (and
even the same example!) that Hegel had employed:
"When the universal is made a mere form and co-ordinated with the particular, as
if it were on the same level, it sinks into the particular itself. Even common
sense in everyday matters is above the absurdity of setting a universal beside the particulars. Would anyone, who wished for fruit,
reject cherries, pears, and grapes, on the ground that they were cherries, pears
or grapes, and not fruit?" [Hegel (1975), p.19, §13, quoted from
here. Italic emphases in the original;
bold added.]
"It is the old story. First
of all one makes sensuous things into abstractions and then one wants to know
them through the senses, to see time and smell space. The empiricist becomes so
steeped in the habit of empirical experience, that he believes that he is still
in the field of sensuous experience when he is operating with abstractions....
The two forms of existence of matter are naturally nothing without matter, empty
concepts, abstractions which exist only in our minds. But, of course, we are
supposed not to know what matter and motion are! Of course not, for matter as
such and motion as such have not yet been seen or otherwise experienced by
anyone, only the various existing material things and forms of motions.
Matter is nothing but the totality of material things from which this concept is
abstracted and motion as such nothing but the totality of all sensuously
perceptible forms of motion; words like matter and motion are nothing but
abbreviations in which we comprehend many different sensuous perceptible
things according to their common properties. Hence matter and motion can
be known in no other way than by investigation of the separate material
things and forms of motion, and by knowing these, we also
pro tanto
know matter and motion as such.... This is just like the difficulty
mentioned by Hegel; we can eat cherries and plums, but not fruit,
because no one has so far eaten fruit as such." [Engels (1954),
pp.235-36. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"N.B. Matter as such is a
pure creation of thought and an abstraction. We leave out of account the
qualitative differences of things in lumping them together as corporeally
existing things under the concept matter. Hence matter as such, as distinct
from definite existing pieces of matter, is not anything sensuously existing."
[Ibid.,
p.255. Bold emphasis added.]
In
fact, the
control of future contingencies now becomes a question about the self-discipline of a
veritable army self-developing
'Concepts'. In fact, these 'Concepts' controlled the future
because they had a bright, shiny 'new logic' -- a
dialectical logic -- to lead the way, a 'logic' that was itself based on a
seriously distorted metaphor about how verbal and written arguments themselves edge toward
a conclusion. This new
'logic' laid down the law, which meant that everything in nature -- Mind and Matter --
could do little other than
bend the knee to its Contradictory Will.
The
World Soul in Plato thus had new life breathed into it and ran the show; the future was now
under the effective control of its 'logic' as part of the supernatural self-expression of
an
'animating
spirit'. In this way, the social application of linguistic rules was inverted and
became the inner expression of 'Self-Developing Mind'.
It is precisely here that the fetishisation
of language -- referred to in
Part One -- inserted itself into Dialectical Philosophy, and then into
Marxism.
As we saw, Ancient and Medieval Logic had
in effect destroyed the expression of generality in language. In its place, an ersatz
'generality' was taken off the bench and sent into play -- only now as a key
factor in the
operation of a 'Cosmic Mind', somehow beavering away inside Hegel's head.
Unfortunately for Dialectical Marxists, even when Hegel's
fantasy is "put back on its feet", the logical blunders on which it
is based remain in place. Indeed, they were fetishised all the more,
transmogrified into an
animating spirit in what would otherwise have been 'inert matter'. This now
breathed 'life' into the moribund theories formerly concocted by the 'crude materialists', for
without this animating spirit -- these 'contradictions' -- their metaphysical systems would be
inert, too; indeed, like a 'clock without a spring'.
"Contradiction
is the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as it
contains a contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity."
[Hegel (1999),
p.439, §956.
Bold emphasis added.]
Hence, Hegel's
'Self-Developing Mind', now "back on its feet", re-animated matter --,
but the untoward result was the mysticalre-enchantment of nature. [Harrington
(1996).]14a1
Paradoxically,
we were also informed that the 'Iron Laws of the Cosmos'
are wholly compatible with human freedom! These Self-Developing Ideas
were, of course, free because they were a law unto themselves. Indeed, they even
seemed to control 'God', who, it turns out, had all along been led by the nose
by these 'self-developing' concepts.
Hence,
the more human beings are in chains the less they are in chains!
You just couldn't make this stuff up!
Fortunately, you don't have to since that's Diabolical Logic for you.
Rousseau
thought he could justify the social control in this way, too, but what he had in mind was an 'Ideal
Thermidor'. In sharp contrast, Hegel discovered that his own Ideas controlled him
--, but only if he
introjected the protocols of 'social reality',
thereby fetishising the ideas 'logically' fighting it out inside his head. Hence, for him, what had once been the product of the social
relations between human beings (language, argument, contradiction, dialectic) not only manipulated
his thought processes, it ran the entire universe!
We might call this, 'Ontology for
Megalomaniacs'.
It is indeed the philosophical equivalent of
a deranged individual who claims he is 'God Incarnate'. These crazy ideas took over the
asylum! Instead of the
'psychologically-challenged' contradicting themselves,
Hegel's universe did it for them!
In relation to this,
Feuerbach plainly got things the wrong way round: Hegel's 'God'
is the projection of
humanity inwards, not outwards. For DM-fans, ideas supposedly 'reflect'
the world --, but that turns out to be so when they, too, unwisely allow Hegel's
'logic' to control their thoughts.14a2
Indeed, as Max Eastman noted:
"Hegelism is
like a mental disease; youcan't know what it is until
you get it, and then you can't know because you have got it."
[Eastman (1926), p.22.]
[Anyone who objects to my quoting Max Eastman
should check this
out first and then perhaps think again.]
Which, of course, helps explain the
semi-religious fervour with which the Sacred Dialectic is defended by all those
whose brains it has colonised. [On that, see
here and
here.]
However, Hegel's Idealist 'solution' only
succeeded in creating
another problem: If autocratic 'principles' like these are required so that order
might be imposed on
recalcitrant reality -- as well as our ideas about it --, and
if knowledge is still
dependent on the vicissitudes of human cognition, then these 'principles'
will only succeed in undermining
themselves. Indeed, if the Cosmic Order can only be comprehended by being put into
some sort of order inside each bourgeois skull by anthropomorphising reality
and
our ideas about it, then that anthropomorphisation can't fail to
self-destruct. That is because, if ordinary human beings
can't be relied on (i.e., if the vernacular is
untrustworthy, and 'commonsense' is unreliable --, which ruling-class
slurs and suspicions motivated this
family of theories in the first place, in Ancient Greece), then these 'inner human beings' (these anthropomorphised,
'Self-Developing' Ideas), and their mysterious 'internal relations', must be
equally, if not more, suspect.
If
the ideas of everyday,material human beings, with their reliance
of 'appearances', can't be trusted, then what confidence can be placed in the
reliability of these inner, ghostly spectres, these shadow human beings?
This worry
emerges not just because it is
difficult enough to account for the social nature of knowledge in the
individual case, but because this 'problem' becomes completely intractable when it
is generalised to take into account the countless minds supposedly able to
perform the same trick and arrive at the same conclusions from
their limited experience and finite stock of ideas. [As we saw
earlier.]
Given this approach, humanity-wide conceptual
coordination would surely be completely miraculous. Indeed, it would be no less
miraculous for this to happen across the inhabitants of a small village, let
alone a large city.
In fact, it
is far more likely that each and every member of the much smaller,
self-selectingcoven of 'professional abstractors' -- or,
for that matter, every single Hegel
scholar -- is
dancing to a different dialectical tune playing away in each socially-atomised head.
[Apologies
again for those mixed metaphors!]
The problem we met earlier (concerning
the social and epistemological fragmentation
introduced by the market economy) re-surfaces precisely here: the bourgeois
psyche disunited will, it seems, never be re-united.
So, in the realm of ideas alone,
it proved
impossible to undo the effects that the bourgeois revolution introduced into
epistemology. If every single human being has to perform these 'feats of abstraction' in
each
socially-isolated head, then there can be no such thing as socialised
knowledge -- or, to be more accurate, no such thing as knowledge.
This helps
account for the countless
failed 'theories of knowledge' post-Renaissance philosophers have concocted
in the last four hundred years -- to add to
those dreamt-up over the previous two thousand.
Nevertheless, by these means the Individual was allowed to strike back, initially disguised as the
Dialectical Guru, Hegel Himself. Only he (and perhaps his DM-descendants)
were 'licensed' to interpret the self-development of thought, and thus the course of
history -- for the benefit of the rest of benighted humanity, of course. Dialectical
Philosophers were now Dialectical Prophets, a resolutely
substitutionist ideology their Gospel.14a
Once more, given this
approach to knowledge, no matter how robust the metaphysical, neurological or
psychological coercion involved (operating inside each dialectical skull), the
coordination of knowledge across a whole population would be quite
miraculous --,
unless, of course, it has been imposed on all involved by the Iron Will of
the Glorious Leader, the Great Teacher, or simply, 'The Party'. The
Invisible
Hand was now replaced by the Mailed Fist of the Stalinised State -- or,
indeed, the
Guardians of Orthodoxy in non-Stalinised Marxist parties. In the 'bourgeois market' of
internally-processed ideas,
Adam Smith's
Invisible Hand couldn't leave so much as a
smudged fingerprint. Hence, a very visible Mailed Fist of the
Dialectical Magus -- which sometimes took the shape of
Gerry Healy,
elsewhere that of Mao, Bob
Avakian, Marlene Dixon,
Abimael
Guzmán, or even the Great
Teacher Himself, Stalin -- was necessary in order to guarantee good epistemological order
inside the collective dialectical skull.
[Exactly how 'Epistemological Stalinism' like
this has worked its way into practically
every nook and cranny of Dialectical Marxism, and thus into virtually every party and tendency on
the far left, is explored in Essay Nine
Part Two.]
However, not
only would each lone abstractor have absolutely no access to the ideas tucked
away in the heads of other lone abstractors, they would have no way of checking
whether or not they were even edging their own abstractions in the 'right' --
let alone the 'same' -- direction!
And, it is no good appealing to
'practice', since that, too, has been overshadowed by the dead hand of abstractionism.
Despite this, the fact that inter-subjective
agreement actually takes place (and countless times, every single day)
suggests that this fanciful
bourgeois
individualist picture is as wide-of-the-mark as
anything could be. Indeed,
when the day-to-day requirements imposed by the material and social world
on each active agent are factored in, this myth falls apart even faster than a
WMD dossier.
The reasons for this aren't hard to find (if
we assume for the purposes of argument that, per impossible,
abstractionism were true): not only is it is highly
unlikely that each mind would form the same general idea of the same
objects and processes from its limited stock of data -- which is
problematic enough in itself in view of the fact that no two people share
exactly the same experience or draw the same conclusions from it -- but, the word "same" attracts identical
difficulties (irony intended). Moreover, in its endeavour to explain
generality, this traditional approach to knowledge involves an appeal to a
concept that looks suspiciously general itself. If no two minds can check the
supposed 'similarities' in or between anyone else's ideas, then there is no way that a social process, if it is based on
abstraction, would be viable. Questions would naturally arise as
to whether the 'same' ideas of anything (abstract, particular, concrete,
general -- or even dialectical) had actually taken root in such socially-isolated
dialectical minds. And these worries would persist until it had been
established whether or not each abstractor had the 'same' idea about the word
"same", let alone anything else.14b
And, how on earth might that be
ascertained
for goodness sake?
Worse still: given the 'dialectical' view of
identity, this problem can't even be stated, let alone solved. The
peremptory rejection of the LOI now
returns to haunt DM-epistemology. By confusing a logical issue with
an epistemological
red-herring, the quest for what is supposed to be a 'superior form of dialectical
knowledge' has now been trapped
in a
solipsistic black hole.
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
Once more, that is because it has yet to be
explained how any two dialectically-distracted minds could frame the
same general, or even particular, idea of anything at all -- even before
the dialectical juggernaut begins to roll --, or how a check might be made
whether or not either of these intrepid abstractors had accomplished this
miraculous feat correctly. And, that isn't so
much because none of us has access to the mind of any other abstractor --
which, on this view, we haven't -- it is because it has yet to be established whether anyone
even has the same idea of the word
"correct"!15
Once more: how on earth might that be
checked for goodness sake?
Again, it is no use looking to practice to
rescue this failing theory, for it has yet to be established whether or not any
two abstractors have the same abstract (or 'concrete') idea even of practice!
Once more, how on earth might that...?
[The reader
is invited to finish that
sentence for herself.]
By "socially-isolated" I don't
mean to suggest that intrepid abstractors are literally isolated
from one another -- as if they lived each on a desert island -- only that since their
theory holds that knowledge (etc.)
begins with whatever they
manage to process in their own heads as individuals, this implies that when it comes to
language and knowledge, they might as well be literally isolated. As I
have shown earlier in this Essay: given this view of abstraction, it is
in fact impossible to build a workable, or even a believable, account of
the social nature of language and knowledge. [I
have developed this idea at length in Essay Thirteen
Part One; readers are directed
there for more details.]
Furthermore, it is equally unclear how even
this relatively minor worry (about the generality of what are supposed to be general ideas) may be
communicated between these lone abstractors without employing the very same notion that
originally required explanation -- i.e., generality itself --, along with the application of the LOI
as a
rule of language.16
More problematic still (for those who at
least gesture in the direction of accepting even a minimally social view of
language and knowledge)is the following: How might it be
ascertained whether or not the same
ideas about anything (abstract, concrete, general, or particular) have
been inherited correctly from previous generations of intrepid abstractors?
Without access to a time machine, mind probes -- and, once more, a prior grasp of the
very things they have allegedly bequeathed to us (i.e., general ideas!) --
no one would be in any position to determine the accuracy of a single 'concept' or
'dialectical principle' supposedly belonging to this 'common inheritance'.
But,
given DM-epistemology, no start could even be made at any attempt to
build such knowledge. Not only would this 'intentional edifice' have no
foundation -- since the basis on which we might build on supposedly inherited knowledge has already been shown to be
no firmer than quicksand --, no two prospective labourers would have the same
plot of land to labour upon, the same plan to guide them, the same materials to
work with -- or even the remotest idea about what would conceivably count as the
'same brick'!
This means that, based on the strictures
dialecticians have themselves placed on any concrete application of the LOI, no two people
couldever have the same general -- or even particular -- idea of anything.
Nor could they have the same idea about approximate identity (so that
they could conclude that their ideas only roughly coincided with those of
anyone else). If the dread word "same" can't
be the same in any two minds, the phrase "approximately the same" stands no
chance.
Worse still,
no dialectician would or could have the same (or approximately the same) general
(or particular) idea as they previously had about anything -- last week, yesterday, or even a few
seconds earlier --, so that they could say concerning
their own opinions that they were even approximately
stable from moment to moment.
In that case, of course, the 'process of
abstraction' can't even get off the ground!
It shouldn't need pointing out that
abstraction can't make a start where there is
nothing common to abstract, or no shared ideas, impressions or
concepts to work with
from moment to moment -- especially when no 'law of cognition'
would remain the same either --, or which were capable of being shared across an entire
population of
socially-isolated
dialectical abstractors.
[Once more,
the 'relative
stability of language' defence was neutralised in Essay Six.]16a
An appeal to memory here would be to no
avail, either. That is because, not only are memories themselves subject
to 'the acid of universal change', it has yet to be established that anyone has the
same memory of the meaning of the word "memory" from moment to moment.
Once again: how on earth might that be
ascertained for goodness sake?
[I
hasten to add that the above sceptical remarks do not represent my views! They
are only being aired in this Essay to expose the
yawning chasm of
scepticism implied by Traditional-, and DM-Epistemology.]
In this way,
abstractionism has
not only undermined the status of every single dialectical proposition (that result was
established in
Part One of this Essay),
the entire project has only succeeded in strangling itself evenbefore
birth as its adherents
unwisely accepted the
regressive bourgeois doctrine that we all abstract in the privacy of our own heads.
Of course, that is why an earlier claim was
made (at the end of
Part One)
that the hypothetical activities of our heroic 'ancestral abstractors' can't have taken
place, since no sense can be made of the possibility that they could.
The above points might be regarded by some as
a grossly unfair misrepresentation of DM. As
TAR notes:
"…[A]ll science 'deductively
anticipates' developments –- what else is an hypothesis tested by
experimentation?" [Rees (1998), p.131.]
This
appears to contradict the claim made above that DM-epistemology can't cope with future contingencies. If
scientists actually use abstractions -- and legitimately so -- why can't
DM-theorists do likewise? What stops them from projecting their ideas into the future
in like manner -- especially if their work is subject to constant empirical
check? Alas for Ms Lichtenstein, successful practice refutes her
excessively negative conclusions.
Or, so it could be
maintained...
Quite apart from the fact that practice has
in fact delivered the oppositeverdict (on that, see Essay Ten
Part One), it is worth pointing
out that based on DM's
own principles, this neat picture only works if 'reality itself' is
actually Ideal. That is because, even if the author of TAR were correct that science
"'deductively anticipates…' developments", it could only do so if reality
already had an underlying logical structure, and nature was 'externalised
thought', no different in form from
Objective Idealism.
[Why
that is so seems pretty obvious;
the reasons for
drawing that conclusion were given at the beginning of
Part One of this Essay. This topic will be re-examined in greater detail in Essay
Twelve (summary here).]
As
Part One showed;
(i) As a matter of course,
traditional theorists extrapolated from a finite body of facts --
comprising what they admitted was only 'partial' knowledge -- to
infinitary conclusions about all of reality, for all of time, and.
(ii) These
moves were originally motivated by an ideologically-driven, but syntactically inept,
re-interpretation of
general words as the
Proper Names of Abstract
Particulars. This ancient screw up was further compounded by the same
theorists when they projected the 'abstractions' they concocted onto
a 'shadow-reality' anterior to experience, which supposedly underpinned the material world
(in an as-yet-to-be-explained manner), which
ersatz-reality turned out to be 'more
real' that the universe we see around us (or so they thought).
DM-theorists readily bought into this Idealist view of knowledge, even though it
completely compromised their overall theory. That is because these moves were
based solely on a
series of linguistic
malapropisms,not on evidence derived from the sciences,
or
even from everyday experience, still less from the practice of revolutionaries.
Worse
still: as Part One also showed, those moves destroy the capacity language has
for expressing anything whatsoever.
Indeed,
and quite apart from these fatal
defects, if general words indeed are indeed the Proper Names of abstract
particulars, no
general conclusions can be drawn from them -- and certainly not by means
of another set of abstractions that simply reproduce the very same
error.17
The second difficulty (mentioned
earlier) isn't unconnected
with the first, but has somewhat different implications. As we have just seen,
traditional solutions to the 'problem' of Universals only appeared to succeed
because they either:
(i) Anthropomorphised the brain (along with its ideas), or they,
(ii) Fetishised language, so that the product of social interaction (language)
was
reified and transformed into the relation between
objects or processes, or they were those
objects and processes
themselves. We saw this throughout Part One in connection with Traditional
Theorists' and dialecticians' confusion of talk about talk with talk
about the world -- for example
here and
here.
As we have also seen, in order to explain the
operation of 'the mind', Empiricists found that they had to postulate the
existence of what were in effect 'intelligent ideas', which were either spontaneously gregarious or
were somehow capable of obeying externally imposed rules 'intelligently'.
On the other hand, Rationalists held that
contingent events in 'reality' couldn't account for our -- or,
indeed, their own -- ideas about them. As they saw things, the reverse was the
case: it was the nature and development of their ideas, or their minds, that
explained the 'outer' world. Naturally, this inverted epistemology and ended up
dictating to
nature what it must be like or what it must contain, implying that reality was
fundamentally Ideal.
All of this is reasonably
clear.
The next bit isn't.
On
the basis of the entire family of rationalist 'world-views', traditional theorists
thought they had constructed
(or even 'discovered') what they took to be nature's fundamental "properties"/"laws", but what they didn't
do was conclude that their theories were true merely because nature and
society were
law-governed. On the contrary, many held that the connection was much tighter
than this. They imagined they were able to read these 'laws' into nature
and society
simply becausethe mind
was structured in a specific way. In addition, the very 'possibility of experience' meant
that the
world (natural and social) also had to be structured in a certain way, otherwise
we couldn't experience it, or even know anything at all about it.18
This placed human cognition right at the centre of 'the meaning and cognitive universe'.
So, what
was intended to be a 'Copernican
Revolution' in Philosophy turned out to be the exact opposite: its
Ptolemaic realignment. 'The human mind' now constructed the world,
not the other way round. In fact,
for some hard core thinkers, 'the mind' and its machinationsactually constituted the world.
[On the pernicious nature of Idealism, and why many opt for it (several of which
motivating factors apply equally well to Marxist dialecticians), see: 'Idealism: A Victorian
Horror-Story, Parts I and II', in Stove (1991), pp.83-177. However, in relation
to Stove's work, readers should take note of the caveats I have posted
here.]
If, as tradition would have it, the world
is a 'reflection' of 'God's Mind' -- and the human mind ('at its best') is also a pale
reflection of 'His' 'Mind' --, then the 'inter-reflection' between 'mind'
and world, world and 'mind', would guaranteethatphilosophical thought left to its own devices
was capable of penetrating beneath surface 'appearances', right
to the heart of 'Being' itself, uncovering its hidden 'essences'. General laws
thus seemed to be either the result of these 'self-directed' concepts, which
accurately captured or mirrored nature's inner secrets, or the latter were their constitutive cause
(what Aristotle might have called their
material and formal cause).
Hermetic
Philosophers had imagined that the
Microcosm of the human 'mind' reflected the Macrocosm of 'God's' creation
because bothwere Mind. As we have seen, this idea dates back at
least to Plato:
"If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I
say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and
apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in
no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be
regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm that to be distinct, for
they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted
in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by
true reason, the other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by
persuasion, but the other can: and lastly, every man may be said to share in
true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men.
Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is
always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into
itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and
imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to
intelligence only." [Plato (1997c), 51e-52a,
pp.1254-55. I have used
the on-line version here. Bold emphases added. The published version translates
the third set of highlighted words as follows: "It is indivisible -- it cannot be perceived
by the senses at all -- and it is the role of the understanding to study it."
Cornford renders it thus: "[It is] invisible and otherwise imperceptible;
that, in fact, which thinking has for its object." (Cornford (1997), p.192.) See
also Note 1b.]
Mystical versions of the above that found their way
into both
NeoPlatonism
and Hermeticism held that union with 'God' was of a
piece with union with Nature (or rather with its 'Essence'), which helps explain the origin of what
turned out to be the main problematic of
German
Idealism: 'Subject-Object Identity'. In Hegel's system, the union between the
'Knower and the Known' was itself guaranteed by the right application of Divine -- aka
Dialectical -- Logic; the
mystical
'Rosicrucian wedding' had finally been consummated.18a
Empiricist theories arrived at
somewhat analogous
conclusions, but from a different direction, and expressed in markedly different
language.19
Either way -- as Hegel himself pointed out -- every tributary of Traditional
Philosophy sooner or later found its way back to the Ideal home from whence it
came:
"Every philosophy is
essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the
question then is only how far this principle is carried out." [Hegel
(1999), pp.154-55; § 316. Bold added.]20
Nevertheless, the serious problems this approach to knowledge brought in its train re-surfaced in DM, only now in a
much more
acute and problematic form. Dialecticians claim that their system somehow reverses the
above process of cognition in order to neutralise its obvious Idealist implications (albeit after
the "mystical shell" has been removed,
leaving only its "rational kernel" -- I quote Marx here, not to
criticise him, but to criticise the use to which his words have been put; I take a
different view of these famous phrases, as I have argued in
Essay Nine Part One). So, they
claim that their theory has been rotated through 180ş,
to stand proudly on its own two, very materialist legs -- hardly noticing that
the Ideal backside is now where the materialist head used to be.
At least that
helps explain all that hot air.
However, sub-logical, mystical trickery like this
wasn't designed to operate in reverse -- which is why the Idealist forward gear
always remains engaged.
As
Essay Two has shown, dialecticians proceed as if it were quite natural --
hardly worth mentioning, in fact --, as if it were totally uncontroversial to extrapolate from thoughts, words
or concepts to the derivation of necessary and universal truths about
nature and society. Not only do
DM-theorists proceed
as if they think their laws and a priori
theses are applicable to all of reality, for all of time, theyhave to talk this way.
And we can now see why that is so:it comes with
the territory. The Dialectical Macrocosm and the Dialectical Microcosm are
two sides of the same class-compromised coin. That is because this entire world-view
was inherited (in a modified form) from
Aristocratic Greek thinkers who designed it, and who fully intended that it should work this way. These
"ruling-ideas" rule 'radical' heads because, to DM-fans, they seem so natural,
if not
quintessentially 'philosophical'.
If DM-theorists didn't think and talk like this, they wouldn't have a
'genuine philosophy' of their own -- certainly not one that Lenin claimed was
the logical culmination of the very best elements of 'western thought':
"The history of philosophy and the history of
social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling
'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified
doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the
development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists
precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the
foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate
continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of
philosophy, political economy and socialism. The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive
and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable
with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It
is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth
century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and
French socialism." [Lenin,
Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone
added. Paragraphs merged.]20a
This
is, of course, the intellectual equivalent of wanting to 'hang with the cool
kids'. It is also one of the main reasons
HCDs
reject my Essays. They don't contain any gobbledygook.
If
abstractions provide the 'metaphysical glue' that supposedly binds knowledge together (or which enables the formation of knowledge, as Lenin argued), what
else could these creatures of Greek Thought imply about Nature
except that it is just one Big Idea?
Or, more accurately:
what else could this
doctrine imply but that Hegel Junior (DM) looks just like his dad, Hegel himself?
"Logical concepts are
subjective so long as they remain 'abstract,' in their abstract form, but at the
same time they express the Thing-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete
and
abstract, both phenomenon and
essence, both moment
and
relation." [Lenin (1961),
p.208. Italic
emphases in the original.]
"Thought proceeding from the
concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get
away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter,
the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all
scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more
deeply, truly and completely." [Ibid.,
p.171.
Italic emphases
in the original.]
Perhaps we can now understand why Lenin
argued this way: DM is the Ideal offspring of an equally Ideal Family. And
this family tree stretches right back into the mists of ruling-class time.
Of
course, dialecticians are among the first to tell us that these
abstractions have been derived from nature and society via some sort of 'law
of cognition', and which have been "tested in practice", but the above
considerations cast serious doubt on the validity of those claims.
These
infant doubts will mature
quite alarmingly as the Essays posted at this site unfold.
Nominalism
to one side, traditional accounts of the origin of Abstract General Ideas all
shared the belief that 'the mind' was somehow capable of ascending from
particulars (given in experience) to the general (not so given) -- or, perhaps
sometimes the other way round (depending on which myth-maker was telling the tale), unifying
particulars under an 'objective law', or doing so by means of something called
an "apprehension" --, as it progressively disregards their
unique ("accidental", "inessential") properties/predicates
(the two irreversibly run together by now), or as it searched for wider
connections in order to 'uncover' the hidden 'essences' that supposedly
underpinned 'appearances'.21
That alone should have made
those who at least claimed to be
materialists pause for more than just a moment; what on earth could be so
materialist about a theory that has to withdraw from the material into the
Ideal in such an irresponsible and peremptory manner?
The
pay-off, so we have been led to believe, is the greater 'explanatory power'
this approach supposedly brings in its train. But, if that is gained at the expense of populating the world with nearly
as many abstractions as there are material bodies, and which turn out to be
more real than those material bodies themselves -- since these 'abstractions' are required to explain
the nature and behaviour of objects and process in this world, not the other way round --
one wonders what sort of victory has been won over
Idealism.
[A 'victory'
of the same order, perhaps, as that of the Church over 'sin', 'crime' and war?
Or, that of Social Democracy over Capitalism? These questions become all the
more ironic when it is recalled that dialectics is incapable of explaining
anything at all (as we will see as the Essays at this site unfold), a disconcerting
outcome only further compounded by the additional fact that Dialectical Marxism
has also been an abject, long-term failure.]
In
fact, the reverse appears to be far more likely. Indeed, this entire approach
is clearly based on the
ancient belief that material reality is insufficient of itself, that it isn't
fully realbut is fundamentally dependent on something that isn't itself material,
alongside the
supposition that nature requires a background operation, or structure, of Ideal
principles to make it work, let alone allow it to exist in the first place.
The result is that DM-theorists (would you believe!)
believe that matter is far too crude and
lifeless to do anything on its own (recall:
Engels actually called matter an "abstraction"!)
-- although this appears to be all that nature has to
offer -- apparently it also requires a 'Logic' to make it tick or even give
it 'substance'. Well, we all know which
religion is based on a belief in the
Logos.
Spoiler
Alert: apparently, the
vast majority
do in one form or another. We have already seen this from the Gospel of John:
"1In the beginning was the Word [λόγος
--
logos],
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 2He was with God in the beginning. 3Through him all things were made; without him nothing
was made that has been made. 4
In him was life, and that life was the light of all mankind." [John
1:1-4. Bold added.]
And that
helps explain why Lenin could declare
that he preferred intelligent Idealism to "crude materialism" -- he
hadn't fully shaken off the cloying grip of Christian Mysticism:
"Intelligent idealism is
closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism. Dialectical idealism instead
of intelligent; (sic) metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid instead of
stupid." [Lenin (1961),
p.274.]
[It is
quite clear from this that Lenin meant "Dialectical idealism is closer to
intelligent materialism than crude materialism...".]22
By nailing their colours to this (ruling-class)
mast, dialecticians have
unfortunately placed themselves
on the side
of the 'Gods'.
"When the
Gigantes
about
Pallene
chose to begin war against the immortals,
Herakles
fought on the side of the gods, and slaying many of the Sons of
Ge
[or Gaia, the 'Earth Goddess' -- RL]
he received the highest approbation. For
Zeus
gave the
name of
Olympian only to those gods who had fought by his side, in order that the
courageous, by being adorned by so honourable a title, might be distinguished by
this designation from the coward; and of those who were born of mortal women he
considered only
Dionysos
and
Herakles worthy of this name." [Diodorus
Siculus, Library of History 4.15.1.]
This
metaphor alludes to an
image painted in
Hesiod's
Theogony (links at the end)
and later in Plato's
Sophist, one of his more profound surviving works. Indeed, that, work
alongside two of his other dialogues -- Theaetetus (Plato
(1997e)) and
Parmenides (Plato
(1997d)) --, are, collectively, the
principle source of much of subsequent Idealism.
The excerpt from the Sophist reproduced below revolves around a conversation between an
Eleatic
"Stranger" (who appears to be a follower of
Parmenides)
and a character called "Theaetetus":
"Stranger. We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who
treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed
to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all,
that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of
not-being....
"...There
appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them; they are
fighting with one another about the nature of essence.
"Theaetetus. How is that?
"Stranger.
Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to
earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and trees; of these they
lay hold, and obstinately maintain, that the things only which can be touched or
handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if
any one else says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him,
and will hear of nothing but body.
"Theaetetus. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they
are.
"Stranger.
And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from
above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of
certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists,
which by them are maintained to be the very truth, they break up into little
bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be, not essence, but generation and
motion. Between the two armies, Theaetetus, there is always an endless conflict
raging concerning these matters.
"Theaetetus. True.
"Stranger.
Let us ask each party in turn, to give an account of that which they call
essence.
"Theaetetus. How shall we get it out of them?
"Stranger.
With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty,
for they are civil people enough; but there will be very great difficulty, or
rather an absolute impossibility, in getting an opinion out of those who drag
everything down to matter. Shall I tell you what we must do?
"Theaetetus. What?
"Stranger.
Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us
imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in
accordance with the rules of argument, and then their opinion will be more worth
having; for that which better men acknowledge has more weight than that which is
acknowledged by inferior men. Moreover we are no respecters of persons, but
seekers after truth." [Plato
(1997b), pp.267-68, 246a-246d. I have used the on-line version here.]
[As noted
earlier, this battle is described in
Hesiod's
Theogony (lines 675-715), and is available
here.]
Again, from this it is quite clear that
Marxist Dialecticians are far closer to the Idealist 'Gods'
than they are to the
Materialist Giants!23
Unfortunately, unlike Capitalism,
Abstractionism has attracted few effective gravediggers, and those it has managed
to accrue have proved to be even less successful at overthrowing the latter
than workers have been at toppling the former. That is largely because these
would be
undertakers were (and still are) far more content simply to point out the
psychological impossibility of the entire abstractionist project than
they are to reveal its logical flaws --, or, indeed, expose its ideologically-compromised motivating
factors. So, this batch of "ruling
ideas" lives on to rule another day -- and another dialectician.
More
recently, however, even though Abstractionism has been subjected to a series of
destructive critiques, this ancient theory still lumbers on. That in turn is partly because many of those who
avowedly came to bury it -- unlike
Mark Antony -- ended up praising it by emulating it. In so doing they
have only succeeded in breathing new life into its moribund cadaver by inventing brand new
'essentialist' theories of their own.24
As
we have seen, and as seems
reasonably clear, an ability to
talk about, say, cats and dogs depends on a prior grasp (in use) of the relevant
general terms (otherwise, plainly, nothing would have been said about them!). This fact
needs no explanation -- nor could one be
provided for it that hadn't already employed the very things that required explaining in the
first place, i.e., general terms.25
If the above observations
have anything going for them, it lies perhaps in the re-direction of our
attention away from hidden, internal processes and privately executed abilities -- allegedly possessed by
each 'lone
abstractor' -- and back toward socially-acquired, publicly performed
and checkable skills
and capacities, in a endeavour to understand not only discourse, but generality
in language and
socially-constituted knowledge, into the bargain.
Naturally, only anti-materialists will
cavil at this point.
Which is why emphasis has been placed in
these Essays on our use of ordinary language in a public domain. That is also why serious questions have been raised about the ability we are all
supposed to possess of being able to squeeze abstract epistemological juice from desiccated discourse in the 'privacy of our heads'.
In contrast once more, the approach adopted
here would mean that human cognition is open to view,
subject to public scrutiny -- unlike the mysterious, inner rituals that underlie
the 'process of abstraction', which, it is worth recalling, fails to
deliver even what had been advertised for it.26
It has been argued at length above, and in
Part One, that instead of
beginning with the general as a way of advancing toward knowledge of the
particular, the DM-'process' of abstraction in fact turns general words into the
Proper Names of Abstract
Particulars, which then succeeds in going nowhere. This not only distorts the way language actually functions --
destroying the capacity it has for saying anything at all --, it stalls the 'dialectical circuit'
before it can even be tested in practice.
Much of the rest of this Part of Essay Three
is aimed at widening, and then substantiating these
sweeping allegations.
While we are at it, what exactly are the
common features that can be abstracted from (or even attributed to)
all shades of, say, the colour blue? Or, the notes that can be played
on the bagpipes? Or, the taste of different wines? Or, the feel of silk,
wool and nylon? Or, even the smell of roses?
[Of course, in several of these examples, the
use of other general terms might come into play -- but they, too, will attract
similar questions. For instance, an appeal might be made to certain
tastes or
aromas that can be detected in different wines -- for example, "a fruity
bouquet". But, once more, what are the common features of "fruity bouquets"? One answer to that
might involve a reference to the taste or smell of
Lychees, for
instance. But, what are the common features of the taste/smell of Lychees? And so
on. I owe this point to Geach (1957).]
One of the more bizarre aspects of the
mysterious process of abstraction (which is in fact little different from the method adopted, or
advocated, by many dialecticians
--, and which is
rarely noticed) involves the drawing of an unintended analogy between the
properties an object is supposed to have and clothing. Hence, in the
'abstractive process', as each outwardly unique distinguishing feature of a
particular is 'peeled off' (or "disregarded") by 'the intellect', the true
(general) form of
the 'object' in question is supposed gradually to come into view -- but, of course,
that only takes place in the
'mind's eye'. This 'mental disrobing ceremony' is, naturally, accessible only to those
who are capable of 'metaphysically undressing' things like tables, chairs, cats, dogs,
electrons and galaxies. Indeed, 'conceptual strippers' like this must be capable of
deciding what has to betrue not only of all the many examples of 'the same sort' (for instance, all
cats) that haven't been ideally skinned in this way (by anyone, and not just themselves), but also of the
many more that no human will ever experience -- based solely on a brief
'internal' inspection of a severely restricted sample of these ghostly
spectres.
However, and this should hardly need pointing out, the properties of objects
don't resemble apparel in any meaningful sense.
If this had ever been an apt analogy then these 'metaphysical garments' (i.e., an
object's properties) would be just as shareable as items of clothing. On
that basis, dogs should be expected to be able to sing like larks, kettles
recite the
Gettysburg Address, and dialecticians accept criticism.
Nevertheless, the analogy with clothing is
as inapt as any could be. For one thing, it is surely abnormal to imagine
that clothing is causally related to -- or physically connected with -- the body of
its wearer. Yet, the properties of an object are linked (in some way) to its
constitution. Colour, for example, is intimately connected with the atomic and
molecular structure of the item in question (and, of course, the light source). For another, while clothing may perhaps serve to hinder the
appreciation of underlying form, an object's properties advertise it, they don't mask it. They are,
so to speak, 'metaphysically transparent'.
This image,
of course, undermines the necessary connection between each 'essence', each
'substance' and its 'accidents', its properties, threatening the 'rationality'
of nature and society,
discussed earlier. That would be a dagger at the heart of
Lenin's
attempt to appropriate
Hegel's
response to Hume's criticisms of Rationalist theories of causation.
Furthermore, and more absurdly, properties
can't be peeled away from objects as part of a hidden, internal 'disrobing ceremony'
of some description. Or,
if they can, one would expect that the nature of each underlying 'object' should
become clearer in all its naked glory as the proceedings unfold. In fact, we
find the opposite turns out to be the case as each 'metaphysical burlesque show'
proceeds.
If, for instance, a cat were to lose too many
of its properties as it is 'mentally skinned', it would surely cease to be a cat.
Clearly, this philosophically-flayed 'ex-cat' (now 'non-cat') would serve rather
badly in any subsequent generalisation based upon it. Indeed, strip the average moggie of
enough of its properties and it would be impossible to decide whether or not the
rest of the abstractive process had been carried out on the same mammal,
the
same animal, or, for that matter, on the same physical object -- let
alone the same idea of one and all.
Moreover, in the absence of any rules
governing the process of abstraction (such as where to begin, which feature to
abstract first, which second -- which
never) one person's abstractions would surely differ from those of the rest
of the abstractive community.
For instance, while Abstractor A might
begin by ignoring (or attributing) Tiddles's engaging purr, B might start with
her four legs, and C might commence with her shape. But, do we (should
they?) ignore (or attribute) first, second or third a cat's colour, fur, fleas, whiskers, tail,
intestines, age, number...?
And, as part of the abstractive process, which
number
relevant to each cat is to be put to one side (or attributed to it): the one
cat, its two ears, its four legs, its dozen or so whiskers,
or the several trillion atoms of which it is composed...?
And where do we stop? Are we to whittle-away
(or attribute to it) its position on the mat, the last dozen or so things it did, its
current relation to the
Crab Nebula...,
or what?
Perhaps even
worse still, this analogy pictures properties as objects that bodies or
processes possess. For example, it is only possible to abstract colour if it is
treated as an individual in its own right, rather like an organ or a limb can be
removed from a body. This is just another untoward consequence of the 'process
of abstraction' itself, whereby the general nouns we use to express properties
are transformed into the Proper Names of Abstract Particulars (as we saw in
Part One).
It
could be objected that none of the above really
matter; the results will be the same anyhow. But, how do we know? Is
there a rule book to guide us? Is there an abstractionists' algorithm we all
unconsciously 'follow', programmed into each of us at birth (or is it at
conception?), a set of tried-and-tested
instructions? Are we all instinctive abstractors, or do we need training? And, if
there are metaphysical disrobing protocols determining the order in which
Tiddles's qualities are to be paired away (or attributed to it), so that this
process might be executed correctly by the entire coterie of intrepid
abstractors, when and where did they
learn them? On the other hand, if there are no such protocols, how might
each aspiring abstractor know if he or she had abstracted Tiddles the same way
each time?
Do we all keep a secret
Abstractor's
Diary? An internal log of what we did the last time we thought about that cat --
or any cat?
Furthermore, even if there were clear --
let alone plausible --
answers to such questions, another annoying 'difficulty' would block our path: it
would still be impossible for anyone to check
a single one of these abstractions to see if they tallied with anyone else's -- or, for that matter, ascertain whether or not they had 'abstracted' them
right. In fact, the word "right" can gain no grip in such
circumstances -- since, as Wittgenstein pointed out, whatever seems right
will be right. But for something to be right it needs to be checked against a
standard that isn't dependent on the subjective impression of the one judging.
But, there is no such standard, here. Given this theory, everyone's notion of a cat
will be private to that individual abstractor. They have no way of checking
their abstractions with those of anyone else, which means, of course, there can
be no standard, 'abstract cat' to serve as an exemplar, and hence nothing by means
of which anyone's abstractions can be deemed correct.
Later on in this Essay I will
be pointing out the following in relation to Andrew Sayer's and Bertell Ollman's
'theory of abstraction':
True to form, Andrew Sayer's attempt to
characterise this 'process' reveals that he, too, thinks this is an individualised, if
not private skill, in relation to which we all seem to be 'natural' experts:
"The sense in which the term
['abstract' -- RL] is used here is different [from its ordinary use -- RL]; an
abstract concept, or an abstraction, isolates in thought a one-sided or partial
aspect of an object. [In a footnote, Sayer adds 'My use of "abstract" and
"concrete" is, I think, equivalent to Marx's' (p.277, note 3).]" [Sayer (1992),
p.87. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this
site. Bold emphasis alone added.]
As is the case with Ollman, and, indeed, everyone
else who has pontificated about this obscure 'process', we aren't told how we
manage to do this, still less why it doesn't result in the construction of a
'private language'.
Indeed,
this is something Ollman himself pointed out:
"What, then, is distinctive about Marx's abstractions? To begin with, it
should be clear that Marx's abstractions do not and cannot diverge completely
from the abstractions of other thinkers both then and now. There has to be a lot
of overlap. Otherwise, he would have constructed what philosophers call a
'private language,' and any communication between him and the rest of us would
be impossible. How close Marx came to fall into this abyss and what can be
done to repair some of the damage already done are questions I hope to deal
with in a later work...." [Ollman (2003),
p.63. Bold emphases added.]
Well, it remains to be seen if Professor Ollman can
solve a problem that has baffled everyone else for centuries -- that is, those who have even so much as acknowledged it exists!
It
is to Ollman's considerable credit, therefore,
that he is at least aware of it.
[In fact, Ollman is the very first
dialectician I have encountered (in nigh on thirty years) who even so much as
acknowledges
this 'difficulty'! Be this as it may, I
have devoted Essay Thirteen Part Three
to an analysis of this topic; the reader is referred there for more
details.]
Of course, none of this fancy footwork would
be necessary if Ollman recognised that even though Marx gestured in its
direction,
HM doesn't need this
obscure 'process' (that is, where any sense can be made of it) -- or,
indeed, if he acknowledged that Marx's emphasis on the social nature of knowledge and
language completely undercuts abstractionism.
Naturally, this means that this process can't form the basis of
'objective' science (and that remains the case even if we substitute
"idealisation" for "abstraction"). Plainly, that is because (i) No one has access to the
results of anyone else's 'mental machinations' (or idealisations), (ii) There
appear to be no rules governing the production of these abstractions --, or, indeed,
governing the entire 'process' itself --, and, as we have just seen, (iii) There
is no standard of right, here.
By
way of contrast, in the real world
agreement is achieved by the use of publicly accessible general terms already in
common use, words that were in the vernacularlong before a single one of us was a twinkle in our (hypothetical)
ancestral abstractors' eye....
One obvious reply to
the above might be that
we abstract by concentrating only on those factors that are "relevant" to the
enquiry in hand. But, what are these "relevant factors"? And who decides?
How might they be
specified before an enquiry has begun? Surely, in order to know what is
"relevant" to the process of, say, 'abstracting a cat', one would
already have to know how to
use the general term "cat", otherwise the accuracy of any supposed
'abstractions' that might emerge at the end would rightly be called into
question, let alone those concerning the competency of the abstractor
him/herself.
If he/she doesn't already know how to use the word "cat", what faith can be put
in anything they subsequently 'abstract', or even report about such
'abstractions'? On the other hand, if an intrepid abstractor already knows how to use the word "cat"
(in order to abstract the
'right' object), one mind very well wonder what the point is of abstracting that
furry mammal in the first place? This
would seem to be about as pointless as checking to see if you know your own name
by looking it up in a telephone directory.
Again, in response to this it could be argued
that past experience guides us. But, how does it manage to do this? Can any of us
recall being asked/made to study the heroic deeds of intrepid abstractors in the days of
yore? Does past experience transform itself into a sort of inner personal
Microsoft Office Assistant -- or these days,
Cortana -- if we hit the right internal 'Help' key? But,
what kind of explanation would that be of the supposedly intelligent process of
abstraction if it requires a guiding hand? And where on earth did this
'inner PA' receive its training?
Once more, it
could be objected that in the investigation of, say, the biology of cats, it
is important for scientists to find out what these animals have in common with
other members of the same species, family,
order,
class
or
phylum, so
that relevant generalisations might be made about them. In order to do that, zoologists
disregard (or attribute) certain features common to cats and concentrate on
those they share with other mammals, vertebrates, living things, and so on --,
be they morphological, ecological, behavioural, genetic or biochemical (etc.). Clearly, in
each case, and at each stage, greater abstraction is required.
Or, so the argument might go.
Nevertheless, if this is what "abstraction"
means, it is surely synonymous with a publicly accessible and checkable set of
linguistic skills and performances, similar in all but name to description, analysis
and classification (etc.). It has nothing to do with a private, internal 'skill'
we are all supposed to possess, namely being able to polish rough and ready particulars
into smooth general concepts. If abstraction were an occult (i.e., hidden), inner process then,
as noted above, no two people would ever agree over the general idea of, say, a
mammal, let alone that of a cat. All would have their own idiosyncratic inner,
but intrinsically un-shareable and un-checkable, exemplars.
Again, one response to this could be that
while we might use language to facilitate the transition from a private to the
public arena, that doesn't impugn our abstractive skills. Unfortunately, this objection introduces topics
discussed in more detail in Essay Thirteen
Part Three, so readers are directed
there for more details. Nevertheless, a few additional comments are worth making
in reply.
Human beings have generally managed to agree on
what animals they consider belong to, say, the Class Mammalia -- i.e.,
human beings who possess the relevant
education and linguistic skills. We might even join with
Hilary
Putnam and call this a legitimate
division of linguistic labour (although, without implying any acceptance of
his ideas about 'essentialism').
However, this phenomenon doesn't
include humans who are supposed to possess unspecified abstractive powers.
So, for example, trainee zoologists don't gain their qualifications by demonstrating to their
teachers an expertise in performing an 'inner dissection' of certain mental
images, ideas, or concepts. The same is true of practising zoologists. On the contrary, they have
had to demonstrate their mastery of highly specialised techniques,
relevant vocabulary and current theory, which skills they are required to exhibit
publicly,
showing they are capable of applying them in appropriate circumstances in a
manner specified by, and consistent with, the professional standards or
expectations laid down
by their teachers, their professions or their peers.
The widespread illusion that we are all
experts in the 'internal dismemberment' of images, ideas or concepts is motivated by
further
confusion, which also originated in Traditional Philosophy: the belief that the
intelligent use of general words depends on some sort of internal,
naming,
representing or processing ceremony. In effect, this amounts once
more to the belief that, despite appearances to the contrary, all words are
names, and that meaning something involves the aforementioned 'inner acts of meaning', 'naming'
or 'representing' -- matching words to images, sensations, processes,
or
ideas in the 'mind'.
At work here is another inappropriate set of
metaphors which in turn trade on the idea that the mind functions like an inner
theatre, TV or computer screen -- now refined perhaps with an analogy drawn against
Microsoft Windows, whereby 'the mind' is taken to be
"modular" (operated, no doubt, by the internal analogue of a computer geek,
skilled at 'clicking' on the right inner 'icon' at the right moment, filing
items in the right folders, setting-up efficient 'networks', etc., etc.). Given
this family of metaphors,
understanding is clearly modelled on the way we ordinarily look at pictures,
but now applied to 'internal
representations', each of us employing the equivalent of an 'inner eye' to appraise
whatever fortune sends our way.
[This
set of inappropriate metaphors underpins Pixar's recent film,
Inside Out.]
These
tropes are a faint
echo of
Plato's theory of knowledge
by acquaintance
and his
Allegory of the Cave. [Of course, Plato's tropes were intended to make a
different set of points, but his focusing on vision is the relevant
factor for present purposes.] As we have seen, more recent bourgeois versions of this family of
ideas regard knowledge as a passive processing of 'representations' in
the 'minds' of
socially-isolated, lone abstractors -- even if this approach to knowledge has
been augmented by dialecticians
with a gesture
toward practice. Nevertheless, this view of knowledge acquisition pictured
it as a form of acquaintance. The reasoning here is little more
complex than this: we all know our friends by personal acquaintance, or
by sight, so we all know the contents of our minds by (internal) acquaintance or
(inner) sight.
This
once again reminds us why Traditional Theorists argued that knowledge is a relation
between the
Knower and the Known. Here we are the Knowers and our own
(internal) ideas are
the Known.
[There
is more
on this in Essays Three Part Four,
Thirteen Part Three (here
and here), and
Six.]
Naturally, if this hidden, privatised abstractive skill
had ever been of any importance at all in the history of science, we should expect to find evidence
of it in the work of thevast majority, if not every single, scientist. Alas there is none.
Even
an
attempt to investigate the truth of that particular assertion (i.e.,
that there is no evidence that scientists privately dismembered ideas in their
heads/'minds') would
automatically throw into doubt the role that abstraction is supposed to play in
science. That is because such an inquiry would have to examine physical evidence
-- i.e., the notes, documents
and writings of these scientists, not their brains. Indeed, any
recognition that what is relevant here are the publicly available,
written records of these individuals, the equipment and techniques they used
(etc.), coupled with their
social surroundings, circumstances and ideological commitments -- as opposed to the contents
of their heads -- which recognition would
confirm that in their practical activity no historian of any
intelligence actually
believes that abstract ideas (understood in the traditional sense, as the
products of 'inner acts of intellection') underpin scientific knowledge,
whatever
theoretical or philosophical views they might otherwise entertain, or rehearse in
public.
Here, as elsewhere,
actions speak louder than
abstractions.
[Again, several examples (drawn from the work
of a handful of 'great' scientists), which disprove the contention that they
were/are
abstractors extraordinaire will be given in Essay Thirteen Part
Two. (See also below.)]
Admittedly, this way of putting things might
fail to align with the opinion that scientists in general have
about their own methods, but their practical activity belies
whatever post
hoc
rationalisations they might advance concerning the nature of their work.
Except in certain areas of
obsolete psychology, when they endeavour to advance scientific knowledge, scientists
neither report on the results of their own internal processing of 'mental
entities', nor on the contents of their heads. And, they certainly don't require
the same with respect to the heads of others in their field, nor anywhere else
for that matter. On the contrary, as far as their work is concerned they develop
novel hypotheses (at the very least) by extending the use and application of
publicly accessible scientific words, techniques
and, in many cases, established theories.
And, this they do by employing, among other things, analogy, metaphor and an
innovative
use of general terms already in both the lexicon and the public domain. All
of this is often allied with the
construction of tailor-made models and specifically targeted "thought
experiments", augmented by the use of other rhetorical devices. [On this, see the
references listed
here.]
[Naturally,
this doesn't mean that these factors aren't related to the development of
the forces and relations of production. However, as noted above, these issues will be
discussed in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Despite this, it could be objected that the above comments thoroughly misrepresent the way that knowledge advances. In fact
(but edited down), the objection might proceed as follows: scientists attempt to
discover the underlying nature of objects and processes in the world in order to
reveal the laws and regularities (etc.) that govern the universe. Indeed,
DM-fans often quote this famous passage from Volume Three of Das Kapital:
"But
all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of
things directly coincided."
[Marx
(1981), p.956; Marx (1998), p.804.]
[I have
commented on this passage in Essay Twelve
Part One;
readers are directed there for more details. Also see my debunking of the
'appearance'-'reality'/'essence' distinction,
below.]
To take
just one example: an animal's 'essential' nature -- supposedly arrived at by the use of
increasingly refined abstract terms -- turns out to be its DNA (or, if not that
-- it is 'whatever'). Another, but more
general example could be the way that Physicists extend knowledge by developing
increasingly 'abstract theories' expressed in, or by, complex mathematical formulae,
models, or
causal laws.
But,
this can't be correct; scientists manifestly didn't discover DNA by the use of greater or more refined
abstractions. They used the theoretical and practical advances achieved by
both previous and contemporaneous researchers -- that in turn weren't arrived
at by 'abstraction' --, and which they augment with their own ideas. The latter might
also have
been developed by other teams of scientists
working within a certain research tradition, to which might be added the results of other
innovative experiments in the same or related fields. All of these were, and
still are, based on cooperative work,
thought and
observation -- frequently assisted by the use of models and yet more 'thought experiments',
all of which are expressed in a public language, subsequently published,
appraised and checked in the open.
None of these (save, perhaps, those 'thought experiments')
even remotely looks like a 'mental process', still less an example of
'abstraction' carried out in a private, 'inner' sanctum. And,
as far as 'thought experiments' are concerned, these, too, are typically rehearsed
in the public domain, and in a public language. Any alleged 'mental processes'
that accompany them are likewise advanced by an innovative use of language
-- but, with the volume turned down.
['Thought experiments' will be discussed in
more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two; some of the relevant literature devoted
to them has been listed in
Essay Four.]
Of
course, it could be argued that no one supposes that abstraction is "done in the
head", or that scientists don't use a
publicly accessible language in relation to their work. It might therefore be maintained that
scientists still endeavour to form abstract ideas based on their use of
such resources, and in this way.
Again, this isn't what scientists
actually do. The above is a myth put about by professional philosophers
and amateur metaphysicians.
These somewhat controversial claims (i.e.,
those relating to what scientists do, as opposed to what they or others say they
do, or what they
or others imagine
they do, or, indeed, what certain philosophers think they do) will
be substantiated (and illustrated) more fully in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
This
is quite apart from the fact that abstractionists themselves tell us that
abstraction is "done in the head"; many examples of this were listed
in Part
One (here,
here and
here), as well as elsewhere in this Essay (for example,
here and
here).
I
will say more about science and scientists later on -- in the following section: "Appearance and Reality".
Nevertheless, anti-abstractionist thought is
a relatively recent phenomenon. The first major thinker to subject it to
detailed criticism (outside the
Medieval Nominalist tradition, that is) was
Berkeley.
[Berkeley's arguments against abstract ideas
are summarised in Dancy (1987), pp.24-40; a different approach linked to
Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics can be found in Jesseph (1993),
pp.9-43. On Berkeley in general, see
here and
here;
his case against abstraction is expertly summarised
here.]
Berkeley's arguments in this regard revolve
around the observation that it is impossible to form an abstract idea of
anything whatsoever since that would require whatever it is supposed to be to possess and not to possess
several (incompatible) properties at one and the same time. He asks whether
anyone:
"…has, or can attain to have,
an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the
general idea of a triangle, which is, neither oblique, nor rectangle,
equilateral, equicrural (Isosceles
-- RL), nor scalenon (Scalene
-- RL), but all and none of these at once." [Berkeley (1975b),
p.81.]
Based on his own inability to form such
abstract ideas, Berkeley casts doubt on the capacity of others to do the
opposite:
"I can imagine a man with two
heads or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider
the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the
rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some
particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of a man that I frame to myself,
must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a
tall or low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive
the abstract idea above described [of a general man]. And it is equally
impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body
moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and
the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever." [Ibid.,
p.78.]
A somewhat similar argument can be found in
Frege (in his review of
Husserl's
Philosophy of Arithmetic):
"Abstraction
"The
author himself finds a difficulty about the abstraction that provides the
general concept of the collective. He says (p.84):
'The
peculiarities of the individual contents that are collected...must be completely
abstracted from, but at the same time their connection must be maintained. This
seems to involve a difficulty, if not a psychological impossibility. If we take
the abstraction seriously, then the individual contents vanish, and so,
naturally, does their collective unity, instead of remaining behind as a
conceptual extract. The solution is obvious. To abstract from something simply
means: not to attend to it specially.'
"The kernel of this explanation is
obviously to be found in the word 'specially'. Inattention is a very strong lye;
it must be applied at not too great a concentration, so that everything does not
dissolve, and likewise not too dilute, so that it effects a sufficient change in
the things. Thus it is a question of getting the right degree of dilution; this
is difficult to manage, and I at any rate have never succeeded....
"[Detaching our attention] is particularly effective. We attend less to a
property, and it disappears. By making one characteristic
after another disappear, we get more and more abstract concepts…. Inattention is
a most efficacious logical faculty; presumably this accounts for the
absentmindedness of professors. Suppose there are a black and a white cat
sitting side by side before us. We stop attending to their colour, and they
become colourless, but are still sitting side by side. We stop attending to
their posture, and they are no longer sitting (though they have not assumed
another posture), but each one is still in its place. We stop attending to
position; they cease to have place, but still remain different. In this way,
perhaps, we obtain from each one of them a general concept of Cat. By continual
application of this procedure, we obtain from each object a more and more
bloodless phantom. Finally we thus obtain from each object a something
wholly deprived of content; but the something
obtained from one object is different from the something obtained
from another object -– though it is not easy to say how." [Frege (1980),
pp.84-85. Italic emphases in the original.]
Frege's sharpest criticisms were reserved for
those of his day who imagined that mathematical concepts could be created, or
perhaps apprehended, by a 'process of abstraction'
--, in particular, the views of the 19th
century mathematician and Mystical Platonist,
Georg Cantor,
as well as his followers:
"We may begin here by
making a general observation. When negroes from the heart of Africa see a telescope or pocket watch for
the first time, they are inclined to credit these things with the most
astounding magical properties. Many
mathematicians react to
philosophical expressions in a similar manner. I am thinking in particular
here of the following: 'define' (Brahma),
'reflect' (Vishnu),
'abstract' (Shiva).
The names of the Indian gods in brackets are meant to indicate the kind of
magical effects the expressions are supposed to have. If, for instance, you find
that some property of a thing bothers you, you abstract from it. But if you want
to call a halt to this process of destruction so that the properties you want to
see retained should not be obliterated in the process, you reflect on these
properties. If, finally, you feel sorely the lack of certain properties in the
thing, you bestow them on it by definition. In your possession of these
miraculous powers you are not far removed from the Almighty. The significance
this would have is practically beyond measure. Think of how these powers could be
put to use in the classroom: the teacher has a good-natured but lazy and stupid
pupil. He will then abstract from the laziness and the stupidity, reflecting all
the while on the good-naturedness. Then by means of a definition he will confer
on him the properties of keenness and intelligence. Of course so far people have
confined themselves to mathematics. The following
dialogue may serve an illustration:
'Mathematician:
The sign
√(−1)
has the property of yielding -1 when squared.
'Layman:
This pattern of printer's ink on paper? I can't see any trace of this property.
Perhaps it has been discovered with the aid of a microscope or by some chemical
means?
'Mathematician:
It can't be arrived at by any process of sense perception. And of course
it isn't produced by the mere printer's ink either; a magic incantation, called
a definition, has first to be pronounced over it.
'Layman:
Ah, now I understand. You expressed yourself badly. You mean that a definition
is used to stipulate that this pattern is a sign for something with those
properties.
'Mathematician:
Not at all! It is a sign, but it doesn't designate or mean anything. It itself
has these properties, precisely in virtue of the definition.
'Layman:
What extraordinary people you mathematicians are, and no mistake! You don't
bother at all about the properties a thing actually has, but imagine that in
their stead you can bestow a property on it by a definition -– a property that
the thing in its innocence doesn't dream of -– and now you investigate the
property and believe in that way you can accomplish the most extraordinary
things!'
"This illustrates the might
of the mathematical Brahma. In Cantor it is Shiva and Vishnu who receive the
greater honour. Faced with a cage of mice, mathematicians react differently when
the number of them is in question. Some…include in the number the mice just as
they are, down to the last hair; others -– and I may surely count Cantor amongst
them -– find it out of place that hairs should form part of the number and so
abstract from them. They find in mice a whole host of things besides which are
out of place in number and are unworthy to be included in it. Nothing simpler:
one abstracts from the whole lot. Indeed when you get down to it everything in
the mice is out of place: the beadiness of their eyes no less than the length of
their tails and the sharpness of their teeth. So one abstracts from the nature
of the mice. But from their nature as what is not said; so one abstracts presumably
from all their properties, even from those in virtue of which we call them mice,
even from those in virtue of which we call them animals, three-dimensional
beings -– properties which distinguish them, for instance, from the number 2.
"Cantor demands more: to arrive at
cardinal numbers, we are required to abstract from the order in which they
are given. What is to be understood by this? Well, if at a certain moment we
compare the positions of the mice, we see that of any two one is further to the
north than the other, or that both are to the same distance to the north. The same
applies to east and west and above and below. But this is not all: if we compare the mice
in respect of their ages, we find likewise that of any two one is older than the
other or that both have the same age. We can go on and compare them in respect
of their length, both with and without their tails, in respect of the pitch of
their squeaks, their weight, their muscular strength, and in many other respects
besides. All these relations generate an order. We shall surely not go astray if
we take it that this is what Cantor calls the order in which things are given.
So we are meant to abstract from this order too. Now surely many people will say
'But we have already abstracted from their being in space; so ipso facto
we have already abstracted from north and south, from difference in their
lengths. We have already abstracted from the ages of the animals, and so
ipso facto from one's being older than another. So why does special mention
also have to be made of order?'
"Well, Cantor also defines what he calls an ordinal type; and in order to arrive
at this, we have, so he tells us, to stop short of abstracting from the order in
which the things are given. So presumably this will be possible too, though only
with Vishnu's help. We can hardly dispense with this in other cases too. For the
moment let us stay with the cardinal numbers.
"So let us get a number of men together
and ask them to exert themselves to the utmost in abstracting from the nature of
the pencil and the order in which its elements are given. After we have allowed them
sufficient time for this difficult task, we ask the first 'What general
concept…have you arrived at?' Non-mathematician that he is, he answers 'Pure
Being.' The second thinks rather 'Pure nothingness', the third -– I suspect a
pupil of Cantor's -– 'The cardinal number one.' A fourth is perhaps left with
the woeful feeling that everything has evaporated, a fifth -– surely a pupil of
Cantor's -– hears an inner voice whispering that graphite and wood, the
constituents of the pencil, are 'constitutive elements', and so arrives at the
general concept called the cardinal number two. Now why shouldn't one man come
out with the answer and the other with another? Whether in fact Cantor's
definitions have the sharpness and precision their author boasts of is
accordingly doubtful to me. But perhaps we got such varying replies because it
was a pencil we carried out our experiment with. It may be said 'But a pencil
isn't a set.' Why not? Well then, let us look at the moon. 'The moon is not a
set either!' What a pity! The cardinal number one would be only too happy to
come into existence at any place and at any time, and the moon seemed the very
thing to assist at the birth. Well then, let us take a heap of sand. Oh dear,
there's someone already trying to separate the grains. 'You are surely not going
to try and count then all! That is strictly forbidden! You have to arrive at the
number by a single act of abstraction....' 'But in order to be able to abstract
from the nature of a grain of sand, I must surely first have looked at it,
grasped it, come to know it!' 'That's quite unnecessary. What would
happen to the infinite cardinals in that case? By the time you had looked at the
last grain, you would be bound to have forgotten the first ones. I must
emphasise once more that you are meant to arrive at the number by a single act
of abstraction. Of course for that you need the help of supernatural powers.
Surely you don't imagine you can bring it off by ordinary abstraction. When you
look at books, some in
quarto, some
in octavo,
some thick, some thin, some in
Gothic type
and some in
Roman and you abstract from these properties which distinguish them, and
thus arrive at, say, the concept "book", this, when you come down to it, is no
great feat. Allow me to clarify for you the difference between ordinary
abstraction and the higher, supernatural, kind.
"With
ordinary abstraction we start out by comparing objects a, b, c, and find
that they agree in many properties but differ in others. We abstract from the
latter and arrive at a concept
Φ under which a and b and
c all fall. Now this concept has neither the properties abstracted from nor
those common to a, b and c. The concept "book", for
instance, no more consists of printed sheets -- although the individual books we
started by comparing do consist of such -- than the concept "female mammal"
bears young or suckles them with milk secreted from its glands; for it has no
glands. Things are quite different with supernatural abstraction. Here we have,
for instance, a heap of sand...." [Frege
(1979), pp.69-71. Unfortunately, the manuscript breaks off at this point.
Italic emphases in the original. Links added; reformatted to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Frege's parody of Cantor illustrates just how ridiculous it is to suppose that abstraction can create mathematical concepts out of
mere signs, or, indeed, out of anything. [Frege's comments find echo in the
thoughts of
Fraser Cowley, quoted elsewhere
in this Essay. Frege's criticisms of Cantor are summarised
in Dauben (1979), pp.220-25. A more detailed discussion of these matters can be
found in Dummett (1991). On the mystical provenance of much of Cantor's work, see Aczel (2000).]
There are several remarkably similar passages
to the above in Marx's earlier work:
"Is it surprising that everything, in the final
abstraction -- for we have here an abstraction, and not an analysis -- presents itself as a logical category? Is it surprising that, if you
let drop little by little all that constitutes the individuality of a house,
leaving out first of all the materials of which it is composed, then the form
that distinguishes it, you end up with nothing but a body; that if you leave out
of account the limits of this body, you soon have nothing but a space -– that
if, finally, you leave out of account the dimensions of this space, there is
absolutely nothing left but pure quantity, the logical category? If we abstract
thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, animate or inanimate, men or
things, we are right in saying that in the final abstraction the only substance
left is the logical categories. Thus the metaphysicians, who in making these
abstractions, think they are making analyses, and who, the more they detach
themselves from things, imagine themselves to be getting all the nearer to the
point of penetrating to their core….
"Just as by means of abstraction we have transformed
everything into a logical category, so one has only to make an abstraction of
every characteristic distinctive of different movements to attain movement in
its abstract condition -- purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of
movement. If one finds in logical categories the substance of all things, one
imagines one has found in the logical formula of movement the absolute
method, which not only explains all things, but also implies the movement
of things...." [Marx (1978),
pp.99-100. Italic emphases in the
original.]
However, in a passage that has already been
quoted in Part One -- from The Holy Family,
and which reveals Marx and Engels at the height of their philosophical powers
-- we find the following acute observations (notice a similar reference to
Vishnu we found in Frege above):
"Now that Critical
Criticism as the tranquillity of knowledge has 'made' all the mass-type
'antitheses its concern', has mastered all reality in the form of
categories and dissolved all human activity into speculative dialectics, we
shall see it produce the world again out of speculative dialectics. It goes
without saying that if the miracles of the Critically speculative creation of
the world are not to be 'desecrated', they can be presented to the profane mass
only in the form of mysteries. Critical Criticism therefore appears in
the incarnation of Vishnu-Szeligaas a mystery-monger.... ["Szeliga"
was thepseudonym of a young
Hegelian, Franz Zychlinski -- RL]
"The
mystery of the Critical presentation of the Mystéres de Paris is the
mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction. Once Herr
Szeliga has proclaimed that 'degeneracy within civilisation' and rightlessness
in the state are 'mysteries', i.e., has dissolved them in the category 'mystery',
he lets 'mystery' begin its speculative career. A few words will
suffice to characterise speculative construction in general. Herr
Szeliga's treatment of the Mystéres de Paris will give the application
in detail.
"If from real apples, pears,
strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further
and imagine
that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity
existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple,
etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring
that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the
almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the
apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence,
perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and
then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'. I therefore
declare apples, pears, almonds, etc., to be mere forms of existence, modi,
of 'Fruit'. My finite understanding supported by my senses does of
course distinguish an apple from a pear and a pear from an almond, but
my speculative reason declares these sensuous differences inessential and
irrelevant. It sees in the apple the same as in the pear, and in the
pear the same as in the almond, namely 'Fruit'. Particular real fruits
are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -- 'Fruit'.
"By
this method one attains no particular wealth of definition. The
mineralogist whose whole science was limited to the statement that all minerals
are really 'the Mineral' would be a mineralogist only in his
imagination. For every mineral the speculative mineralogist says 'the
Mineral', and his science is reduced to repeating this word as many times as
there are real minerals.
"Having reduced the different
real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit',
speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow
to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the
diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as
hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is
easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to
arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the
abstraction.
"The speculative philosopher
therefore relinquishes the abstraction 'the Fruit', but in a
speculative, mystical fashion -- with the appearance of not
relinquishing it. Thus it is really only in appearance that he rises above his
abstraction. He argues somewhat as follows:
"If apples, pears, almonds
and strawberries are really nothing but 'the Substance', 'the
Fruit', the question arises: Why does 'the Fruit' manifest itself to me
sometimes as an apple, sometimes as a pear, sometimes as an almond? Why this
semblance of diversity which so obviously contradicts my speculative
conception of Unity, 'the Substance', 'the Fruit'?
"This, answers the
speculative philosopher, is because 'the Fruit' is not dead,
undifferentiated, motionless, but a living, self-differentiating, moving
essence. The diversity of the ordinary fruits is significant not only for my
sensuous understanding, but also for 'the Fruit' itself and for
speculative reason. The different ordinary fruits are different manifestations
of the life of the 'one Fruit'; they are crystallisations of 'the
Fruit' itself. Thus in the apple 'the Fruit' gives itself an apple-like
existence, in the pear a pear-like existence. We must therefore no longer say,
as one might from the standpoint of the Substance: a pear is 'the
Fruit', an apple is 'the Fruit', an almond is 'the Fruit', but
rather 'the Fruit' presents itself as a pear, 'the Fruit'
presents itself as an apple, 'the Fruit' presents itself as an almond;
and the differences which distinguish apples, pears and almonds from one another
are the self-differentiations of 'the Fruit' and make the particular
fruits different members of the life-process of 'the Fruit'. Thus 'the
Fruit' is no longer an empty undifferentiated unity; it is oneness as
allness, as 'totality' of fruits, which constitute an 'organically
linked series of members'. In every member of that series 'the
Fruit' gives itself a more developed, more explicit existence, until finally, as
the 'summary' of all fruits, it is at the same time the living
unity which contains all those fruits dissolved in itself just as it
produces them from within itself, just as, for instance, all the limbs of the
body are constantly dissolved in and constantly produced out of the blood.
"We see that if the
Christian religion knows only one Incarnation of God, speculative
philosophy has as many incarnations as there are things, just as it has here in
every fruit an incarnation of the Substance, of the Absolute Fruit. The main
interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real
ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears,
almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we
rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples,
semblances
of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for
they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of
the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind.
Hence what is delightful in this speculation is to rediscover all the real
fruits there, but as fruits which have a higher mystical significance, which
have grown out of the ether of your brain and not out of the material earth,
which are incarnations of 'the Fruit', of the Absolute Subject.
When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the
mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the
contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into
sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of
'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the
mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the
Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses,
for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond.
Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their
natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which
gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute
Fruit'.
"The ordinary man does not
think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples
and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative
way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by
producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the
unreal
creation of the mind 'the Fruit'. And in regard to every object the
existence of which he expresses, he accomplishes an act of creation.
"It goes without saying that
the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by
presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist
in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the
names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to
abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by
which he passes
from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity
of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'
"In the speculative way of
speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject,
as an
inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension
constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx
and Engels
(1975), pp.54-60. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Italic emphases in the original.]
This quotation almost completely undermines
the DM-theory of abstraction. It is a pity that both Marx and Engels later seem
to have lost the philosophical clarity of thought they displayed in this passage.
In many respects it
anticipatesFrege's and Wittgenstein's
approach to abstract ideas, even if phrased in a completely different
philosophical idiom.
It is worth underlining the fact that this
passage exposes the sham nature of the 'dialectical circuit', not just Hegel's
use of it.As Marx and Engels argue:
"Having reduced the different
real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit',
speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow
to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the
diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc….
Indeed, it is impossibleto arrive at the opposite of an
abstraction without
relinquishing the abstraction….
"When you return from the
abstraction, the
supernatural creation of the mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural
fruits, yougive on the contrary the natural fruits a
supernatural significanceand transform them into sheer abstractions.
Your main interest is then to point out the unity of 'the Fruit'
in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the mystical
interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the Fruit'
realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for
instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence
the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their
natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which
gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute
Fruit.'" [Ibid., pp.58-60. Bold emphases added; italic emphases in the
original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Marx and Engels are quite clear here: no
amount of "careful empirical" checking can turn a creature of abstraction back
into its concrete alter ego.
It is also important to note that Marx and Engels
also anticipated the approach adopted in these Essays -- that abstract general ideas are
the result of a syntactically inept re-interpretation of ordinary general terms
(outlined in detail in
Part One of this
Essay). As they themselves pointed out:
"The
ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states
that there are apples and pears. But when the
philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says
something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the
real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal
creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….
"It goes without saying that
the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by
presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist
in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the
names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to
abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity,
by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be
the
self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'" [Ibid., p.60.
Bold emphases added; italic emphases in the original. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
Here, Marx and Engels quite rightly point out
that it is the distortion of language that gives life to metaphysical
abstraction. Indeed, they underlined this approach to ordinary language (and the
distortion it suffers in the hands of Philosophers) in The German Ideology
(partially quoted earlier):
"For philosophers, one of the most difficult
tasks is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world.
Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers
have given thought an independent existence, so they had to make language into
an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which
thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of
descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the
problem of descending from language to life.
"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an
independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations
of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive,
systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and
philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence
of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a
consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers would only
have to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, to recognise it as the distorted language of the actual world, and
to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of
their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added;
italic emphases in the original.]
The highlighted section of the last paragraph
above might well serve as the guiding principle of this site. Indeed,
Wittgenstein
himself could almost have written it.
In his perceptive analysis of
Metaphysics,
the late
Fraser
Cowley had this to say about 'abstract universals':
"In the traditional doctrine,
according to which one can both refer to universals and predicate them of
particulars and other universals, a general term like 'lion' would signify or
designate a universal. This universal would be predicated of a particular in
such a sentence as 'This is a lion' and referred to in such a sentence as 'The
lion is a creature of the cat family.' The lion being carnivorous and subject, I
believe, to melancholy in captivity, that universal would be carnivorous and
subject to melancholy. And just as one can point to an animal and say 'this
kind' or 'this species', so one should be able to point to one and say 'This
universal comes from East Africa'…. But clearly 'universal' is not admissible in
such contexts, and this shows that the logical syntax is quite different from
that of 'kind,' 'sort,' 'type,' 'species,' and so on….
"Many people have tried in
their metaphysical performances consciously or half consciously to avoid such
nonsense by referring, for example, to the universal which is allegedly
predicated in 'This beast is a lion,' by the expression 'lionhood.' Many similar
malformations occur in philosophical writings -– doghood, thinghood,
eventhood, and so on. They are formed by mistaken analogy with manhood,
womanhood, girlhood, widowhood, bachelorhood, and of course not with
neighborhood, hardihood, falsehood, likelihood, or Little Red Riding
Hood." [Cowley (1991), p.92. Italic emphases in the original.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Linguistic monstrosities like those above --
and worse -- litter the pages of
(traditional) philosophical books and articles, in their
Ancient, Medieval and Modern incarnations. For example, in a recent book on the
nature of 'Time' we find the following rather bizarre phrases:
"Any property partly composed
of presentness, apart from the two properties of pastness and futurity is not an
A-property." [Smith (1993), p.6.]
Here we note
with Frege that the powers of
certain Asian deities have been channelled in order to create out of thin air the
required temporal 'properties': "pastness", "presentness" and
"futurity." There are countless pages of material like this in
contemporary metaphysical
literature, and not just those concerning the nature of 'Time'.
[Sustained criticisms of abstract general
concepts and ideas (as well as essentialism) can be found in the following: Hallett (1984,
1988, 1991) and Kennick (1972). A more general
refutation of abstractionism is outlined in Geach (1957).
A broad attack on the nature of abstract
objects can be found in Teichmann (1992). See also
here.]
As noted
above several times, 'abstractionism' is intimately connected with the
ancient distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality. It is to that
traditional dogma that I now turn.
A cursory
glance through the first half of this Essay might
motivate the objection that it ignores the fact that scientists
actually use the method of abstraction, and have done so for many centuries
in their search for knowledge. Hence, according to this widely held belief, they do
so in order to discover -- or 'uncover' -- the underlying, "objective"
nature of reality.
[The
first part of this counter-claim was in fact examined earlier,
here and
here;
both halves will be re-examined in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two, to be
published in 2021.]
However, the above objection invites consideration
of two further ideas that DM-theorists have also inherited from Traditional
Metaphysics:
(i) The distinction between "appearance" and "reality", and,
(ii) The
difference between "essence" and "accident", "necessity" and
"contingency".
Once again, we see that dialecticians have
(unwisely)
bought into these ancient, aristocratic distinctions, meekly accepting the class-motivated dogma that 'appearances' aren't 'fully real', and
that 'abstraction' is required if we are to penetrate the outer 'shell' of the former in order
to gain knowledge of the underlying 'rational order' represented by the latter. In short, it
enables these intrepid theorists, these erstwhile radicals, to comprehend 'appearances', objects, and
processes more fully, scientifically and philosophically.
Ironically,
as we will discover, this
is the exact opposite of what actually emerges at the end of the
exercise.
"The important thing about a
Marxist understanding of the distinction between the appearance of things and
their essence is twofold: 1) by delving beneath the mass of surface phenomena,
it is possible to see the essential relations governing historical change -–
thus beneath the appearance of a free and fair market transaction it is possible
to see the exploitative relations of class society, but, 2) this does not mean
that surface appearances can simply be dismissed as ephemeral events of no
consequence. In revealing the essential relations in society, it is also
possible to explain more fully than before why they appear in a form
different to their real nature. To explain, for instance, why it is that the
exploitative class relations at the point of production appear as the exchange
of 'a fair day's work for a fair day's pay' in the polished surface of the
labour market." [Rees (1998), p.187. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the
conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases alone added.]
Others agree:
"But, as Marx
said, 'all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the
essence of things directly coincided' and the sun appears to go round the
earth but in reality, as we all now know, it is the other way round." [John
Molyneux, quoted from
here. Accessed 09/02/2018. Bold emphasis added.]
"As we know appearances can be deceptive. Each day the sun
appears to circumnavigate the earth, when the reality is that the earth travels
around the sun. We therefore need to penetrate the veil of appearance in order
to reveal the reality that is disguised within. That is the reason for Marxist
economic theory. As the Soviet economist
Rubin
explained, 'Marx approaches human society by starting with things, and going
through labour. He starts with things which are visible and moves to phenomena
which have to be revealed by means of scientific research...'.
We must see beyond the appearance of things to the real
relationships." [Rob
Sewell, quoted from
here.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Link and bold emphases added.]
"It is because of this very sequence of the successive grades of
scientific knowledge that science can evolve. Knowledge advances by the road of
contradiction. It is accompanied by errors, by deviations from the direct
attainment of its object. The external appearance of things for a time hides
the true content of objects from the eyes of the seeker. Thus when first we look
at merchant-capitalist society the relations between people are hidden by the
relations between things. But the practical mastery of the material world tears
away the covering of appearance from the objects of investigation, rectifies
error by transforming into actuality the true objective content of knowledge,
and purges science of the illusory. Scientific experience, which is handed over
by one generation to the next, and is each time enriched by some new scientific
discovery, is all the time increasing the possibility of an adequate knowledge
of the objective world. The experience of industrial practice, the
traditions of revolution, scientific discoveries, the store of ideas, are handed
over from one epoch to the next and ever more deeply disclose the infinite
possibilities of human thought. In the unlimited advance of human history, at
every new step of its development there is a fuller, richer, more diverse
revelation of the absolute content of the material world, which content, though
confined within historically limited ideas, is nevertheless absolute truth. The
progressive advance of human thought, the law-governed connection of its
different stages, were guessed in an inspired manner by Hegel, who
criticized both the metaphysical view of knowledge (which admits only the
eternity of truths), and relativism. In his Phenomenology of Spirit he
characterizes the succession of philosophic systems in the following words:
'The more the
ordinary mind takes the opposition between true and false to be fixed, the more
is it accustomed to expect either agreement or contradiction with a given
philosophical system, and only to see the one or the other in any explanation
about such a system. It does not conceive the diversity of philosophical systems
as the progressive evolution of truth; rather it sees only contradiction in that
variety. The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say
that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes,
the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant’s existence, for
the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are
not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with
one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them
at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not
contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this
equal necessity of all moments constitutes from the outset the life of the
whole.' [We might note in passing the batty nature of Hegel's analogy
between budding plants and the advance of knowledge -- RL. (Bold added.)]
"But, for Hegel, the inevitable development which gives rise to
these different ideas and successive systems arises from a merely logical
unfolding, so that they are revealed finally as only moments of the 'absolute
idea.' For dialectical materialists the unity of relative and absolute truth is
based on the limitless development of social-historic practice, in which the
systematic connections of the material world are disclosed." [Shirokov
(1937), pp.123-24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Bold emphases alone added. Shirokov is here quoting
Hegel (1977), p.2, although that published version differs slightly
from the version over at the Marxist Internet Archive (to which I have linked)
and the version quoted by Shirokov.]
"But this tendency in capitalism goes even further. The fetishistic character of
economic forms, the
reification of all human relations, the constant expansion and extension of
the division of labour which subjects the process of production to an abstract,
rational analysis, without regard to the human potentialities and abilities of
the immediate producers, all these things transform the phenomena of society and
with them the way in which they are perceived. In this way arise the 'isolated'
facts, 'isolated' complexes of facts, separate, specialist disciplines
(economics, law, etc.) whose very appearance seems to have done much to pave the
way for such scientific methods. It thus appears extraordinarily 'scientific' to
think out the tendencies implicit in the facts themselves and to promote this
activity to the status of science.
"By contrast, in the teeth of all these isolated and isolating facts and partial
systems, dialectics insists on the concrete unity of the hole. Yet although
it exposes these appearances for the illusions they are-albeit illusions
necessarily engendered by capitalism in this 'scientific' atmosphere it still
gives the impression of being an arbitrary construction." [Lukacs
(1971), p.6. Bold emphasis added.]
"[Appearance is a] philosophical term concerned with the
relativity of perception and the difference between immediately given sensual
knowledge and conceptual knowledge of the lawfulness of things. Appearance is
the dialectic of Form and Content, the recognition of the difference between
them. In Hegel's Logic,
Appearance is the second grade of Essence, moving beyond the recognition of the
outer form of a thing to its lawful, inner character or content. Appearance is a
modification of Being which includes Essence
but is transient and unstable, because it is still partial or abstractly
one-sided." [Glossary
of terms at the Marxist Internet Archive. Emphases and link in the
original.]
"Now, if you've never thought critically
about how a capitalist economy works or never had the benefit of reading
Marx, then all of that probably sounds like some pretty crazy sh*t.
About as crazy as telling Joshua of the Hebrew Bible that the Sun is the
stationary centre of the universe (or our solar system) and the Earth
revolves around it. Only a madman would think such a thing. It is
obvious that the Sun rises in East and sets in the West. But, in
reality, the Sun rising and falling around the Earth is merely the form
of appearance that the Sun takes from our immediate experience. If
we took the Sun simply as it appears, never thought critically about its
movements or lack thereof, then we would never be able to apprehend the
nature of our solar system.
"Critical thought demands abstraction. We
must organize the manifold objects of reality in the thought realm of
our minds, which means we have to provisionally distance ourselves from
the complex, concrete appearances and start with the most simple and
abstract category that captures the phenomena we are attempting to
understand. Hence, Marx starts with the commodity in the abstract."
[Quoted from
here. Bold emphases added; spelling modified to conform with UK English.]
[I
have quoted several more comments like this from Herbert
Marcuse,
George Novack, Mao and others in the next main sub-section.]
But, according to Rees,
who clearly agrees with Rubin, Shirokov, Lukacs, and Hegel (perhaps only in this
respect), a commitment to
scientific knowledge also involves the belief that:
"There is a deeper reality,
but it must be able to account for the contradiction between it and the way it
appears." [Rees (1998), p.188. Bold added.]
And, this is where abstraction supposedly enters
into the
picture:
"[K]nowledge requires an
active process of abstraction capable of discriminating between essence and
appearance." [Ibid., p.189. Bold added.]
"Critical thought demands abstraction.
We must organize the manifold objects of reality in the thought realm of our
minds, which means we have to provisionally distance ourselves from the complex,
concrete appearances and start with the most simple and abstract category that
captures the phenomena we are attempting to understand." [Quoted from
here. Bold
added.]
However, abstraction can't simply operate
by itself:
"[A]bstraction can be a
method of seeing reality more clearly…[but] consciousness must issue in
practical activity, which will furnish the proof of whether or not our
conceptions of the world are accurate…. In conscious activity, human
beings overcome the abstractness of thought by integrating it with concrete,
immediate reality in all its complexity -– this is the moment when we see
whether thought really does assume an objective form, whether it really can
create the world, or whether it has mistaken the nature of reality and is
therefore unable to enter the historical chain as an objective force which, in
the case of the class struggle, seizes the masses…. [F]or Lenin practice
overcomes the distinction between subjective and objective and the gap between
essence and appearance." [Rees (1998), pp.190-91. Bold emphasis added.
Paragraphs merged.]
It is far
from clear what much of the above actually means (and that isn't just because of
the obscure language used), but for present purposes attention will be confined to
the supposed 'contradiction' between "appearance" and "deeper reality" as both of these notions apply to the natural and the social world.
["Social contradictions" will be examined
below, and in much more detail Essay Eight Parts
Two and
Three.]
Do
'appearances' motivate false beliefs? Dialecticians appear to be rather confused about
this (irony intended).
Maybe this
is all a little too hasty. In which case, it might be both wise and helpful to examine
(in slightly more
detail) what Hegel and
several DM-theorists have
had to say about the connection between 'appearance' and 'reality'/'essence'/'actuality',
as well as any link their words might have with the nature and origin of false beliefs.
Unfortunately, finding a clear, connected series of ideas in Hegel is like
looking for a thread of straw-coloured cotton hidden somewhere in a dozen haystacks; nevertheless,
here are some of the things he had to say:
"The
view that the objects of
immediate
consciousness, which constitute the body of experience, are mere appearances
(phenomena) was another important result of the Kantian philosophy. Common
Sense, that mixture of sense and understanding, believes the objects of which it
has knowledge to be severally independent and self-supporting; and when it
becomes evident that they tend towards and limit one another, the
interdependence of one upon another is reckoned something foreign to them and to
their true nature. The very opposite is the truth. The things immediately
known are mere appearances -- in other words, the ground of their being
is not in themselves but in something else. But then comes the important
step of defining what this something else is. According to Kant, the things that
we know about are
to us appearances only, and we can never know their
essential
nature, which belongs to another world we cannot approach. Plain
minds have not unreasonably taken exception to this subjective idealism, with
its reduction of the facts of consciousness to a purely personal world, created
by ourselves alone. For the true statement of the case is rather as follows.
The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere phenomena, not for us
only, but in their own nature; and the true and proper case of these things,
finite as they are, is to have their existence founded not in themselves but in
the universal divine Idea. This view of things, it is true, is as idealist
as Kant's; but in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the Critical
philosophy should be termed absolute idealism. Absolute idealism, however,
though it is far in advance of vulgar
realism, is by no means merely restricted to philosophy. It lies at the root
of all religion; for religion too believes the actual world we see, the sum
total of existence, to be created and governed by God." [Hegel
(1975, §45, p.73. Links in the original. Bold added.]
"The
Essence must appear or shine forth. Its shining or reflection in it is the
suspension and translation of it to immediacy, which, while as
reflection-into-self it is matter or subsistence, is also form,
reflection-on-something-else, a subsistence which sets itself aside. To show or
shine is the characteristic by which essence is distinguished from
Being -- by which it is essence; and it is this show which, when it is
developed, shows itself, and is Appearance. Essence accordingly is not
something beyond or behind appearance, but -- just because it is the essence
which exists -- the existence is
Appearance (Forth-shining).
"Existence
stated explicitly in its contradiction is Appearance. But appearance
(forth-showing) is not to be confused with a mere show (shining). Show is the
proximate truth of Being or immediacy. The immediate, instead of being, as we
suppose, something independent, resting on its own self, is a mere show, and as
such it is packed or summed up under the simplicity of the immanent essence. The
essence is, in the first place, the sum total of the showing itself, shining in
itself (inwardly); but, far from abiding in this inwardness, it comes as a
ground forward into existence; and this existence being grounded not in itself,
but on something else, is just appearance. In our imagination we ordinarily
combine with the term appearance or
phenomenon the conception of an indefinite congeries of things existing, the
being of which is purely
relative, and which consequently do not rest on a foundation of their own,
but are esteemed only as passing stages. But in this conception it is no less
implied that essence does not linger behind or beyond appearance. Rather
it is, we may say, the infinite kindness which lets its own show freely issue
into
immediacy, and graciously allows it the joy of existence. The appearance
which is thus created does not stand on its own feet, and has its being not in
itself but in something else. God who is the essence, when he lends existence to
the passing stages of his own show in himself, may be described as the goodness
that creates the world: but he is also the power above it, and the
righteousness, which manifests the merely phenomenal character of the content of
this existing world, whenever it tries to exist in independence." [Ibid.,
§131, pp.186-87. Links in the original; bold emphases added.]
This
shows Hegel held these peculiar ideas for theological reasons, but what he
has to say above (e.g.,"essence does not linger behind or beyond
appearance") appears to contradict what we read
below (no pun intended).I'll
return to consider that presently.
"Essence
that issues from being seems to confront it as an opposite; this immediate
being is, in the first instance, the unessential.
But secondly, it is more than merely unessential being, it is essenceless being,
it is illusory being[Illusory Being,
Schein = Appearance -- RL.] Thirdly, this illusory being is not something
external to or other than essence; on the contrary, it is essence's own illusory
being. The showing of this illusory being within essence itself is
reflection." [Hegel
(1999), §818,
p.394. Bold emphases alone added.]
The above
clearly implies that the opposite of 'essence' is 'illusory being' (Schein =
appearance or illusion), and that can only mean it is in 'some sense false', or
misleading. It is hard to see how anything illusory can fail to motivate false
beliefs --, or, at the very least, for it fail to be misleading.
Michael
Inwood adds the following thoughts concerning Hegel's ideas in this area:
"Essence
shows or appears (scheint), but itself
remains hidden behind a veil of Schein.... This suggests the idea of
a world that is the reverse of the world of appearances, in which everything
that has, in our world, a certain quality, has, in the world in itself, the
opposite quality." [Inwood (1992), pp.39-40.
Bold emphases alone added.]
Once more,
it isn't easy to see how this wouldn't motivate certain false beliefs.
However,
Hegel's theory is rather more complex than the above brief remarks might
suggest; it isn't as if 'essence' is 'true' and appearance is 'false', to put
this at its crudest. The relation between the two is much more involved (if that
is even the correct word!). The background is again supplied for us by Inwood:
"Kant held
that objects with which we are acquainted are appearances. So too does Hegel, or
at least he regards some of them as appearances. But he does not mean the same
by 'appearance' as Kant does. Kant distinguishes carefully between the words
'appearance' (Erscheinung) and 'illusion' (Schein). All phenomenal
objects are appearances, in the sense that they are merely the way in which
reality as it is in itself appears to us. But we can, nevertheless, distinguish
between the illusory and the real within our experience, within the realm of
appearances:
'When I say
that the intuition of outer objects and
the self-intuition of the mind alike represent the objects and the mind, in
space and time, as they affect our sense, that is, as they appear. I do not mean
to say that these objects are a mere illusion. For in an appearance the
objects, nay even the properties that we ascribe to them, are always regarded as
something actually given. Since, however, in the relation of the given object to
the subject, such properties depend on the mode of intuition of the subject,
this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in
itself.' [Inwood is here quoting
Kant (1998), B69, p.190, although he has employed a different
translation.]
"Hegel, too,
distinguishes between Schein and Erscheinung, but not in the same
way that Kant does. The word Schein, for example, does not mean only
'illusion', but has connotations, over and above those which Kant ascribed to
it, in virtue of its association with the verb scheinen, 'to shine'.
Moreover, unlike Kant, Hegel calls physical entities Schein at least as
often as he characterises them as Erscheinungen, though this is due in
part to his liking for the pun on Sein ['to be' -- RL]. The important
point, however, is that when Hegel claims that objects are appearances he does
not mean what Kant meant:
'The
objects of which we are immediately aware are mere appearances, i.e.,... they
have the ground of their being not in themselves but in something else. But then
the further question is how this something else is determined. According to the
Kantian philosophy the things of which we are aware are only appearances for
us, and their in-itself (Ansich) remains for us an
inaccessible beyond.... The true situation is in fact this, that the things of
which we are immediately aware are mere appearances not only for us but in
themselves (an sich) and that the very essence (Bestimmung) of
things which are thereby finite is to have the ground of their being not in
themselves but in the universal divine idea. This conception of things is then
also to be denoted as idealism, but, in contrast to that subjective idealism of
the critical philosophy, as absolute idealism. This absolute idealism,
although it goes beyond ordinary, realistic consciousness, is yet in substance
so little to be regarded as the property of philosophy that it rather forms the
basis of all religious consciousness, in so far as this too regards the sum of
everything that exists (da ist), in general the world we see, as created
and governed by God.' [Hegel
(1975, §45, p.73. (This is a different translation of the same passage
quoted earlier.) Bold emphases
alone added.]
"We might
infer from this passage that everything except the logical idea itself is an
appearance." [Inwood (2002), pp.408-09.Italic emphases in the original.]
Inwood then
points out that even this might be to misinterpret Hegel. Hegel sometimes
distinguishes objects from appearances, although it isn't easy to see how he can
do this consistently (no irony intended). Anyone interested can read Inwood's
valiant attempt (over the next few pages of his book) to make some sort of sense out of
what Hegel is trying to say -- Inwood
(2002), pp.409-16. In the end he is forced to conclude that for Hegel everything
in the phenomenal world is an appearance, but grounded in "the logical idea", and
hence in 'God'. [Ibid., p.413.]
As we are
about to see, Dialectical Marxists have greatly 'simplified' this picture (in
fact they have hacked it to pieces!), and so it is more than a moot point
whether they have been faithful to the distinction between 'appearance' and
'essence'/'reality' as Hegel conceived it (always assuming a clear idea of that
distinction can be found in Hegel, to begin with!).
Having said
this, it could be argued that 'Marxist-dialectics' must stand or fall on
its own merits. Maybe so, but since Marxist use Hegel as some sort
of philosophical Zimmer Frame, it isn't easy to see how it can stand on its own two feet.
Despite the fact that dialecticians assert
that 'appearance' and 'reality' (or, 'essence' and 'appearance', etc.) contradict each
other, they seldom tell us with any clarity what they mean by this, nor do they illustrate this
alleged clash with examples drawn from the natural
world. [Those that supposedly arise in society will be
examined
presently.] Nevertheless, even if DM-theorists were to provide their
readers with a full and complete explanation, one blessed with crystal clarity, it
would still be difficult to see what the 'contradiction' could actually be
between 'appearance' and 'reality'.26a
In
addition to the passages quoted in an
earlier sub-section,
Marxist dialecticians have made some attempt to explain what they mean,
albeit explanations not yet blessed with the sort of clarity mentioned earlier.
Here is Herbert Marcuse expressing this odd idea as follows:
"Under the rule of formal
logic, the notion of the conflict between essence and appearance is expendable
if not meaningless; the material content is neutralised; the principle of
identity is separated from the principle of contradiction (contradictions are
the fault of incorrect thinking); final causes are removed from the logical
order....
"Existing as the living
contradiction between essence and appearance, the objects of thought are of that
'inner negativity' which is the specific quality of their concept. The
dialectical definition defines the movement of things from that which they are
not to that which they are. The development of contradictory elements, which
determines the structure of its object, also determines the structure of
dialectical thought. The object of dialectical logic is neither the abstract,
general form of objectivity, nor the abstract, general form of thought -- nor
the data of immediate experience. Dialectical logic undoes the abstractions of
formal logic and of transcendental philosophy, but it also denies the
concreteness of immediate experience. To the extent to which this experience
comes to rest with the things as they appear and happen to be, it is a
limited and even false experience. It attains its truth if it has freed
itself from the deceptive objectivity which conceals the factors behind the
facts -- that is, if it understands its world as a historical universe,
in which the established facts are the work of the historical practice of man.
This practice (intellectual and material) is the reality in the data of
experience; it is also the reality which dialectical logic comprehends." [Marcuse
(1968), pp.114-17. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The doctrine of Essence
seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the
scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of
knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical
evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge
deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has
an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show
themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from
one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to
quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that
permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth.
The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential
from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse
(1973),
pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting
Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions employed at this site. Minor typo corrected.]
[We
will see here how wide of the mark the
first paragraph of the above actually is; Marcuse's risible attempt to criticise
Analytic Philosophy
(as well as the ordinary language of working people) has already been taken
apart in
Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
[HCD
= High Church Dialectician;
LCD
= Low Church Dialectician; FL = Formal Logic.]
The above passage, of course, says more-or-less the same as John Rees
(quoted earlier), but with just enough obscure jargon thrown in to
confuse the unwary.
Even so, readers will no doubt have noticed
that an HCD of Marcuse's undoubted stature quotes not one single FL-text (or
source) in support of this rather contentious allegation:
"Under the rule of formal
logic, the notion of the conflict between essence and appearance is expendable
if not meaningless...." [Ibid.]
Marcuse must know that there are many ancient
and modern logicians and philosophers who have in fact adopted this way of talking
(about the distinction between 'essence' and 'appearance'); however, FL itself
doesn't seem to enter into it. If it does, we still await the proof.
Now, this comment:
"...the principle of identity
is separated from the principle of contradiction (contradictions are the fault
of incorrect thinking)...", [Ibid.]
reveals the
depth of confusion we had associated largely with theeven more logically-challengedLCD-wing of dialectical confusion, but it seems HCD-honchos are
just as clueless about FL. Indeed, as we have seen (here,
for example), Hegel committed several egregious logical blunders of his own,
upon which insecure base Marcuse unwisely rests his faith.
This is quite apart from the fact
that contradictions aren't the result of "incorrect thinking". In
fact, they could be the
result of (a) A genuine disagreement between two individuals, (b) An argument
that uses
reductio ad absurdum, (c) A mismatch between theory and
observation in the sciences (more on that in Essay Thirteen Part Two), (d) An
illustrative example in logic (where no mistakes have been made), or (e) An
indirect proof. [(b) and (e) are, of course, variants of one another.]
In which case, many contradictions are the result of the
application of 'correct' thinking.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that
Marcuse admits that:
"To the extent to which this
experience comes to rest with the things as they appear and happen to be, it
is a limited and even false experience." [Ibid. Bold added.]
So he, too, holds that appearances can be, and
(often?) are, false.
George Novack
also weighed in on this with his very own brazenexample of dogmatic apriorism:
"What distinguishes essence
or essential reality from mere appearance? A thing is truly real if it is
necessary, if its appearance truly corresponds to its essence, and only so long
as it proves itself to be necessary. Hegel, being the most consistent idealist,
sought the source of this necessity in the movement of the universal mind, in
the Absolute Idea. Materialists, on the other hand, locate the roots of
necessity in the objective world, in the material conditions and conflicting
forces which create, sustain and destroy all things. But, from the purely
logical standpoint, both schools of philosophy agree in connecting reality with
necessity.
"Something acquires reality
because the necessary conditions for its production and reproduction are
objectively present and operative. It becomes more or less real in accordance
with the changes in the external and internal circumstances of its development.
It remains truly real only so long and insofar as it is necessary under the
given conditions. Then, as conditions change, it loses its necessity and its
reality and dissolves into mere appearance.
"Let us consider a few
illustrations of this process, this contradiction between essence and
appearance, resulting from the different forms assumed by matter in its motion.
In the production of the plant, seed, bud, flower and fruit are all equally
necessary phases or forms of its existence. Taken separately, each by itself,
they are all equally real, equally necessary, equally rational phases of the
plant's development. [We see here that Novack isn't ashamed to cite
Hegel's batty idea
about blossoms which we met earlier -- RL.]
"Yet each in turn becomes
supplanted by the other and thereby becomes no less unnecessary and non-real.
Each phase of the plant's manifestation appears as a reality and then is
transformed in the course of development into an unreality or an appearance.
This movement, triadic in this particular case, from unreality into reality and
then back again to unreality, constitutes the essence, the inner movement behind
all appearance. Appearance cannot be understood without an understanding of this
process. It is this that determines whether any appearance in nature, society or
in the mind is rational or non-rational." [Novack
(1971), pp.86-87. Bold emphasis added.]
It isn't my
immediate concern to criticise this (almost classic) example of Mystical
Natürphilosophie
(however, it will be later), but merely to note: (a) The fanciful way
that the term "contradiction" has been utilised by Novack, and (b) His idiosyncratic use of the word "appearance". Exactly why a seed turning
into a plant makes the seed an "appearance" Novack failed to say (except he
regards Hegel's word on such matters as Gospel Truth), but why any of this is a 'contradiction'
he left
no less obscure. Of course, this might be a faint echo of an idea
Hegel toyed with that anything that is transient or which lacks permanence
is an 'appearance'. [Inwood (2002), pp.408-13.] Indeed, in relation to this it is worth asking how Novack
knows that something is real only if its "appearance" coincides with its
"essence" (always assuming that there are such things as 'essences', to begin
with), that is, over and above merely accepting Hegel's diktat, once
more.
This is in turn connected with the idea that some things appear
for a short time and then disappear or fade away, like someone who (i) Has a
part in a play (as in "NN, now appearing in
Death of a Salesman on
Broadway"), (ii) Occupies an official position for a year, (iii) Testifies
in court (as in "NM is appearing for the prosecution"), or (iv) Is
famous only for
fifteen minutes. Or, maybe even when we (v) Describe how someone looks (as in
"Her appearance gave her away; she was clearly terrified", or "His appearance
changes from day-to-day; he is a master of disguise.") In this sense we
might at a stretch say that a plant or a flower is "an appearance". At a stretch
that is a valid point, but it is still unclear what this has to do with
'essence' and 'appearance'. Originally, the point here was, of course, to contrast the
transient existence of certain phenomenal objects and processes
when compared with others that are perhaps more permanent. For example, the play
mentioned above might be on Broadway for a season, but Broadway will still be
there after the play is well gone. So, it looks like 'essence' is somehow connected with permanence,
'appearance' with transience (no pun intended). And yet, do these more permanent
features of the world have the 'ground of
their being' within themselves, or do they, too, not 'rely on
God'? If the latter is the case, then even they are also 'appearances'. Will Broadway still be
there in five billion years time? I think there is room to suppose it
might not. So, it too is an 'appearance', according to Hegel.
Furthermore,
what connection is there between 'appearances' that might deceive us -- like the
way that sticks appear to bend when partially immersed in water or the way the
Sun appears to rise in the East and fall in the West -- and the sort of
'appearances' mentioned in the previous paragraph, those associated with a
lack of permanence? Presumably sticks will still look bent when partially
immersed in water in ten million years' time, just as the apparent motion of the
Sun will remain the same as long as the Sun, the Earth and human beings still exist. Given the
considerations mentioned above, these 'appearances' are
also really 'essences' since they look like permanent features of the natural
world --, which means, of course, that this distinction itself has become absurd.
[I will return to consider these phenomena again, below,
here,
here and
here.]
Be that as
it may, how
any of this is connected with 'contradiction' is still far from obvious.
Contrast the above comments of Novack's with his earlier warning:
"A consistent materialism
cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason,
intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source.
Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon
evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in
practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
And yet, much of what Novack has to say
about "appearance" and "reality" (and, indeed, about 'dialectical logic' in
general) is based on "abstract reason,
intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source";
and the same can be said about the
other DM-fans quoted at this site on such issues.
HCD
theorist, Hyman Cohen, took great exception to 'crude' interpretations of the
'contradiction' between 'essence' and 'appearance' (as part of his response to
an article
written by Mark Mussachia):
"Yet,
if one consults a textbook of Marxist philosophy (Fundamentals of
Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow -- this appears to
be Konstantinov (1974), pp.188-92 (no pun intended!) -- RL), it is plain to see
that essence and appearance are depicted as complex categories, correlated
categories whose oppositeness does not constitute a total negation, one of the
other, but a unity; they are characterised through one another." [Cohen (1980),
p.120. Italic emphases in the original.]
Here
is what we find in the above textbook (the reader will no doubt notice the
dogmatic nature of what is about to follow
--
"validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other
subjective or purely theoretical source"
-- as well as the dearth of
evidence offered in its support):
"Essence and appearance are correlated categories. They are characterised
thorough one another. Whereas essence is something general, appearance is
individual, expressing only an element of essence; whereas essence is something
profound and intrinsic, appearance is external, yet richer and more colourful;
whereas essence is something stable and necessary, appearance is more transient,
changeable and accidental. The
difference between the essential and the unessential is not absolute but
relative. For instance, at one time it was considered that the essential
property of the chemical element was its atomic weigh. Later this essential
property turned out to be the charge of the atomic nucleus. The property of
atomic weight did not cease to be essential, however. It is still essential in
the first approximation, essential on a less profound level (sic!), and is further
explained on the basis of the charge of the atomic nucleus.
"Essence is expressed in its many outward manifestations. At the same time
essence may not only express itself in these manifestations. When we are in the
process of gaining sensory knowledge of a thing, phenomena sometimes seem to us
to be not what they are in reality. This seemingness is not generated by
our consciousness. It arises through our being influenced by real relationships
in the objective conditions of observation. Those who thought the Sun rotated
around the Earth took the seeming appearance of things for the real thing.
Under
capitalism the wages of the worker seem to be payment for all his work, but in
reality only part of his work is paid, while the rest is appropriated by the
capitalists free of charge in the form of surplus value, which constitutes the
source of their profit.
"Thus
to obtain a correct understanding of an event, to get to the bottom of it, we
must critically test the evidence of immediate observation, and make a clear
distinction between the seeming and the real, the superficial and the essential.
Knowledge of the essence of things is the fundamental task of science. Marx
wrote that if essence and appearance directly coincided, all science would be
superfluous. The history of science shows that knowledge of essence is
impossible without considering and analysing the various forms in which it is
manifest. At the same time these various forms cannot be correctly understood
without penetrating to their 'foundation', their essence." [Konstantinov (1974),
pp.191-92. Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
Well,
this is all rather vague, and not entirely consistent (an approach one
has come to expect from self-respecting DM-ideologues!); one minute we are told that 'essence'
is "profound" and "intrinsic", the next that it might not be
such,
but "relative" and hence not the least bit "intrinsic". At
this point, one might well ask: Is this perhaps a contradiction
between what seems to be the definition of "essence" and what it
'really'
is? I fear the answer might be "yes", since the definition of "essence" appears to contradict
its own 'essence'! And, far from being told that 'essence contradicts
appearance' we find these rather sheepish words in its place:
"When
we are in the process of gaining sensory knowledge of a thing, phenomena
sometimes seem to us to be not what they are in reality." [Ibid.
Bold added.]
Only
"sometimes"? And only "seem"? How often is this "sometimes"? And how strong is this
"seem"? Does the Sun orbit the Earth or not? Are workers paid for all
the hours they work, or not?
As seems plain (no pun
intended, once more!), readers would be well advised to ignore the
DM-criticism of the "either-or" of 'commonsense' at this point since it
looks like (no pun intended again!) the above textbook has just applied it.
That is because the answer must include one or the other of the following options -- either the Earth orbits the Sun, or it is the
other way round, but not both! This textbook clearly concurs, and opts for
the former, not both. So, this innocent-looking "seem" is a
perhaps little stronger than it appears to be (irony intended, this time), since this 'seeming'
itself (i.e., the Sun orbiting the Earth) isn't "the real thing". The Earth orbits the Sun. End of story (so we are
told).
In
which case, it isn't too clear why Cohen referenced this textbook since we are now
no clearer than we were before about what these two (i.e., Cohen and Konstantinov) meant. Quite the
reverse in fact. What, for example, does Cohen mean by the following?
"[E]ssence and appearance are depicted as complex categories, correlated
categories whose oppositeness does not constitute a total negation, one of the
other, but a unity; they are characterised through one another." [Loc cit.]
So,
how is the correct relation (whatever it is) between the Sun and the
Earth "characterised" by the appearance that the Sun orbits the
Earth,
when we are now told that the reverse is the case? As we have just seen, there
is a clear "either-or" at work here, which implies the former and the latter
aren't in the end "characterised through one another".
[However, the
"either-or" of 'commonsense' is in fact far more robust than it
might seem to be to most DM-fans (irony intended, again); on that, see
here.]
Furthermore,
this surely can't be the case:
"The difference between the essential and the unessential is not absolute but
relative. For instance, at one time it was considered that the essential
property of the chemical element was its atomic weigh. Later this essential
property turned out to be the charge of the atomic nucleus. The property of
atomic weight did not cease to be essential, however. It is still essential in
the first approximation, essential on a less profound level, and is further
explained on the basis of the charge of the atomic nucleus." [Konstantinov,
op cit.]
If it were,
then it looks like 'essence' depends on the choices we make, not on the way things
are, independently of us.
Cohen's comment is, therefore, far too brief, confused and enigmatic to be of
much help, while the much longer passage from Konstantinov is, as we have just
found out, far too vague
and inconsistent to be of any use, either.
The same
confusion is apparent in the comments made by a fan of Systematic Dialectics with
whom I debated these issues recently:
"Now, if you've never thought critically
about how a capitalist economy works or never had the benefit of reading
Marx, then all of that probably sounds like some pretty crazy sh*t.
About as crazy as telling Joshua of the Hebrew Bible that the Sun is the
stationary centre of the universe (or our solar system) and the Earth
revolves around it. Only a madman would think such a thing. It is
obvious that the Sun rises in East and sets in the West. But, in
reality, the Sun rising and falling around the Earth is merely the form
of appearance that the Sun takes from our immediate experience. If
we took the Sun simply as it appears, never thought critically about its
movements or lack thereof, then we would never be able to apprehend the
nature of our solar system.
"Critical thought demands abstraction. We
must organize the manifold objects of reality in the thought realm of
our minds, which means we have to provisionally distance ourselves from
the complex, concrete appearances and start with the most simple and
abstract category that captures the phenomena we are attempting to
understand. Hence, Marx starts with the commodity in the abstract."
[Quoted from
here. Bold added; spelling modified to conform with UK English.]
"'[E]ssence' isn’t 'in a secret
world lying behind "appearances"'. It has no reality except in its appearance.
However, taking the appearances to be exhaustive of reality is a mistake.... [E]ssence, necessarily expresses itself through the appearances"
[Quoted from
here and
here; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site.]
First, this isn't how scientific knowledge of the
Solar System developed or went through a profound series of changes in the 16th
and 17th
centuries. As we will see in Essay Thirteen Part Two in much more detail,
Copernicus's ideas, for example, were motivated by two key factors, his
Hermeticism and a desire for mathematical simplicity:
"At
rest, however, in the middle of everything is the sun. For in this most
beautiful temple, who would place this lamp in another or better position than
that from which it can light up the whole thing at the same time? For, the sun
is not inappropriately called by some people the lantern of the universe, its
mind by others, and its ruler by still others. [Hermes] the Thrice Greatest
[Hermes
Trismegistus -- RL] labels it a visible god, and
Sophocles' Electra, the all-seeing. Thus indeed, as
though seated on a royal throne, the sun governs the family of planets revolving
around it. Moreover, the earth is not deprived of the moon's attendance. On the
contrary, as Aristotle says in a work on animals, the moon has the closest
kinship with the earth. Meanwhile the earth has intercourse with the sun, and is
impregnated for its yearly parturition." [Copernicus, De Revolutionibus,
Book 1, Chapter 10, partially quoted in
Kuhn (1995), p.131, using a different
translation.]
Kuhn adds the following thoughts about the work of
the next
scientist in line,
Johannes
Kepler:
"Neoplatonism is explicit in Copernicus'
attitude toward both the sun and mathematical simplicity. It is an essential
element in the intellectual climate that gave birth to his vision of the
universe. But it is often hard to tell whether any given Neoplatonic attitude is
posterior or antecedent to the invention of his new astronomy in Copernicus'
thought. No similar ambiguity exists with respect of the later Copernicans.
Kepler, for example, the man who made the Copernican system work, is quite
explicit about his reasons for preferring Copernicus' proposal, and among them
is the following:
'[The sun] is a fountain of light, rich in
fruitful heat, most fair, limpid, and pure to the sight, the source of vision,
portrayed of all colours, though himself empty of colour, called king of the
planets for his motion, heart of the world for his power, its eye for his
beauty, and which alone we should judge worthy of the Most High God, should he
be pleased with a material domicile and choose a place in which to dwell with
the blessed angels…. For if the Germans elect him as Caesar who has most power in
the whole empire, who would hesitate to confer the votes of the celestial
motions on him who already has been administering all other movements and
changes by the benefit of the light which is entirely his possession?....[Hence]
by the highest right we return to the sun, who alone appears, by virtue of his
dignity and power, suited for this motive duty and worthy to become the home of
God himself, not to say the first mover.'" [Kuhn (1995), p.131, quoting Kepler from
Burtt (1954), p.48. Spelling
modified to conform with UK English. (These link to PDFs.)]
As
Frank
Tipler, Professor of Mathematical Physics, pointed out:
"[T]he
new theory of Nicolaus Copernicus which, while still committed to uniform
circular motion, argued that by placing the sun at the centre instead, the
apparent retrograde motion of the planets could be accounted for with
greater mathematical simplicity and elegance."
[Quoted from
here; accessed 15/09/2020.
Spelling
modified to conform with UK English; bold emphasis added.]
The next scientist in line,
Galileo
Galilei, didn't indulge in any historic feats of 'mental abstraction',
either, as he helped hammer the last few nails in the coffin of the old Aristotelian/Ptolemaic system. Not a bit of it, he looked down his telescope and saw that several
planets had their own moons. The old system couldn't explain this, but it
showed that Kepler's model (which also needed revising) was at least
physically possible. [On this, see Koestler (2017).]
So, 'abstraction' (even if we knew what it was) played no part in this.
Second, one might well wonder how
the above passage might be
rendered consistent -- in relation to how, for example, the Sun 'appears' to move and how any
'essence' here (that is, if there is any!) "necessarily
expresses itself through the appearances". If that were so, why did no one see
the supposed 'essence' here for what it was until the above scientists appeared
on the scene? That is, the fact that the Earth moves relative to the
Sun, not the other way round? Why did it take so long for scientists to arrive
at that conclusion? And how does this particular 'essence' (a moving Earth) "necessarily
express itself through the appearance" of its opposite: the fact that the
Earth appears to be stationary? It rather looks like the 'essence' in this case
(whatever it is!")
failed to "express itself through the appearance". Indeed, it
created in
humanity a set of false beliefs lasting many centuries -- that the Earth doesn't
move and sits stationary at the centre of the Universe --, which is, of course, inconsistent with what we now
know to be the case, that the Earth does move. In fact, it is now plain
that the 'essence' here was locked away in a "secret world lying behind
appearances", since it took so long to force it out into the open!
This is, indeed, what Hegel himself asserted:
"The immediate Being of things is thus conceived
under the image of a rind or curtain behind which the Essence is hidden."
[Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112. Bold added.]
Finally, I
return to consider the motion of the earth several times again below and show
that the neat picture painted by DM-fans isn't quite as clear cut as they
seem to think.
On this
issue, here is
what one commentator had to say (quoted earlier):
"Essence
shows or appears (scheint), but itself remains hidden behind a veil of
Schein (appearance -- RL).... This suggests the idea of a world that
is the reverse of the world of appearances, in which everything that has, in our
world, a certain quality, has, in the world in itself, the opposite quality."
[Inwood (1992), pp.39-40. Bold emphases alone added.]
At a time in
his life when his ideas were influenced by ruling-class forms-of- thought, Marx
also
expressed this idea rather forcefully:
"The contradiction between existence and essence, between matter and form, which
is inherent in the concept of the atom, emerges in the individual atom itself
once it is endowed with qualities. Through the quality the atom is alienated
from its concept, but at the same time is perfected in its construction. It is
from repulsion and the ensuing conglomerations of the qualified atoms that the
world of appearance now emerges. In this transition from the world of essence to the world of appearance, the
contradiction in the concept of the atom clearly reaches its harshest
realisation. For the atom is conceptually the absolute, essential form of
nature. This absolute form has now been degraded to absolute matter, to the
formless substrate of the world of appearance." [Marx
(1975b), pp.61-62. (This links to a PDF.)
Bold
emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]
Here,
too, is Mao:
"We should draw a lesson here: Don’t be
misled by false appearances. Some of our comrades are easily misled by them.
There is contradiction between appearance and essence in everything. It is
by analyzing and studying the appearance of a thing that people come to know its
essence. Hence the need for science. Otherwise, if one could get at the essence
of a thing by intuition, what would be the use of science? What would be the use
of study? Study is called for precisely because there is contradiction
between appearance and essence. There is a difference, though, between the
appearance and the false appearance of a thing, because the latter is false.
Hence we draw the lesson: Try as far as possible not to be misled by false
appearances." [Mao
(1977b), pp.165-66. Bold emphases added.]
So, it seems
reasonably clear from this that for DM-fans, 'essences' are 'hidden' and 'appearances' are
in some sense 'false' or misleading.
In addition, one might
well wonder how the following is even possible:
"It is by analyzing and studying the
appearance of a thing that people come to know its essence." [Ibid.]
Surely, in order to study "the appearance of a thing" we should have to rely on
its appearance, which we have just been warned not to trust, since at least some of
them are "false". [But how we tell all the 'false' from the 'not false'
appearances is unclear.] No use appealing to scientific observations since they
also rely on these suspect 'appearances'. And, what would be the point of
"analysing" these dubious 'appearances' if they can't
be trusted? No good appealing to anyone's writings for help (not even Mao's!) since
they too now confront us as 'appearances'!
"Whereas Kant stopped at contradiction, Kant
being paralyzed by its omnipresence where thought was concerned, Hegel presses
forward to the recognition of the profound truth of contradiction, and thus
Hegel is not trapped with an incognizable essence and a perfectly
cognizable appearance, as in Kant; since, for Hegel, reality can only present
itself by means of contradictory oppositions, such as the opposition
appearance/reality." [David DeGrood, quoted from
here; bold emphasis alone added.]
"Elsewhere, it is the contradiction between
essence and appearance that is emphasised in the dialectic approach." [Hirsch
(2004), p.8. Bold added.]
"In his Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin, after
renewed study of Hegel, explicitly breaks with reflection theory in favour of a
much more dialectical theory of cognition that emphasises the contradiction
between essence and appearance and establishes consciousness, not just as a
reflection of the world, but also as a factor capable, through practice, of
shaping it. Human knowledge, according to Lenin, depends upon an active
process of abstraction, capable of distinguishing between essence and appearance,
rather than passive reflection, an insight with profound consequences for the
theorisation of literary production." [Quoted from
here,
pp.31-32. (This links to a PDF.) Accessed 19/08/2020. Italic emphasis in
the original, bold added.]
"Essence refers to 'the negative reciprocal reflectedness of many capitals with
one another through which they themselves, in as much as they are concretely
different from one another, are posited as capitals essentially identical to one
another; that is existing values that valorise themselves…. This is their
identity within their difference.' Appearance refers to 'the reciprocal relation
of the many capitals among themselves whereby, as capitals that are different in
many concrete aspects, they oppose and compete [with each?] other in order to obtain
their greatest valorisation. This, by contrast, is their difference within their
identity.' [The author] is able to show -- through the Hegelian categories of
repulsion and attraction, quality and quantity, one and many -- that
the contradiction between essence and appearance
is mediated in a more concrete form, 'as capital in its existence
in-and-for-itself'." [Tony McKenna, quoted from
here, accessed 19/08/2020, Bold added.]
"'If the essence and appearance
of things directly coincided, all science would be superfluous'. Does Marx's
dictum lead to novel insights? The purpose of science is to discover the
nature of reality concealed under surface appearance. Based on this
definition, Marx makes the above assertion -- if things appeared exactly as they
are, there would be no need for science to remove the veil of appearance.
Social science, therefore, is the search for the real nature of society,
underneath all of its visible, external façades. If the reality of society is
easily observable in our everyday experience, then there is no need for
scientific reflection on society, as Marx defines science. The idea that society
has an 'appearance', which is not the same as social 'essence', forms the
starting point for the Marxist discussion of ideology. Ideology is what allows a
society to persist, even though the essence of that society may contain
contradictions.
"It is important to note that
the difference between appearance and reality is not due to some form of false
belief or faulty vision on the part of the observer.
The appearances are caused by the reality. There is no 'mistake' in the
observance of society, because it is the nature of society that the essence
projects a certain appearance.
It is the nature of a mirage that it is an illusion,
it is not a case of 'faulty vision'. A person with normal vision will still see
a mirage, as it is the very essence of the mirage which creates the illusion.
"Marx was primarily concerned with the nature of the capitalist mode of
production. The cardinal tenets of Marx's theory of the essence of capitalism
are: Only expenditure of labour creates economic value, in proportion to the
amount of labour expended; workers do not receive the whole value of what they
produce -- capitalists enjoy profits due to surplus value, for which the worker
is not paid; labour power is the only form of capital investment which creates
profit. (1) The social appearance, on the other hand is: An object is worth what
it can be exchanged for in the market, i.e. its exchange-value;
workers appear to be paid for all of their labour; capital is seen to 'create'
profit.
There is clearly a marked difference between the appearance and essence of
society.
Marx uses the idea of 'commodity fetishism' to explain this difference.
'Commodity fetishism' is the vision of objective value in
commodities especially money, as the commodity of exchange. Under a society with
exchange, the only way people can gauge value is during the exchange process.
For example, in the labour market, a worker will agree to a contract with an
employer for a certain wage per time period.
The worker feels that he is being paid for all of his work, and the employer
feels that the value of the labour-power employed is worth the wage.
The actual value of the labour is more than the wage, as the employer will
eventually extract a surplus value when the product is sold. The cause of this
commodity fetishism is the nature of the exchange process. The result is that
some aspects of the appearance of society are the 'inverse' of its essence.
"The notion of 'inversion' is very
important to Marx, as it sums up the idea that the capitalist mode of production
contains contradictions. The contradiction is between the essence and
appearance. Marx goes so far as to say that 'everything appears as reversed
in competition'. Ideology 'conceals the contradictory essential
relations...because it is based on a sphere of reality which reveals the
contrary to its essential relations'. The role of ideology, therefore, is to
hide the essence of society as it contradicts the appearance, which is
beneficial to the ruling class at the time. As ideology is based on the
'phenomenological sphere', or the sphere of 'appearances', it fulfils its role
by reinforcing the appearances of society, thus further burying the 'essence'."
[Luis Avilés, quoted from
here.
Accessed 16/12/2016. Minor typo corrected. Some paragraphs merged.]
So, this theory (that there is a 'contradiction'
between 'essence' and 'appearance') is mainstream and is clearly widely held
among Dialectical Marxists.
However, in the last of the above passages,
Luis Avilés
seems
to want to have his cake and eat it. On the one hand, he claims that
"the
difference between appearance and reality is not due to some form of false
belief or faulty vision on the part of the observer", but then he says
"It
is the nature of a mirage that it is an illusion, it is not a case of 'faulty
vision'. A person with normal vision will still see a mirage, as it is the very
essence of the mirage which creates the illusion." But, if someone sees what she
takes to be water,
which
is just a mirage,
then she is entertaining a false belief that there is water.
Avilés then tells us that
"workers appear to be paid for all of their labour" and the "worker
feels that he is being paid for all of his work...." Is this a true or a false
belief? He adds "The
actual value of the labour is more than the wage."
If so, the aforementioned worker held a false belief.
There appears to be no other way to make sense of this.
Somewhat appropriately, comrades like Avilés
and Mandel (considered below) appear to be able to hold two contradictory ideas
'in their heads' at once, that 'appearances', or the beliefs they motivate,
aren't
false -- even while they
are false!
DM-stalwart, Ernest Mandel, tackles this knotty 'problem'
head on:
"But for Marx, the materialist dialectician,
the distinction between 'essence' and 'appearance' in no sense implies that
'appearance' is less 'real' then (sic) 'essence'. Movements of value determine in the
last analysis movements of prices; but Marx the materialist would have laughed
at any 'Marxist' who suggested that prices were 'unreal', because in the last
analysis determined by value movements. The distinction between 'essence'
and 'appearance' refers to different levels of determination, that is in the
last analysis to the process of cognition, not to different degrees of reality.
To explain the capitalist mode of production in its totality it is wholly
insufficient to understand simply the 'basic essence', the 'law of value'. It is
necessary to integrate 'essence' and 'appearance' through all their intermediate
mediating links, to explain how and why a given 'essence' appears in given
concrete forms and not in others. For these 'appearances' themselves are neither
accidental nor self-evident. They pose problems, they have to be explained in
their turn, and this very explanation helps to pierce through new layers of
mystery and brings us again nearer to a full understanding of the specific form
of economic organization which we want to understand. To deny this need to
reintegrate 'essence' and 'appearance' is as un-dialectical and as mystifying as
to accept 'appearances' as they are, without looking for the basic forces and
contradictions which they tend to hide from the superficial and empiricist
observer." [Mandel
(1976), p.20. (This links to a PDF.) Italic emphasis in the original.
Bold added.]
It could be argued that this shows that
Marxists don't believe that appearances are false.
First of all, it is worth noting that Mandel
considers social phenomena, here. He would hardly suggest, for example,
that because sticks appear to be bent in water that that implies they are bent,
or that this bending is somehow "real". Do they really bend in water? Would it be
false to say sticks are bent in water? Indeed, it would.
Second, Mandel asserted that Marx would have
laughed at any 'Marxist' who suggested "prices were 'unreal'" simply because
prices are really determined by the movement of value. But, would it be
true to say that price is an accurate reflection of value? No, it wouldn't. So,
this appearance (that is, if it is one!) is deceptive and motivates a
false belief among economists. Which Marxist would accept this as a
true picture of the economy? Would Marx? Again, no, he wouldn't.
Third, Mandel then argues that:
"The distinction between 'essence' and
'appearance' refers to different levels of determination, that is in the last
analysis to the process of cognition, not to different degrees of reality."
[Ibid.]
Well, this would suggest that Marxism
doesn't actually tell us about "reality", since, according to
Mandel, the distinction between
"appearance" and "essence" is merely a
heuristic device, which no more relates to "reality" than any other
"appearance". "Essence" would now seem to be no more "real" than, say, the 'real'
shape of a table. When asked what the 'real shape of a table' is, what could
anyone say? Tables look different from different angles, as does everything else. If
someone were to insist that this is the 'real shape of a table', would
they be stating a truth? Of course not.
Hence, Mandel's 'explanation' is no help at all. It
fails to show that 'appearances' don't motivate false beliefs -- perhaps those
held by anyone 'not in the know' --, or that the distinction between 'appearance' and 'essence' doesn't
confirm the accusation that Marxists
believe 'appearances' are in some sense false.
[I will look at what Mandel
says about 'abstraction' in a later re-write of this Essay.]
Finally, as we will see in Essay Ten
Part One, a desperate appeal to "practice" here (perhaps in order to
help resolve these 'problems') would be to no avail. Practice takes place at the
level of 'appearances', so one set of 'appearances' can hardly absolve another
set -- that is, if they needed absolving in the first place!
Issues connected with 'commonsense' have a role to play in the distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'/'essence'. However, few DM-theorists inform
their readers/audience (with any consistency or
clarity) what they mean by 'commonsense' (although Lenin once claimed that "common sense = the prejudices of its time" [Lenin
(1961), p.271]) -- let alone what its core, or even component, beliefs are supposed to be. One theorist
who did make some attempt to address this 'problem' was the
STD,
Teodor Oizerman.
Here, he is speaking about 'everyday
consciousness', which I take it is meant to be the same as 'commonsense':
"Everyday consciousness is a multi-layered
complex and contradictory entity composed of a multitude of perceptions,
emotions and concepts that are generated and continuously reproduced by the
relatively constant and familiar conditions surrounding individuals.... We
encounter concepts of everyday consciousness everywhere. They are, first and
foremost, empirical notions consisting partly of relative truths and partly of
illusions and errors: water boils at 100oC;
gold does not rust; the sun rises in the morning and sets in the evening; money
in a savings bank pays interest. Proverbs are classic expressions of everyday
consciousness, polished to perfection by the ages; they are the quintessence of
popular wisdom ('life is not a bed of roses'), the class instinct of the
oppressed and exploited..., popular fears and hopes." [Oizerman (1982), p.101.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
One
can almost hear the contempt and condescension in Oizerman's voice as he wrote
this. But, what evidence was offered in support of these claims?
None at
all.
[I
have said much more about 'commonsense',
here.]
We
will examine one of Oizerman's examples (sunrise) later in this Essay, but if we focus on the
volunteered example given below, we
might be able to make some sense of the broader claim that there is a 'clash of
sorts' between the way things appearto be and the truths scientists and
Philosophers are supposed to be looking for, somehow tucked away and hidden 'below
the surface' -- that is, the supposed clash between 'commonsense' and 'science'.
The
following case in point has been deliberately
chosen for its triteness and its familiarity. A more
arcane
example
would plainly have obscured the issues involved. As noted above, other instances of this
phenomenon (where 'appearances' appear to 'contradict reality') will be considered as
the argument unfolds in this Essay, as well as in other Essays posted at this site.
This volunteered example concerns the
apparent incongruity that exists between the way that sticks look bent, and the
fact that they do not really bend, when they are partially immersed in water. Of
course, it could be objected that this doesn't illustrate a process
in nature, and so it isn't relevant. Nevertheless, it is relatively easy to
adapt this example so that the objection itself becomes irrelevant, as we will also see.
[Other instances of this alleged incongruity can be modified in like manner, but I
will refrain from doing so here for
obvious reasons. Hence, they should be viewed in the same way, in order to help prevent
this section descending into
recondite, scholastic pedantry.]
Be
this as it may, this illusion, or incongruity, might be expressed as follows:
R1: This stick appears bent
in water.
R2: It isn't the case that
this stick appears bent in water.27
R1a: This stick appears to
bend when immersed in water.
R2a: It isn't the case that
this stick appears to bend when immersed in water.
R1 and R2, and R1a and R2a, form apparently
contradictory pairs, but this type of incongruity clearly isn't the sort to
which Rees and other dialecticians are alluding -- i.e., the alleged
contradiction between appearance
and reality. Plainly, R1 and R2 are both about appearances,
hence, they don't illustrate the aforementioned clash between appearance
and reality.
Perhaps the following will work:
R3: This stick bends when put
in water.
R4: It isn't the case that
this stick bends when put in water.
Again, these two
seem to be contradictory,
but, unfortunately once more they aren't what Rees and other
dialecticians have in mind, either, since they fail to contrast appearance
with reality. R3 and R4 merely express two contradictory propositions relating
to a possible state of affairs; neither is about
appearances.
However, the following pair of sentences
does attempt to contrast appearance and reality:
R5: This stick appears bent
in water.
R6: It isn't the case that
this stick is bent in water.28
The problem
with the above two is that they aren't contradictories since they can
be both true at
once, just asthey can both be false at once. The truth of one does not
imply the falsehood of the other, nor vice versa. There is therefore no
logical connection between them. Nor do they even seem to be 'dialectically' connected:
that is, they don't struggle with one another, nor do they turn into each other (as they
should if the
DM-classics are to be believed). Moreover, they don't imply one another (in the
way that the existence of capitalist class supposedly implies the existence of
the proletariat, and vice
versa).
[It is worth
reminding ourselves that two propositions are contradictory if they can't
both be true and they can't both be false, at once. Not only do they have
opposite truth values, the truth of one implies the falsehood of the other, and
vice versa. I only mention this since most DM-fans seem oblivious of it,
often conflating the LEM, PB (propositional bi-polarity) and
the LOC
with one another
--
and, indeed, all of them with
opposites,
inconsistencies, absurdities, contraries, paradoxes, puzzles, quandaries, oddities, irrationalities,
oppositional processes, antagonisms,
opposing forces, events that go contrary to expectations,
alongside a whole host of other unrelated idiosyncrasies. In fact, they are so eager
to see contradictions everywhere, that they find they have to tinker with the
meaning of "contradiction" so that (for them) it becomes synonymous with
"struggle", "conflict", and "opposition". I have said much more about this in
Essay Eight Part Two.]
It could be objected that the fact
that sticks appear to bend in water prompts the naďve belief that they do
just that, which contradicts the fact that they don't really
bend when partially immersed. That incongruity, or at least its realisation, could motivate someone into
rejecting an
unscientific or false belief. In that sense, therefore, it could be
argued that reality does indeed contradict appearances. [It is far from clear
that anyone who accepts the line expressed
here or here -- that appearances, or
the beliefs they motivate, aren't false/'unreal' -- can actually make
this argument.]
But, does this make it false
to say that sticks look bent in water? Clearly not. In which case, if these two
sentences were indeed contradictory (recall, no two contradictory propositions can be
true together or false together) -- given that R6 and R5 are both true
--
it would be incorrect to say
that they are contradictory.
R5: This stick appears bent
in water.
R6: It isn't the case that
this stick is bent in water.
Of course, if DM-theorists reject this
contention (as it seems they will), then they must be intending to
revise
the meaning of the word "contradiction", as opposed to using a familiar
term
drawn from ordinary language -- where, incidentally, in ordinary language the verb form ("to
contradict") literally means "to gain-say", to say the opposite
of what another says. Either that, or they intend to
revise a typographically similar word ("contradiction") found in FL
where two contradictory propositions have to have opposite truth-values,
and where the truth of one implies the falsehood of the other.
In
fact, dialecticians appear to oscillate between a hybrid understanding of this word
(no pun intended), positioned
half-way between the meaning(s) it has in the vernacular and the connotations it
has in FL,
all the while somehow linking it with the maverick sense given to the word by
Hegel -- which has yet to be explained with any degree of
clarity.29
Naturally, dialecticians are at liberty to make revisions as they see fit, and
use words as they please, but
any attempt to do so in this case would have no more significance, or effect, than would a
similar attempt to revise the definition of, say, "relative surplus value" in
order to 'prove' that because Marx ignored this 'new definition', his analysis
of the (social) source of value was therefore misguided.
In connection with this, it is also worth
recalling that according to physical theory light rays are deflected from their
path when they
pass between air and water, creating the 'illusion' that sticks bend. However,
if sticks didn't really look bent in water (or if it were false to
say that they appeared to bend when immersed) that would
refute the scientific thesis that light rays themselves deviate upon
entering or leaving the relevant media. Tinker around with ideas like this too
much and far more serious problems will emerge that threaten to undermine much of Physics.
So, even in this sense, appearances aren't
'contradicted by reality' -– far from it, they play an essential part in the
verification of scientific theory concerning light as it passes between
media. Hence, the scientific truth that light
deviates when passing between media is confirmed by, if not
founded upon, the appearance
recorded in R5! And this isn't even a transient appearance (as noted
above, this will presumably last as long as the human race exists); so given
what we found out earlier, this
can't even be an Hegelian
'appearance'.
R5: This stick appears bent
in water.
It could be objected that this is an
entirely specious response. The plainfact is that scientific knowledge is
inconsistent with the belief that sticks bend in water. No amount of
're-interpretation' can minimise its significance.
However, that would have been an effective
rebuttal if, (i) The argument above were about beliefs and not about
appearances, and
if (ii) It could be shown that anyone actually believed (or has ever
believed) that sticks bend in water -- since the
counter-response volunteered in the previous paragraph specifically mentioned what might
plausibly be believed by naďve or untrained observers. Undeniably, such a belief would
be incompatible with what we know to be the case, but the DM-claim is that
appearances contradict reality. It says nothing about beliefs doing
that.
Indeed, the point made above is that far
from reality contradicting
appearances, scientists themselves need appearances to be correct
in order to confirm such things as
Snell's Law,
and hence that they have to take note of what seem to bebent sticks.
Plainly, that is
because scientists have to look at objects and processes in the world, and if they saw sticks in
water that didn't appear to bend when immersed they would either question
whether the liquid concerned was indeed water or wonder if they were
hallucinating.
Hence, the above objection only seems to work by confusing appearances with
beliefs. Now, it certainly isn't being questioned here whether or not
propositions drawn from scientific investigation contradict certain beliefs
about the world (expressed propositionally) that humanity might once have
accepted or to which they still adhere. But, beliefs aren't the same as appearances.
It could be objected that the argument
above is inconsistent; on the one hand, it alleges that there can be no
contradiction between appearances and reality, but on the other hand, it allows
for the fact that there can be -- indeed, there are --
contradictions between scientific propositions and certain beliefs.
So, the above argument
appears to hold that these are contradictory:
How can the first pair be deemed
contradictory while the second isn't?
Or, so it might be
argued.
Of course, the wording of my
earlier claim was specifically this:
B5: It certainly isn't being questioned
here whether or not propositions drawn from scientific investigation contradict
certain beliefs
about the world (expressed propositionally) that humanity might once have
accepted or to which they still adhere. But, beliefs aren't the same as appearances.
Now, while
not p certainly is the
contradictory of p, p itself isn't the contradictory of, NN believes that not p,
although, it would certainly be paradoxical if NN believed not p
while acknowledging that p itself was true. [This has since come to be
known as
Moore's Paradox, after British Philosopher,
G. E. Moore,
one of Wittgenstein's tutors. I have comment on the Paradox in Part One,
here.]
Nor is p
the contradictory of the back end of B4
--
i.e., p isn't the contradictory of "to NN that not p" (in this particular sentential
context).
B4: It appears to NN that not
p.
In that case, B1/B2 and B3/B4 aren't comparable.
[B6 has been
deliberately left in a stilted form so that the point might be easier
to see. In addition, it
mustn't be assumed that I believe
B1 and B2 are contradictory (they aren't!); I am just seeing
where this counter-argument might take us.]29a0
It could be argued that if we re-word
the above, they might still be analogous; perhaps in the following way:
B6: p.
B7: NN has a belief that not
p.
B8: p.
B9: NN has an appearance
that not p.
In response to this I will
merely note that these two sets of sentences can only be made to appear
to be analogous (irony intended) by a crass misuse of language
(in B9). But, human beings can no more have appearances than they can have seemings or
lookings. Of course, if we had sentences in language like B10 (mirroring those
like B9, or even B11):
B10: It believes to me that
not p,
B11:
It appears to me that not p,
then we might be able to make
some sense of this response, but we don't -- and it isn't difficult to see why. We form
our beliefs based on all manner of contingencies, but appearances are things we
undergo, like it or not -- we don't form them. Moreover, we use
sentences like these: "NN believes that p", but not "NN appears that
p"; "NM believes in the branch secretary", but not "NM
appears in the branch secretary"; "NP believes he can win", but not "NP
appears he can win"; "MN has lost her belief in the Labour Party", but
not "MN has lost her appear (sic) in the Labour Party", and so on.
So,
appearances still aren't beliefs, nor are they analogous to them.
Nevertheless, it could be objected that
while sticks might appear to bend in water, the fact is that they
don't actually do this. In that sense, subjective appearances are contradicted by
objective facts.
However, this latest objection itself labours
under several misconceptions:
(1) First, appearances are,
I take it, 'part of
reality' (for want of a better phrase).
No one supposes, surely, that appearances are fictional in the way
that The Tooth Fairy or Pixies are, or that
they have been invented (like, say,
Fake News). It isn't
as if our ancestors made a fable up that there were such things as appearances,
and several millennia later we have finally realised this and have now seen through it. If so, appearances are just as 'real' as unbent sticks. [Of
course, the problem here centres on the word "real" and the profligate
and incautious way it is used in Traditional Thought. I will say more about
that in
Essay Twelve. In the meantime, readers should consult Moore (1953), pp.216-33,
and Austin (1964), pp.62-83.]29a
(2) Moreover, and worse, since neither
'appearances' nor 'reality' are propositional, no contradiction is
possible between them.
It could be objected that the issue
here is the contradiction
between essence and appearance not between appearance and
reality, which is an invention of the present Essay. [However from the
quotations we have seen above, here and
here, that isn't the case.]
But, even if
the meaning of "essence" were itself clear, it is
difficult to see how there could be such a contradiction, not unless appearances
and essences were also propositional. Hegelians might be able to get away
with that idea (but as far as I know they haven't wandered down this
blind alley, yet),
since, for them, everything is Ideal; but materialists can't.
Of
course, that comment itself depends on a view of contradictions I don't expect dialecticians to accept, but until they
tell us what they do mean by their use if this word, little progress can be made.
Since we have only been waiting for 200 years to be informed what dialecticians
actually mean by "contradiction", it might perhaps be a little
impatient of me expect them to produce one in the next century or so.
[This topic is discussed in more detail in
Essays
Four,
Five,
Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three, and Eleven
Part One.]
Moreover, it is important to remember that the example under discussion
here focuses on sticks that look bent in water. In that case, unless dialecticians
have a theory about the 'essence' of sticks that differs from their notion, or
any notion, of
'real sticks', this objection must fail, too. After all, it was Novack who argued
that:
"...A thing is truly real if
it is necessary, if its appearance truly corresponds to its essence....
Materialists...locate the roots of necessity in the objective world, in the
material conditions and conflicting forces which create, sustain and destroy all
things. But, from the purely logical standpoint, both schools of philosophy
[i.e., Idealism and Materialism -- RL] agree in connecting reality with
necessity.
"Something acquires reality
because the necessary conditions for its production and reproduction are
objectively present and operative. It becomes more or less real in accordance
with the changes in the external and internal circumstances of its development.
It remains truly real only so long and insofar as it is necessary under the
given conditions. Then, as conditions change, it loses its necessity and its
reality and dissolves into mere appearance." [Novack
(1971), p.86.]29b
Which more or less settles things: appearances are just as much a
part of reality as essences are, if they coincide. [How they
manage do that in the case of bent sticks I will leave those addicted to
this of this way of talking to figure out for themselves since I don't prefer
this use of language and I can make
no sense of it.]
(3)
Thirdly, the
idea that it is
merely a 'subjective' experience that sticks appear to bend when put in water is
itself mistaken. Not only does everyone
see the same appearance (i.e., bent sticks) -– which means it can't be
subjective (or only one person would see it) -–, but this
apparent bending of sticks forms a basis for the 'objective' fact that confirms
the scientific belief that light changes its path when passing between media. If
the appearance of bent sticks were merely subjective, what should we make of
the idea that light alters its course? Is that subjective too? Is the
'objectivity' of science founded on such weak 'subjective' foundations?
Again, exception might be taken to the claim
that appearances are "objective", since most philosophers and scientists
appear to agree
that they are subjective (no irony intended). Since objectivity relates to something called
"observer independence", appearances must be subjective --
or so it could be argued.
(A)
First of all, I'm not advancing any such claim, since I reject the use of
such metaphysical language. I have already noted above that I don't prefer this way of talking; obscure language like this
is merely being employed here to assist in its own demise. Hence, the frequent
use of 'scare' quotes.
(B)
Secondly, since it is also an appearance that philosophers and scientists believe that
appearances are subjective, that belief must itself be subjective; it plainly isn't "observer independent". In fact, as
should seem reasonably clear, no observation made by scientists or philosophers
would or could ever
be "observer/mind independent", and thus "objective", given
this crazy way of talking.
So, if 'objectivity' is understood as
"observer-", or "mind-independence", then it would be impossible to form an
'objective' opinion of anything -- let alone about 'subjectivity' -–
that is, while we humans unwisely possess
'minds'
and foolishly go about the place observing things.
Indeed, as we shall soon see, any attempt to
classify appearances as 'subjective' (hence not fully 'real') would fatally
undermine not only science, but the opinions of anyone who holds such an unwise
belief.
Hence,
if 'objectivity' is defined as
"observer-independence" etc., then plainly the notion that light bends when it
passes between media (and every other belief we have) can't be
'objective'. As now seems undeniable, the truth of this and every other scientific
idea depends on centuries of observation (and no little human thought,
too),
as much as it depends on the current beliefs of even more human beings. Exactly how
these can be independent of each other is a mystery few
dialecticians bother to explain. Eliminate the 'subjective' element from science --
if that is what it is -- and everything we believe to be
'objective' must go with it. If science dealt only with "observer-independent"
realities, we wouldn't be able to acquire any 'objective' beliefs at all.
Of course, all this will be music to
dialecticians' ears, since they already accept the idea that there is a dialectical interplay between
the 'objective' and the 'subjective':
"Logical concepts are subjective so long as they
remain 'abstract,' in their abstract form, but at the same time they express the
Thing-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract, both
phenomenon and essence, both moment and relation. Human
concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a
whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the tendency, in the source."
[Lenin (1961),
p.208. Italic emphases in the
original.]
In
that case, we must abandon the idea that "objective" means "mind-independent",
contradicting Lenin:
"We ask, is a man given
objective reality when he sees something red or feels something hard, etc., or
not? This hoary philosophical query is confused by Mach. If you hold that it is
not given, you, together with Mach, inevitably sink to subjectivism and
agnosticism and deservedly fall into the embrace of the immanentists, i.e., the
philosophical Menshikovs. If you hold that it is given, a philosophical concept
is needed for this objective reality, and this concept has been worked out long,
long ago. This concept is matter. Matter is a philosophical category
denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and
which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing
independently of them. Therefore, to say that such a concept can become
'antiquated' is childish talk, a senseless repetition of the arguments
of fashionable reactionary philosophy. Could the struggle between
materialism and idealism, the struggle between the tendencies or lines of
Plato
and
Democritus
in philosophy, the struggle between religion and science, the
denial of objective truth and its assertion, the struggle between the adherents
of supersensible knowledge and its adversaries have become antiquated during the
two thousand years of the development of philosophy?...
"As
the reader sees, all these arguments of the founders of empirio-criticism
entirely and exclusively revolve around the old epistemological question of the
relation of thinking to being, of sensation to the physical. It required the
extreme naďveté of the Russian Machians to discern anything here that is even
remotely related to 'recent science,' or 'recent positivism.' All the
philosophers mentioned by us, some frankly, others guardedly, replace the
fundamental philosophical line of materialism (from being to thinking, from
matter to sensation) by the reverse line of idealism. Their denial of matter is
the old answer to epistemological problems, which consists in denying the
existence of an external, objective source of our sensations, of an objective
reality corresponding to our sensations. On the other hand, the recognition
of the philosophical line denied by the idealists and agnostics is expressed in
the definitions: matter is that which,
acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation; matter is the objective
reality given to us in sensation, and so forth....
"'Matter is disappearing'
means that the limit within which we have hitherto known matter is vanishing and
that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter are likewise
disappearing which formerly seemed absolute, immutable, and primary
(impenetrability, inertia, mass, etc.) and which are now revealed to be relative
and characteristic only of certain states of matter. For the sole
'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical
materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality,
of existing outside our mind." [Lenin (1972),
pp.144-45,
165,
311. Bold emphases alone added, quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
"To be a materialist is to
acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To
acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind,
is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Ibid.,
p.148. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
It isn't
easy to make the above comments consistent with one another.
However, if
dialecticians are prepared to contradict Lenin, then much of their epistemology will soon follow it out the window, for,
according to this latest turn-of-events, it seems that nature is 'objective'
only if we know about it, and then only if we manage to do so in certain ways!
It could be objected here that this
misconstrues Hegel's notion of objectivity; indeed, it confuses it with a much
looser modern concept. Hegel drew many of his ideas from
Kant's Critical Philosophy, and
adapted them accordingly. In fact, his ideas on this score can't be
separated from his system as a whole.
However, since this topic will be examined
in Essay Twelve Parts Five and Six, not much more will be said about it here.
Nevertheless, for present purposes it is worth pointing out that Dialectical Marxists surely can't
accept Hegel's notion of objectivity, since it would render them
Objective Idealists. In that case, until we are informed exactly what dialecticians
do mean when they say the sort of obscure things about 'objectivity' that
Lenin comes out with, little more can be done with their confused ideas.
[It is important to remind ourselves
that in Materialism and Empiriocriticism, quoted above, Lenin clearly
meant by "objectivity" the existence of objects and processes independent of,
and external to, the human mind, which doesn't appear to be what Hegel meant by this word (no pun intended);
that is, if we could determine what Hegel actually meant by anything he came out
with. I have said much more about this in Essay
Thirteen Part One.]
In
response it could be argued that an
objective view of nature is one which attempts to picture it as it must be
(or as it must have been) without observers, or even as it would be if
there were no minds to observe and interact with it -– that is, it aims to depict reality
as it isin-itself
--
perhaps even with respect to its constantly changing 'essence'.
Of course, this take on 'objectivity' would
undermine what Lenin has just said,
since "Thing-in-themselves" doesn't mean
"Things-as-observed-by-some-mind-or-other":
"Logical concepts are subjective so long as they
remain 'abstract,' in their abstract form, but at the same time they express the
Thing-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract, both
phenomenon and essence, both moment and relation. Human
concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a
whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the tendency, in the source."
[Lenin (1961),
p.208. Italic emphases in the
original.]
Here,
Lenin appears to connect objectivity with what we
determine it to be when we investigate it 'dialectically' (no pun intended
again!). As usual, the
pronouncements coming from DM-fans are about as clear and
perspicuous as the
Nicene
Creed. I will leave it to others make what they can of this dialectical
tangle.
Independently of this, the above use of the word "picture"
is something of a give-away. Pictures are only such because of the observers who view them.
Eliminate the observer and the 'picturing' role of science must go with it.
Admittedly, the physical object that constitutes a picture (i.e., the canvas,
the frame, the paint, and so on) won't immediately vanish if humanity and all sentient
life perished (or it won't depending on how that happens!), but the verb "to picture" is for us transitive.
Without
human
input, no picturing could take place. The Moon, for example, isn't a picture
for, or of, anything.
That is, of course, why we find the 'Ideal
Observer' -- and/or the use of terms that imply that actual observers
exist somewhere --, cropping up all over the place, supposedly viewing events
(even if only as part of a 'thought-experiment' -- such as "Imagine
you are travelling on a light beam/at the speed of light"; or "Imagine
you live in two-dimensional Flatland!") in many
'objective' theories or descriptions of nature. On that basis, the term "objective"
would mean something like "observer-, but not ideal-observer-independent". In other words, science would be 'objective' only if we
conveniently forget that it is meant to be observer-independent.
Again, it could be argued that the
objectivity of science is based on the following sort of counterfactual:
R7: Even if there were no
observers, light would still bend as it passed between media.
Naturally, sentences like R7 won't be
controverted at this site (although it is questionable whether the word "objectivity"
is
any help, here), but it is worth pointing out that R7 isn't relevant to the doctrine
presently being challenged, for if there were no observers then appearances
couldn't contradict reality -- for, in that case, there would plainly be no
'appearances' to conflict with anything, anyone to do the
'contradicting' or, indeed, experience a single 'appearance', to begin with.
So, 'objectively' speaking (to adopt this
confused mode of expression for the moment) appearances can't contradict
"things-in-themselves", if they are counterfactually depicted this way.
It might still be felt that there
must be a contradiction between 'commonsense' -- or ordinary language --
and scientific knowledge if the latter is to make any progress. We no longer
believe many things that once seemed obvious to 'commonsense', which, of course,
means that most of our former erroneous ideas must have been either abandoned
or corrected by science at some point.
However, this latest attempt to rescue the
claim that reality contradicts appearances labours under another confusion --
one that holds that 'commonsense' and ordinary language are somehow the same.
They aren't.
[This
topic is examined in greater detail in Essay Twelve (however, some of that
material has been re-posted
here). There,
it will become apparent that since no one seems to have a clear idea what the
term "commonsense" means (that is, as it is used in philosophy),
it is
difficult to make much sense of this objection.]
It is
also worth pointing out that long before the scientific study of nature began,
human beings were well aware of the fact that sticks don't bend in water.
It hardly took a Newton or a Galileo to uncover that amazing fact! This isn't to say that earlier generations
were able to explain this phenomenon, but that plainly isn't relevant
to the topic in hand.
[Several of the other 'corrections'
scientific advance has allegedly forced on 'commonsense' will be examined in the
next sub-section, and again in
other Essays posted at this site.]
As we have just seen, this entire topic
revolves around the use of two obscure terms-of-art: "objective" and
"subjective". Neither of these has a clear meaning or a fixed use -- even
for
those who think they know what they mean. Of course, this implies that
the distinction between these two words must be 'subjective' itself -- again,
if we accept as legitimate this obscure way of talking for the moment.
Be this as it may, if the thesis that
'reality
contradicts appearances' actually depends on this obscure pair, then
it would prove impossible to determine its veracity until these terms have
themselves been given a clear
meaning -- and, incidentally a meaning that doesn't itself depend on a single instance
of human or observer-motivated input --, for that would render it/them
'subjective',
too.
[Again, 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity' are
examined in more detail in Essay Thirteen
Part One.]
Finally, as noted above, this entire issue
reduces this discussion to a consideration of contradictory beliefs -–
the erroneous nature of which becomes obvious by scientific advance, as opposed to those derived from
'commonsense'. If that is all this means then it, too, won't be controverted
here, for there is nothing in the least bit puzzling about false beliefs, still
less about contradictory
beliefs.
In view of the above, perhaps we should
consider examples that illustrate the alleged conflict between science and
'commonsense' (conflicts that many think haveactually taken place
in the study of nature -- which,
as we have seen, is a favourite example cited by DM-fans), in order to
try to understand what the supposed 'contradiction' between 'appearance' and 'reality'
is meant to be. To that end, consider the following:
R8: The Sun appears to rise
each morning.
R9: It isn't the case that
the Sun appears to rise each morning.
R10: It isn't the case that
the Sun rises each morning.
Once more, while R8 and R9 might look
contradictory they fail to match the sort of conflict we seek since
they are both about appearances. In addition, there is no obvious logical
connection between R10 and either one of R8 and R9. That is because the truth or
falsehood of R10 has nothing to do with the truth or falsehood of R8 and R9, nor
vice versa. In fact, if the earth were stationary, and it was the Sun
that moved,
things would appear no different than if the reverse were the case.
Furthermore, we
surely wouldn't conclude that R10 had been contradicted if sunrise couldn't be
seen one morning because of, say, fog or clouds; that is, if it didn't appear
to rise. Nor would R8 become false if, in the future, scientists changed their
minds about the truth of R10 (or its corollary, the idea that the Earth revolves
around the Sun, not the other way round).31
Clearly,
this recurring problem is the result of a serious difficulty, but it's more like
a fatal objection, that John Rees and other dialecticians seem to have
overlooked: it isn't possible to form a contradiction
from a
proposition that expresses matters of fact conjoined with one that reports an appearance,
indeed,
as we saw earlier.
In short, the following schematic sentences:
R11: It appears to be the
case that p,
R12: It is not the case that
p,
can't
form a contradictory pair when interpreted in the manner specified, and then
conjoined (where, again, p is a
propositional variable).
Moreover, unless we subscribe to the view
that facts and appearances are intelligent, or
perhaps argumentative and
belligerent -– that is, that they are capable of disputing with
one another -- it would make no sense to suppose that an appearance could
literally contradict (i.e., "gainsay", "speak against") a true proposition. Not only are
appearances non-linguistic and non-sentient, but as far as propositions and
appearances are concerned, they don't seem to oppose each other
'dialectically' in any
obvious way. They don't turn into one another (which is what
dialectical opposites are supposed to do,
so we are told), nor do they cause/motivate each other to change.
The existence of one does not imply the existence of the other (unlike the
existence of the proletariat, which is implied by, and implies in return, the
existence of the capitalist class, so we are told). Hence, as such,
this alleged contradiction makes little sense, even in DM-terms.
Furthermore, the apparent motion of the Sun is the
same today (with respect to sunrise, at least) as it was thousands of years ago.
To be sure, we might interpret this particular phenomenon differently today, but that doesn't affect how things
stillappear to observers. In that case,
at best, a DM-'contradiction'
here must be
figurative if it is to apply in any meaningful way -- either that or it is merely terminological.
If this were a genuine DM-'contradiction', something should have changed at least since
Copernicus wrote what he did (since 'dialectical contradictions' cause change,
so we are also told).
Nevertheless, it
could be argued that there are aspects of scientific knowledge that do in
fact contradict appearances, despite what has been argued above. It is
surely true that those who relied on 'commonsense' at one time imagined that the
earth was stationary, whereas scientists now know that our planet moves. In
which case, the following pair of propositions illustrate the intended contradiction:
R13: The earth moves.
R14: It is not the case that
the earth moves.
Even though
these two certainly contradict one another they aren't what we are looking
for --
since neither of them is about
appearances.
Moreover, Rees seems to be interested in
contradictory pairs whereboth halves are true (or which relate to
'contradictory' states of affairs that coexist), those involving seemingly
'correct' appearances which are contradicted by genuinely 'objective' underlying realities
-– otherwise the alleged superiority of
DL over
FL would be illusory.
That is because, as already noted, both halves of a DM-style contradiction must both be true at
once (or, once more, they must relate to 'contradictory' states of affairs that
coexist), unlike their less
contentious FL-cousins.
It hardly needs pointing out that Rees (and other DM-theorists) wouldn't be
interested in pairs of supposedly contradictory propositions if they thought
both were false, or that one was true while the other was false -- or even that they
both failed to relate to 'contradictory' states of affairs that coexisted. But, because DM-theorists
without exception fail to specify clearly what they mean by
"contradiction" in such contexts (or, indeed, in any contexts), it is impossible to say whether or not
even this supposition of mine is
itself correct.
It could be objected that
modern, post-Copernican science has in fact
contradicted Aristotelian and Ptolemaic
theories about the immobility of the
Earth. Of course,
that is itself a controversial interpretation of the relationship between
ancient and modern science -– and one that isn't obviously
correct. [I will explain why that is so in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Be this as it may, one clear consequence of
the TOR is that with a suitable change of reference frame it is
possible to picture the Earth as stationary and the Sun (etc.) in motion
relative to it. That done, the above alleged 'contradiction' disappears. In which case,
the only necessary 'correction' to Aristotelian/Ptolemaic
Physics (in this respect) would involve the abandonment of the idea that the
Earth is situated in a unique
frame of reference -– but science itself can neither confirm nor confute
thatparticular metaphysical (or even theological) assumption.
On this topic, Robert
Mills had this comment to make:
"Another way of stating the
principle of equivalence, a way that better reflects its name, is to say
that all
reference frames, including accelerated reference frames, are equivalent, that
the laws of Physics take the same form in any reference frame…. And it is
also correct to say that the Copernican view (with the sun at the centre) and
the Ptolemaic view (with the earth at the centre) are equally valid and equally
consistent!" [Mills (1994), pp.182-83. Spelling altered to conform with UK
English.]
Add to that what
Astronomer,
Fred Hoyle,
had to say:
"Instead of adding further
support to the heliocentric picture of the planetary motions the Einstein theory
goes in the opposite direction, giving increased respectability to the
geocentric picture. The relation of the two pictures is reduced to a mere
coordinate transformation and it is the main tenet of the Einstein theory that
any two ways of looking at the world which are related to each other by a
coordinate transformation are entirely equivalent from a physical point of
view.... Today we cannot say that the
Copernican theory is 'right' and the Ptolemaic theory 'wrong' in any meaningful
physical sense...." [Hoyle (1973), pp.78-79. Paragraphs merged.]
"We now know that the
difference between a heliocentric theory and a geocentric theory is one of
relative motion only, and that such a difference has no physical significance.
But such an understanding had to await Einstein's theory of gravitation in order
to be fully clarified." [Hoyle (1975), p.416.]
"Thus from Einstein's point
of view Ptolemy and Copernicus are equally right. What point of view is chosen
is a matter of expediency. For the mechanics of the planetary system the view of
Copernicus is certainly the more convenient. But it is meaningless to call the
gravitational fields that occur when a different system of reference is chosen
'fictitious' in contrast with the 'real' fields produced by near masses: it is
just as meaningless as the question of the 'real' length of a rod...in the
special theory of relativity. A gravitational field is neither 'real' nor
'fictitious' in itself. It has no meaning at all independent of the choice of
coordinates, just as in the case of the length of a rod." [Born (1965), p.345. I
owe this reference to Rosser (1967).]
However, this
particular idea pre-dates the TOR; as
Robert DiSalle notes (who also provides the background to these theoretical
developments), it goes back at least to
Leibniz:
"The term 'reference frame' was coined in the 19th century,
but it has a long prehistory, beginning, perhaps, with the emergence of the
Copernican theory. The significant point was not the replacement of the earth by
the sun as the centre of all motion in the universe, but the recognition of both
the earth and the sun as merely possible points of view from which the motions
of the celestial bodies may be described. This implied that the basic task of
Ptolemaic astronomy -- to represent the planetary motions by combinations of
circular motions -- could take any point to be fixed, without sacrificing
predictive power. Therefore, as Copernicus suggested in the opening arguments
of On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, the choice of any
particular point required some justification on grounds other than mere
successful astronomical prediction. The most persuasive grounds, seemingly, were
physical: we don't perceive the physical effects that we would expect the
earth's motion to produce. Copernicus himself noted, however, in reply, that we
can indeed undergo motions that are physically imperceptible, as on a smoothly
moving ship.... At least in some circumstances, we can easily treat our moving
point of view as if it were at rest.
"As
the basic programme of Ptolemy and Copernicus gave way to that of early
classical mechanics as developed by Galileo, this equivalence of points of view
was made more precise and explicit. Galileo was unable to present a decisive
argument for the motion of the earth around the sun. He demonstrated, however,
that the Copernican view does not contradict our experience of a seemingly
stable earth. He accomplished this through a principle that, in the precise form
that it takes in Newtonian mechanics, has become known as the 'principle of
Galilean relativity': mechanical experiments will have the same results in a
system in uniform motion that they have in a system at rest. Arguments against
the motion of the earth had typically appealed to experimental evidence -- e.g.,
that a stone dropped from a tower falls to the base of the tower, instead of
being left behind as the earth rotates during its fall. But Galileo argued
persuasively that such experiments would happen just as they do whether the
earth were moving or not, provided that the motion is sufficiently uniform....
Galileo's account of this was not precisely the principle that we call 'Galilean
relativity'; he seems to have thought that a system in uniform circular motion,
such as a frame at rest on the rotating earth, would be indistinguishable from a
frame truly at rest. The principle was named in his honour because he had
grasped the underlying idea of dynamical equivalence: he understood the
composition of motion, and understood how individual motions of bodies within a
system -- such as the fall of a stone from a tower -- are composed with the
motion of the system as a whole. This principle of composition, combined with
the idea that bodies maintain their uniform motion, formed the basis for the
idea of dynamically indistinguishable frames of reference....
"Leibniz, later, articulated a more general 'equipollence of
hypotheses': in any system of interacting bodies, any hypothesis that any
particular body is at rest is equivalent to any other. Therefore neither
Copernicus' nor Ptolemy's view can be true -- though one may be judged simpler
than the other -- because both are merely possible hypothetical interpretations
of the same relative motions. This principle clearly defines (what we would
call) a set of reference frames. They differ in their arbitrary choices of a
resting point or origin, but agree on the relative positions of bodies at any
moment and their changing relative distances through time...." [DiSalle
(2020). Quotation marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphasis in the original;
spelling modified to agree with UK English. Link added.]
[Although, DiSalle
also points out that
Leibniz's equivalence principle was actually inconsistent with his view of
motion. It took the TOR to sort this conundrum out.]
Of course, as Leibniz argued, it could always
be claimed that Copernican theory is
simpler than the Ptolemaic system, but until we
receive a clear sign that nature works in accordance with our notions of simplicity (or
cares a fig about them), that response won't wash.
Here is
physicist, Sabine Hossenfelder:
"They were so sure, they bet billions on
it. For decades physicists told us they knew where the next discoveries were
waiting. They built accelerators, shot satellites into space, and planted
detectors in underground mines. The world prepared to ramp up the physics envy.
But where physicists expected a breakthrough, the ground wouldn't give. The
experiments didn't reveal anything new. What failed physicists wasn't their
math; it was their choice of math. They believed that Mother Nature was
elegant, simple, and kind about providing clues. They thought they could
hear her whisper when they were talking to themselves. Now Nature spoke, and she
said nothing, loud and clear." [Hossenfelder (2018), p.vi. Paragraphs merged;
bold emphasis added.]
This is quite apart from the fact that
'simplicity' itself is impossible to define in non-question-begging terms. For example,
which is the simpler of these two formulae?
(1) θ = Ae-kt
(2) θ = At2
+ Bt + C
Plainly, (2) is algebraically 'simpler', but (1) is
'simpler' if we judge simplicity on the basis of the number of terms used.
Naturally, the problem deciding which 'law' (when expressed mathematically,
for example) is
'simpler' becomes all the more difficult as the complexity level rises. [On
this, see Losee (2001), pp.228-29.]
Of
course, the above interpretation of the relation between the Copernican and the
Ptolemaic systems suffers from the not inconsiderable problem of trying to
explain how, if we fix the frame of reference so that the Earth is stationary
while the rest of the heavens revolve around it, the 'fixed stars' manage to
travel quite so far and so fast. Indeed, if they complete one
revolution per day (as they must given this view), then they will have to travel
many times faster than the speed of light, as the stars and galaxies many
billions of light years distant do a complete circuit in 24 hours. [Naturally,
this assumes that the 'fixed stars' are thousands, millions or billions of light
years away.]
Even more
puzzling still: if any point anywhere can be taken as the
centre of a stationary frame of reference and everything else moves in relation
to it, then, for example,
when someone sets off for a walk, and they are considered stationary
while the rest of the world moves past them (again, on this view), one might very well wonder why
every other object,
and especially every other human being, fails to register the acceleration that they must undergo to
accommodate these ambulatory proclivities. Or, indeed, why water in nearby canals,
rivers or lakes doesn't
slosh about. Why drinks in cups or glasses don't spill when anyone 'gets up' to 'leave' a bar.
Why houses or flats don't crumble to the ground as if hit by an earthquake
whenever anyone sets off in a sprint. And so on...
It won't do
at this point to complain that the above aren't inertial frames of reference but
involve
accelerated (i.e., non-inertial) frames of reference. The fact
that not all of the above experience accelerations (and the 'inertial forces'
associated with them) tells us which object(s) have changed their motion and
which haven't. However, let is assume that the relative motion between the
ground and someone who sets off for a walk is zero before that change in motion,
and after that individual sets off it is a steady, not now accelerating, four
km/hr. But, after she sets off, the ground isn't moving any faster
relative to that individual (no matter what the mathematics of relative motion
might tell us -- the ground hasn't accelerated!), that individual is
moving four km/hr faster relative to the ground than before. In which case, even
though a mathematical description of the relative velocities here can't
discriminate between these two scenarios (i.e., the question concerning which
one, the earth or the walker, is now moving faster relative to the other than
they were before), a physical description, and more importantly our experience
of the world, most certainly can distinguish between them. If we were to argue
that the ground is now actually moving four km/hr faster relative to the walker
than it was before, then we would be forced to conclude that the earth
(not the walker) must have undergone an acceleration. But that is true of only
one of them, the walker herself. That is, of course, just a roundabout way of
saying that we don't live in a mathematical universe, that the world we live and
experience in isn't a mathematical object.
Indeed, if we were to press these
considerations much further, they could stand as an effective 'common sense' refutation
of a core principle of Relativity Theory. Well, we should perhaps leave such puzzles to the
experts to sort out...
[I
posted this conundrum on a physics discussion board a few years ago, but the
answers I received
were incomprehensible to anyone who doesn't think the universe is a
mathematical object of some sort. (I certainly failed to understand them, and I
have a mathematics degree!) Indeed, the ensuing discussion showed that if
you know enough technical jargon, you can make anything appear to work (rather
like the jargon bandied about in Medieval Theology -- anyone who has read enough of that material will know
of what I speak). They also illustrate how much disagreement there is among
physicists over such basic issues as space, time and motion (indeed, as noted in
Essay Five)! A perusal of any advanced physics
discussion board will amply confirm this, too. For example, I have been asking
Professors of Physics on Quora for the last four years to explain what energy is; they all
either ignore the question or change the subject!]
Having said that, it is worth pointing out
that in relation to the relative motion of heavenly bodies, the above
local considerations don't apply (except, maybe, the one related to the
superluminal velocity of the orbiting stars). This might illustrate
the fact that a mathematical theory could appear successful when it is
applied to the entire universe, and might even make very accurate predictions,
but when it comes to its application to the world as we know it, or as we
experience it locally, it might not seem
quite so sensible -- or even believable.
In which case, the TOR makes very poor predictions
about our experience of the everyday world. [I will say much more about
that in Essay Thirteen Part
Two.]
Nevertheless, even if this were an accurate
depiction of the relation between these two theories, it would
still fail to be of much use to DM-fans -– that is, not unless they abandon the
requirement that DM-'contradictions' should both be true (or that they must both
'co-exist'). But, as noted earlier, both sets of
propositions (concerning the Ptolemaic and the Copernican systems) can't be true at
once, given their commitment to the superiority of the latter system over the former.
And should DM-fans decide that the Equivalence Principle vindicates their
approach (in that it allows us to regard both systems as equally valid), that
would be no help, either. That is because this principle merely says
that the validity of each depends on the frame of reference chosen, which means
that when one frame is chosen, one option is left by the wayside until a new
frame is chosen. Dialecticians certainly can't appeal to the alleged
contradiction between 'appearance' and 'reality' here, since there is no
'reality' for anything to contradict until a reference frame has been chosen --
which, of course, makes each separate system a creature of convention, and
not the least bit 'real'. It is also worth
recalling that there aren't just two competing reference frames up for grabs
here; any point in space (and, plainly, there are countless
septillions of these) is equally
valid.
It might, however, be interesting to see
whether or not any DM-fans who accept the Equivalence Principle are brave enough to
countenance the rather startling consequences that follow from it (several of which
were outlined above), as well astheir opposites. Would
they, therefore, be happy to accept that the stars both (really) travel many times faster than the
speed of light and that they don't, at the same time? Or that when dialectician, D(1), say, sets
off for a demonstration she in fact remains stationary and the demonstration
actually comes to her (without those in the demonstration noticing the
subsequent acceleration when D(1) 'sets off' from home, in the way
they might feel such forces when sat in a car when it accelerates, or brakes), andit
doesn't.
Or, even this puzzling conundrum: when comrade D(1)
(still the centre of a frame of reference) dives into a swimming pool she is met
with a wall of water accelerating upwards to meet her, but without any distortion to its
shape. That is, every part of the
entire body of water in the pool must accelerate upwards at the same time and
the same rate,
behaving like a perfectly rigid solid, not a liquid. Must DM-fans accept
both that scenario and its opposite?
Returning to saner issues: as I pointed out
above (and in more detail in
Essay Five), the only 'contradiction' that
can be cobbled together in this case would involve an
undischarged ambiguity:
A1: The Earth moves.
A2: The Earth does not move.
But, this apparent 'contradiction' would
vanish as soon as this ambiguity was resolved:
A3: In Inertial Frame, IF(1), the
Earth moves.
A4: In Inertial Frame, IF(2), the
Earth does not move.
But,
this is no more a contradiction than the following example would be (one we will
use again below):
R15: The strikers moved.
R16: It is not the case that
the strikers moved.
This pair certainly looks
contradictory (especially if both relate to the same strikers at the same
moment, and thus both are held true), but that would cease to be the case when
it was discovered that the said strikers were sat on a train that was travelling
at 80 miles per hour. On the train, these militants could be sat perfectly
still, but to an observer on a platform they would appear to be moving at speed.
Since all motion is relative to an inertial frame, the beliefs motivated by one
set of observations would merely appear to contradict those motivated by
another. But, as soon as frames of reference are taken into account, the 'contradiction'
disappears.
[DM-fans
might be tempted to respond that the above sort of contradiction isn't of the
type they are interested in; they focus on 'dialectical contradictions'. I have
dealt with objections like this in Essays
Five and
Eight Parts One,
Two and
Three, where we will see that
dialecticians themselves haven't a clue what a 'dialectical contradiction' is --
or if they have, they have kept it to themselves remarkably effectively for over
150 years.]
However, if
both Aristotelian and Ptolemaic astronomies are now regarded by DM-theorists as
representative of 'appearances' (or, perhaps, of a 'commonsense view' of
the universe), and they still hold either or both to be true, or 'partially/relatively true' -- even if
they are 'contradicted' by 'reality' -- then it seems that they must also be
prepared to accept the truth, or 'partial/relative truth', of any number of
erroneous or misguided theories. Andif that is so, they must
also be prepared to accept the truth, or 'partial/relative truth', of what
were once viewed as 'commonsense' ideas –- such as, say, the ancient belief that
a woman who sees
a hare will give birth to a child with a hare-lip. Or, the more modern
'urban myth' that some women can, and have given birth to live
rabbits. [Pickover (2000).] It seems they would have to accept the truth (or
'relative truth') of these fables and their negations!
If we are meant to countenance
DM-'contradictions' where both halves are 'true' (or they represent
coexistent 'contradictory' states of affairs), alongside the odd idea
that there is some truth even in the most outlandish of theories (perhaps as
knowledge 'spirals' in on 'absolute truth'), then the above conclusions
seem unavoidable.
Here,
for example, is Cornforth:
"Just as truths are for the
most part only approximate and contain the possibility of being converted into
untruths, so are many errors found not to be absolute falsehoods but to contain
a germ of truth.... We should recognise, then,
that certain erroneous views, including idealist views, could represent, in
their time, a contribution to truth -- since they were, perhaps, the only ways
in which certain truths could first begin to come to expression...." [Cornforth
(1963),
pp.138-39. Bold emphasis added. Paragraphs merged.]
[Of
course, any dialecticians who are tempted to cleave to unvarnished Hegelianism a little too enthusiastically
and intimately (upside down or 'the right way up') will have to adopt a
radically different view of
truth (i.e., they will interpret it as the degree of conformity -- or lack of it
-- between an object and its
'concept'). But, as we saw in
Part One of this Essay, that
'theory of truth' only works if an ancient syntactical confusion -- i.e., the
belief that concepts can be treated as objects, or the Proper Names thereof --
is itself correct, and which 'objects' can be put in some sort of relation with another
'object'. (More on this in
Essay Twelve (when it is
published in full). See also,
here and
here.)]
On the other hand, if an antiquated or
obsolete theory is to be rejected because it is based on 'appearances', not
'reality', then DM-style 'contradictions' can't feature in it anywhere, after all. That is because we would have alleged truths (those
supposedly depicting
'reality') facing putative falsehoods (those allegedly encapsulating 'commonsense',
ancient, or obsolete views of 'reality') -– but never
two truths, still less two 'partial truths' (i.e., those belonging to an
outmoded conception confronting the less 'partial' theses found in more recent
scientific
theories of 'reality', or parts of it).
Howsoever these options are reshuffled there
appear to be no winning cards in any of the hands DM-theorists have dealt, or
could have dealt, themselves.
This means that we still don't have a
DM-'contradiction', even in this relativelyclear case. Nor are we
ever likely to get one --, and that is for the reasons set out above.
Even if a case could be made
that supported the view that scientific propositions contradict indicative sentences
that 'express
appearances', that still
wouldn't achieve all that dialecticians seem to require. That is because (as
argued at length in
Essay Five)
propositions that might look contradictory -- and which are both
thought
to be true -– would normally be disambiguated, or they would be given a
context against which they might be understood, which would
resolve the apparent contradiction.
This latest assertion is no mere 'bourgeois'
prejudice or diktat. Consider the following example, again, which is analogous
to the previous pair:
As we saw
earlier, when a frame of reference is supplied the 'contradiction'
disappears.
And it won't do to complain about the trite
nature of R15 and R16 --, not, that is, unless and until DM-theorists tell us
what
they mean by the obscure phrase "dialectical contradiction". [Since this
topic is dealt with more fully in Essay Eight Parts
One, Two and
Three, no more will be said about
it here.]
All this is
quite apart from the fact that DM-texts themselves contain little other than
trite examples -- boiling water, contradictory seeds,
cooks who add too much salt to
soup, characters
who speak "prose all their lives", the differential fighting ability of
Mamelukes, "cone bearings", "Yea, Yea"/"Nay, Nay", etc., etc.
DM isMickey Mouse Science,
par excellence, and DM-fans have no room to point their fingers at yours
truly..
Just
as it is quite apart from the fact that relative motion is hardly a "trite"
topic in physics.
As seems
clear, apparent 'contradictions' aren't presented to us by nature and society
totally 'naked', as it were; they arise either from ambiguities inherent in
language, or from a lack of clarity (etc.) in the original 'problem' -- or so it has
been argued in
Essay Five.
In the above case (i.e., R15 and R16), the 'contradiction' plainly arose because of a (covert) change of reference frame.
While this would make such
'contradictions' sensitive to the choice of reference frame, it wouldn't
automatically imply they were dependent on
'contradictory states of affairs' or 'contradictory processes' in 'reality'
(whatever that means). However, that was certainly not the point
DM-theorists wanted to make about the 'contradictions' that interest them. And yet, those mentioned above were
either artefacts of a
conventionalised choice of reference frame or they were a direct consequence of
confused thinking. They are certainly not based on 'reality' (again, whatever that
means).33
Philosophers and scientists often
confuse ordinary language with 'commonsense'; part of the idea
here is that the former 'contains' or 'expresses' the latter. With
respect to the alleged contradiction between appearance and reality --
motivated, for instance, by early modern theories that the Earth
isn't located at the centre of the Universe, as
we have just seen. These days those who conflate the vernacular with
'commonsense' have in mind the supposed link between
what many have termed "folk" theories of nature (e.g., that the Earth is stationary while
the Sun moves) -- or those that apply to our psychological makeup --, and everyday language.
Given this approach to 'commonsense', it seems incongruous,
mistaken or misguided to use the word "sunrise" when the Sun doesn't actually
rise. This is supposed to show that ordinary language still retains concepts
based on, or derived from, defunct metaphysical, religious or quasi-scientific
beliefs and theories, which in turn is taken to mean that the vernacular is
defective, at least in areas
that involve science, psychology and philosophy.
[It
is worth pointing out that I restrict the word "commonsense" to its theoretical
and philosophical use, and the term "common sense" to its ordinary employment --
as in, for example, "Use your common sense. No one puts their hand in a lion's cage!"]
However, even if this seeming incongruity actually had anything to do with
common sense, it would still fail to show that the
vernacular depends upon or encapsulates outmoded scientific or metaphysical
theories. This can be seen from the fact that all of us (scientists included)
still employ terms like "sunrise" despite our assenting to modern
theories of the Universe. We aren't to suppose that when scientists, for
example, use the word "sunrise" they do so ironically, duplicitously, or
thoughtlessly.
Moreover, unless scientists and philosophers used and already understood terms
taken from ordinary language, they could scarcely begin to correct common sense
-– always assuming that it needed correcting, or
even that this is what scientists or philosophers in fact do, or wished to do.
[On
this topic, see Baz (2012), Button, et al
(1995), Cowley (1991), Cook (1979, 1980), Ebersole (1967, 1979a, 1979b), Hacker
(1982a, 1982b, 1987), Hallett (2008), Hanfling (1984, 1989, 2000), Ryle (1960),
Macdonald (1938), Stebbing (1958) and Stroud (2000). This issue will be
discussed in more detail in Essay Twelve Part Two. Since
writing this, I have come across a somewhat similar approach to the line adopted
here in
Frank (1950), Chapter Seven.]
However, a much more revealing fact about ordinary language -– and one easily
missed -- is that we can readily form the negations of sentences that
contain allegedly obsolete notions (like the daily ascent of the Sun). Consider,
for instance, the following hackneyed example (quoted earlier):
"As we know appearances can be deceptive. Each day the sun
appears to circumnavigate the earth, when the reality is that the earth travels
around the sun. We therefore need to penetrate the veil of appearance in order
to reveal the reality that is disguised within." [Quoted from
here.]
This
yields the following pair of propositions:
S1: The Sun rises in the morning.
S2: It isn't the case that the Sun rises
in the morning.
First
of all, the fact that we can form the negation of every indicative empirical
sentence capable of being written or uttered (in every language on the planet
that has the relevant vocabulary) demonstrates that the vernacular is neither a
theory nor is it dependent upon one. That is because -- to use another argument
I owe to
Peter Geach
-- no viable theory could countenance the negation of all its
empirical propositions, as ordinary language readily does.
Naturally, this claim is somewhat controversial -- but,only for those intent on depreciating
or denigrating ordinary language!
[Ordinary language will be defended in depth in Essay Twelve Part Seven; some
of that material has already been published
here.]
Second,
scientific theories extend, develop and even replace ordinary words, using
typographically similar terms with new meanings (such as "time", "space",
"solid", etc.), the meaning of which has been modified by analogy and
metaphor (etc.). In addition, they introduce technical terms not found in the
vernacular at that time, or even later -- such as "electricity" (which has now
entered the vernacular) or "2,4-Dinitrophenylhydrazine"
(which hasn't). But, unless these revisions and innovations had been linked to
ordinary language
and practice, at some point, or at some level, their meanings
would be completely unclear if not entirely indeterminate. Moreover, the theories
that used them would thereby be incomprehensible. Which is, of course, part of
the reason why several scientists tell us, for instance, that no one understands
Quantum Mechanics:
"Those who are not shocked when they first come across quantum theory can't
possibly have understood it." Niels
Bohr
"If you are not completely confused by quantum mechanics, you do not understand
it."
John
Wheeler
"Quantum mechanics makes absolutely no sense."
Roger
Penrose
"There was a time when the newspapers said that only twelve men understood the
theory of relativity. I do not believe there ever was such a time. There might
have been a time when only one man did, because he was the only guy who caught
on, before he wrote his paper. But after people read the paper a lot of people
understood the theory of relativity in some way or other, certainly more than
twelve. On the other hand, I think I can safely say that nobody understands
quantum mechanics…. I am going to tell you what nature behaves like. If you
will simply admit that maybe she does behave like this, you will find her a
delightful, entrancing thing. Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can
possibly avoid it, 'but how can it be like that?' because you will get 'down the
drain,' into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped. Nobody knows
how it can be like that." [Feynman
(1992), p.129. Bold emphases added.]
Video One: "Nobody
Understands Quantum Mechanics"
Clued-in physicists already seem to be aware that the language they use presents, or
even generates, problems. Here, for example, is Physicist
David Peat:
"It hasn't been a great couple of years for theoretical physics. Books such as
Lee Smolin's
The Trouble with Physics and
Peter Woit's
Not Even Wrong embody the frustration felt across the field that
string
theory, the brightest hope for
formulating a theory that would explain the universe in one beautiful equation,
has been getting nowhere. It's quite a comedown from the late 1980s and 1990s,
when a grand unified theory seemed just around the corner and physicists
believed they would soon, to use
Stephen
Hawking's words, 'know the mind of
God'. New Scientist even ran an article called 'The end of physics'.
"So what went wrong? Why are physicists finding it so hard to make that final
step? I believe part of the answer was hinted at by the great physicist
Niels Bohr, when he wrote: 'It is
wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about nature. Physics
concerns what we can say about nature.'
"At first sight that seems strange.
What has language got to do with it? After all, we see physics as about
solving equations relating to facts about the world -- predicting a comet's
path, or working out how fast heat flows along an iron bar. The language we
choose to convey question or answer is not supposed to fundamentally affect the
nature of the result.
"Nonetheless, that assumption started to unravel one night in the spring of
1925, when the young
Werner
Heisenberg worked out the basic
equations of what became known as quantum mechanics. One of the immediate
consequences of these equations was that they did not permit us to know with
total accuracy both the position and the velocity of an electron: there would
always be a degree of irreducible uncertainty in these two values.
"Heisenberg needed an explanation for
this. He reasoned thus: suppose a very delicate (hypothetical) microscope is
used to observe the electron, one so refined that it uses only a single photon
of energy to make its measurement. First it measures the electron's position,
then it uses a second photon to measure the speed, or velocity. But in making
this latter observation, the second photon has imparted a little kick to the
electron and in the process has shifted its position. Try to measure the
position again and we disturb the velocity. Uncertainty arises, Heisenberg
argued, because every time we observe the universe we disturb its intrinsic
properties.
"However, when Heisenberg showed his
results to Bohr, his mentor, he had the ground cut from under his feet. Bohr
argued that Heisenberg had made the unwarranted assumption that an electron is
like a billiard ball in that it has a 'position' and possesses a 'speed'. These
are classical notions, said Bohr, and do not make sense at the quantum level.
The electron does not necessarily have an intrinsic position or speed, or even a
particular path. Rather, when we try to make measurements, quantum nature
replies in a way we interpret using these familiar concepts.
"This is where language comes in.
While Heisenberg argued that 'the meaning of quantum theory is in the
equations', Bohr pointed out that physicists still have to stand around the
blackboard and discuss them in German, French or English. Whatever the
language, it contains deep assumptions about space, time and causality --
assumptions that do not apply to the quantum world. Hence, wrote Bohr, 'we
are suspended in language such that we don't know what is up and what is down'.
Trying to talk about quantum reality generates only confusion and paradox.
"Unfortunately Bohr's arguments are often put aside today as some physicists
discuss ever more elaborate mathematics, believing their theories to truly
reflect subatomic reality. I remember a conversation with string theorist
Michael Green
a few years after he and
John
Schwartz
published a paper in 1984 that was instrumental in making string theory
mainstream. Green remarked that when
Einstein
was formulating the theory of relativity he had thought deeply about the
philosophical problems involved, such as the nature of the categories of space
and time. Many of the great physicists of Einstein's generation read deeply
in philosophy.
"In contrast, Green felt, string
theorists had come up with a mathematical formulation that did not have the same
deep underpinning and philosophical inevitability. Although superstrings were
for a time an exciting new approach, they did not break conceptual boundaries in
the way that the findings of Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein had done.
"The American quantum theorist David Bohm
embraced Bohr's views on language,
believing that at the root of Green's problem is the structure of the languages
we speak. European languages, he noted, perfectly mirror the classical world of
Newtonian physics. When we say
'the cat chases the mouse' we are dealing with well-defined objects (nouns),
which are connected via verbs. Likewise, classical physics deals with objects
that are well located in space and time, which interact via forces and fields.
But if the world doesn't work the way our language does, advances are inevitably
hindered.
"Bohm pointed out that quantum effects
are much more process-based, so to describe them accurately requires a
process-based language rich in verbs, and in which nouns play only a secondary
role....
"Physics as we know it is about equations and quantitative measurement. But
what these numbers and symbols really mean is a different, more subtle matter.
In interpreting the equations we must remember the limitations language places
on how we can think about the world...." [Peat
(2008), pp.41-43. Bold
emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
Now,
I don't want to suggest that I agree with the above author's comments
about the nature of language (or even about scientific language), but
they certainly indicate that (some) leading scientists themselves are aware
there is a problem.
[To
be sure, Peat concurs with Bohm when he suggests that we need to learn from Native
American languages, which seem to have rather odd grammars; but it is to be
wondered how a culture that has produced no science or technology of any note
has much to teach one that has.
Again, this line of defence will be pursued in more detail in Essay Thirteen
Part Two, to be published sometime in 2021. Nor is it at all clear what it
means to say that language contains certain assumptions. In fact, as this section
seeks to show, it can't. However, it is important to add that when I say Native
American culture has produced "no
science or technology of any note" I do not mean to disparage, demean or
depreciate that culture. Plainly, Native Americans wouldn't have
survived had they not developed any scientific ideas or any technology
whatsoever.
Plainly they did. What I am alluding to is the vastly superior scientific
knowledge and technology the development of capitalism has enabled -- even if
the class war has greatly distorted and abused both -- upon which the very possibility of socialism and human
emancipation are predicated.]
Third, returning to the case in point, the view defended here means that the
word "sunrise" is no more problematic than "nightfall" and "daybreak" are. No
one imagines that the use of "nightfall" commits anyone to a "folk theory" of
the susceptibilities of darkness to the law of gravity, or that "daybreak"
suggests mornings are brittle. Or, indeed, that their use reflects a defunct or
obsolete scientific theory, or even that they encapsulate common sense. Consider
the word "solstice" (from
the Latin solstitium -- meaning "point at which the sun seems to
stand still"). Even though this word is an echo of the old Geocentric Theory of
the solar system, no one supposes that when Astronomers use this word they are
secretly, or inadvertently, committed to the
Ptolemaic Theory.
Indeed, and to change the example, no one (certainly no scientist) believes that
when someone catches the 'flu (or
influenza) there is some sort of cosmic influence at work, even
though, as matter of fact,
the original use of this word (from the medieval Latin,
influentia) was based on an ancient, mystical theory about there being just
such stellar influences. Still less would anyone be willing to accept the
idea that when someone is described as "hysterical" this implies they have a
wandering womb (even though this word was originally connected with an obsolete
scientific
theory that
wombs
could indeed wander -- taken from the Greek,
hysteria or 'womb', and from which we get "hysterectomy"). Nor do
psychologists these days believe that "lunatics"
are sensitive
to phases of
the Moon, or even that
phlegmatic individuals have a
superabundance
of phlegm, and so on. In fact, if the term "Big Bang" were to be understood
as unsympathetically as critics of common sense interpret "sunrise", we would be
committed to the view that the origin of the Universe was not only rather loud,
it had been witnessed by some form of sentient life -- as well as the idea that
sound can travel across a vacuum!
[On
"influenza", type that word into the search box
here. On hysteria, see
here and
here. Of course, since the 'Big Bang' is also supposed to be the
origin of space and time, there was nowhere for the sound, if there had been any,
to travel.]
On
lunacy, we read this from the BBC:
"In
folklore, a full moon is associated with
insanity -- hence the word lunacy --
werewolves and all manner of unpleasant
happenings. However, when psychologists and
statisticians have looked into the matter, a
lunar influence on the human brain and
behaviour remains elusive. Overwhelmingly
they have failed to discover a correlation
between the timing of a full moon and events
such as assaults, arrests, suicides, calls
to crisis centres, psychiatric admissions,
poisonings and vehicle accidents.
"Eric Chudler, who has compiled a long list
of the research says: 'Most of the data --
and there have been many studies -- find
that there is not an association between the
phase of the moon and any of those abnormal
behaviours.' Many believers of the full moon
myth work in law enforcement and health
professions. Police officers and hospital
staff frequently witness horrific and
upsetting events. Mr Chudler suggests that
when these traumatic things happen, workers
are much more likely to notice a full moon
shining in the sky than they are to register
more modest half or quarter moons.
Consequently, they only make a connection
with accidents or crimes when the moon is at
its most obvious and symbolically
significant." [Quoted from
here.
Several paragraphs merged; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Link added.]
But,
this doesn't stop ordinary speakers using the words "lunacy" and "lunatic"
(often colloquialised as the 'politically incorrect', "loony"), and they do this
without (in general) being aware of the alleged connection between the phases of
the Moon and madness, etc.
In
addition, it is worth adding that there are many scientific terms in use
today that are themselves derived from what are unrelated, or even obsolete, use
of language. For example: "Oxygen"
(derived from the original Greek meaning "acid"); "Quark"
(coined by
Murray
Gell-Mann from Finnegans
Wake -- are Quarks really "coloured"?);
"Law"
("layer, measure, stroke", derived from Jurisprudence); "Atom"
(meaning "indivisible"); "Acid"
(meaning "of the taste of vinegar", "sour" or "sharp to the taste"); "Alkali"
(Arabic, "the ashes of a plant"); "Algebra"
(Arabic, "reunion of the broken parts", or "the reduction"); "Alcohol"
(Arabic, al-kuhul, "powdered antimony", or eye-makeup), "Flow"
(Old High German,
flouwen, "to rinse"); "Force"
(Latin, "strength, courage, fortitude; violence, power, compulsion"); "Root",
used in Mathematics (part of a plant); "Matrix"
also used in mathematics (from the Latin for "mother" or "womb"); "Vector"
(again from the Latin, vehere, "to carry"); "Missing Link" (from
The Great Chain of Being), "Planet"
(late Latin,
planeta, or "wanderer"), "vaccine"
(from vacca, cow), "inoculate"
(from the Latin, inoculatus, "to graft a bud" into a tree or shrub),
"electricity" comes from the Greek word for amber --
ἤλεκτρον
--
"electron",
but no one supposes it now carries that connotation.
[Concerning
The Great Chain of Being, see
Lovejoy (1964). On this topic in general, see Crosland (2006) and Danziger
(1997).]
Moreover, the idea that words encapsulate ancient or defunct theories appears to
commit us to the view that 'meanings' accompany or follow words about the place
as if they were glued to them by a 'semantic adhesive' of some sort, so that
when a word had gained a specific meaning, it will always mean, or
connote, the same no matter what, or when. But, this would in turn imply that
words are quasi-intelligent beings with 'memories', whose denotations and
connotations are hard-wired into their 'memories', and which can't be altered or
modified by subsequent users. [i would be decidedly odd to see DM-fans accept
the idea that there are such unchanging meanings. This topic was covered in Part One,
here.]
Howsoever these metaphors are interpreted they clearly imply that users will
have the meanings of words dictated to them by those words themselves, or
even that they somehow 'catch' the meaning of these words when young, rather
like the way that they might pick up a virus from a sibling or parent.
[The
recent infatuation with
Richard
Dawkins's
'memes' also
trades on this
fetishised myth. On the weakness of this aspect of Dawkins's 'theory, see
McGrath
(2005). See also Essay Thirteen Part Three,
here. (Any who object to
my referencing McGrath's book, which defends belief in 'God', should also point
a few fingers at DM-fans who look to Hegel, who had a similar aim in mind. Of
course, I am only recommending McGrath's arguments against 'memes', which seem
to me pretty conclusive, not his Theology!)]
In
this instance, something analogous to a foreign body will have taken speakers
over, controlling their brains and governing their speech. Learning a language
would be more like contracting a disease, or like being 'possessed', rather than
it being a socially-acquired skill. Meaning in language wouldn't
be a function of the communal life, and social interaction -- or even the material existence
of human beings. It would be a function of the social life of words and their
disembodied 'meanings'. Hence, the claim that words still carry their
ancient or obsolete meanings about with them would amount to their
fetishisation
-- in effect, humanising symbols while de-humanising humans. So, on
top of the alienation inflicted on humanity by class society would come the
alienation of their control over language. Language and meaning would be the creation of
extra-human forces, mirroring the tale we are told in certain mythologies that
language and meaning were bestowed on humanity
by the 'gods'/'God'. [On this novel
form of
linguistic fetishisation, see also
here.]
Admittedly,
TAR's general point
appears to be that while science presents us with
an 'objective' view of the world, ordinary 'commonsense' operates at the level
of 'subjective appearance'.
"But Hegel is also difficult for reasons
that are not the result of character and circumstance. His theories use terms
and concepts that are unfamiliar because they go beyond the understanding of
which everyday thought is capable. Ordinary language assumes that things and
ideas are stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that.' And, within strict
limits, these are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the fundamental
discovery of Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change…. And they
change because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is to
this end that Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic
processes…. It is the search to resolve…contradictions that pushes thought past
commonsense definitions which see only separate stable entities." [Rees (1998),
pp.45, 50.]
"The important thing about a Marxist
understanding of the distinction between the appearance of things and their
essence is twofold: 1) by delving beneath the mass of surface phenomena, it is
possible to see the essential relations governing historical change -– thus
beneath the appearance of a free and fair market transaction it is possible to
see the exploitative relations of class society, but, 2) this does not mean that
surface appearances can simply be dismissed as ephemeral events of no
consequence. In revealing the essential relations in society, it is also
possible to explain more fully than before why they appear in a form
different to their real nature. To explain, for instance, why it is that the
exploitative class relations at the point of production appear as the exchange
of 'a fair day's work for a fair day's pay' in the polished surface of the
labour market." [Ibid., p.187.]
In the
above, Rees argues that while 'commonsense' might be alright in its own,
legitimate sphere, it is nevertheless inadequate when it is applied in more
technical areas or in circumstances that involve change.
Here
are my comments (taken from Essay Four
Part One) about the first
of the above two passages of Rees's (slightly edited):
Concerning the alleged limitations of
ordinary language, John Rees
expressed himself as follows:
"Ordinary language assumes
that things and ideas are stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'. And,
within strict limits, these are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the
fundamental discovery of Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change….
And they change because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is
to this end that Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic
processes." [Rees (1998), p.45.]
The problem with this passage is that
it gets
things completely the wrong way round. It is in fact our use of ordinary
language that enables us to speak about change, movement and development. Complex
philosophical jargon (especially terminology invented by Hegel) is completely useless in this regard, since it
is wooden, static and of indeterminate meaning, despite what Rees asserts.
[Any who think differently are invited to reveal precisely which set
of Hegelian
terms is able do what the words listed below (or their equivalent in German)
already achieve for us, only better.]
As is well-known (at least by Marxists),
human beings managed to progress because of their interaction with nature, later
constrained by the class war and the
development of the forces of and relations of production. In which case, ordinary language
-- the result of collective labour --
couldn't fail to
have invented a array of words with the logical and semantic multiplicity that
allowed its users to
speak about changes of almost limitless complexity, speed and duration.
This is no mere dogma; it is easily confirmed. Here is
a greatly shortened list of ordinary words (restricted to modernEnglish, but omitting simple and complex
tensed participles and
auxiliary
verbs) that allow speakers to talk about changes of almost unbounded
complexity, rapidity, or scope:
[In each case, where there is
a noun form of a word its verb form
has been listed (for instance, "object" as in "to object"). Moreover, where I
have listed the word "ring", for example, I also intend cognates of
the verb "to ring"
-- like "ringing" and "rang". I have also omitted
many nouns that imply change or development, such as "river", "runner", "wind",
"lightning", "tide", "cloud", and "fire". Anyone
who didn't know such words implied changing processes in the world -- that
rivers flow, fires burn, runners run, and winds blow -- would merely underline
their lack of comprehension of English (or whatever language theirs happened to be),
compounded by a dangerously
defective knowledge of the world. Not knowing that fires burn, for example,
would endanger life. In addition, several of the above also have verb forms,
such as "fired" or "winding". Other nouns also imply growth and development,
such as "tree", "flower", "mouse", "day", "human being". Anyone who
thought "human being", for example, reflected a 'fixed and changeless' view of
the world would perhaps be regarded as suffering from some form of learning
disability; either that, or they were in the grip of an off-the-wall
philosophical theory of some sort.]
Naturally, it
wouldn't be difficult to extend this list until it contained literally thousands
of entries -- on that, see
here and
here --, all capable of depicting countless changes in
limitless detail (especially if it is augmented with words drawn from mathematics,
science and
HM).
It is only a myth put about by Hegel and DM-theorists (unwisely echoed by
Rees, and others -- such as Woods and Grant)
that ordinary language can't depict change adequately, since it is
supposedly dominated by 'the abstract understanding', a brain module helpfully identified
for us by Hegel without a scrap of supporting evidence, still less a brain scan. By way of contrast,
ordinary language
performs this task far better than the incomprehensible and impenetrably
obscure jargon Hegel invented in order to fix something that wasn't broken.
Naturally, it
wouldn't be difficult to extend this list until it contained literally thousands
of entries -- on that, see
here and
here --, all capable of depicting countless changes in
limitless detail (especially if it is augmented with words drawn from mathematics,
science and
HM).
It is only a myth put about by Hegel and DM-theorists (unwisely echoed by
Rees, and others -- such as Woods and Grant)
that ordinary language can't depict change adequately, since it is
supposedly dominated by 'the abstract understanding', a brain module helpfully identified
for us by Hegel without a scrap of supporting evidence, still less a brain scan. By way of contrast,
ordinary language
performs this task far better than the incomprehensible and impenetrably
obscure jargon Hegel invented in order to fix something that wasn't broken.
Dialecticians
like Rees would have us
believe that because of the alleged shortcomings of the vernacular only the
most recondite and abstruse terminology
-- concocted by Hegel, the meaning of much
of which is still unclear, even to Hegel scholars! -- is capable of telling us what
we already know, and have known for tens of thousands of years, that
things change!
Indeed, we read the following (about
ancient cosmology):
"Now, to understand the power of sacred cities and cosmic
shrines we have to understand the power of the cosmos. The ancients recognised
that there is really only one thing taking place in the universe, one expression
of transcendental power, and that is change. Day transforms into night. Each
night alters the shape of the moon. Seasons change. Seeds sprout into the light
and gradually grow into mature plants that flower and blow to seed. Through
metamorphosis, tadpoles become frogs, and caterpillars become moths. Our lives
change.... The world changes.... Everything changes, but for the ancients,
change occurred in an ordered and oriented world." [Krupp (1997), p.17.
Paragraphs merged.]
It is preposterous, therefore, to suppose that the
ability to express change hadn't been incorporated into language many thousands
of years before 'Being' inflicted Hegel and his crazy ideas on humanity.
Of course, as Rees himself implicitly concedes,
Hegel's jargon has had to be 'translated' into 'ordinary-ish' sorts of words
for the rest of us to be able to gain even a
glimmering of the obscure
message it supposedly conveys -- that was the point of Rees's précis of a
key
Hegelian 'deduction' that many other Hegel scholars have also
'translated' for us (and which will be discussed in detail Essay Twelve Part
Five, summary
here); cf., Rees (1998), pp.49-50 --, the aim of which, apparently,
was to reveal that we can't
possibly understand change without such assistance!
[Although an earlier version of this 'derivation' was
published in Hegel (1977), Hegel's more 'mature' attempt to 'obtain' 'Nothing' from 'Being',
and then 'Becoming' from the 'relation' between those two, appeared in Hegel
(1999),
pp.82-108. As noted above, just like Rees, others have tried to make this incomprehensible
derivation 'comprehensible', for example: Burbidge (1995), pp.38-45; Carlson
(2007), pp.9-53; Hartnack (1997), pp.11-19; Kaufmann (1978), pp.199-203; and
Marcuse (1973)
pp.129-34).]
But, if we already have
ordinary terms (like those listed above) that enable us to talk about and
comprehend change what need have we of Hegel's
obscure terminology?
Conversely,
if, according to Rees, ordinary language is inadequate when it is faced with the
task of 'translating' Hegel's observations into something we can understand,
then how
would anyone be able to grasp what Hegel supposedly meant, or even
determine whether he meant anything
at all? Why translate Hegel into the vernacular if the latter can't cope?
On the other hand, if we are
capable ofcomprehending Hegel's obscure ideas only when they have been
rendered into ordinary-ish sorts of terms, why do we need his convoluted
jargon to reveal to us what it now turns out our language was quite capable of expressing
to begin with -- when (on this supposition)
it must have been adequate enough for just such a successful re-casting of
his ideas by commentators like Rees for the rest of us to grasp? After all, that
is why they chose to translate it.
If ordinary language enables its users
to capture what Hegel meant, in what way is the vernacular defective? Alternatively, if it can't do this, then how might we ever understand Hegel?
In that case, if Hegel
were correct, no one (including Hegel himself!) would be able to
understand Hegel! That is because, ex hypothesi, his words would then be
incapable of being translatedin terms that anyone could comprehend.
Conversely, once
more, if Hegel's words are translatable in terms we can understand, that
must mean we
already have the linguistic resources available to us to comprehend change
perfectly well, thank you very much.
In which case, the following dilemma now
faces Hegel-fans:
(a) If we suppose Hegel were
correct (that ordinary terms can't adequately capture change), no one would be able to understand him, or,
(b) Alternatively, if we suppose Hegel were
mistaken -- and we are capable of understanding him enough to be able to say eventhat much --
no one need bother, since the vernacular would in that case be perfectly adequate
on its own.
Either way, Marxists
would be well-advised to avoid that obscure bumbler like the plague....
Here is John Rees again:
"Hegel is also difficult for reasons that
are not the result of character and circumstance. His theories use terms and
concepts that are unfamiliar because they go beyond the understanding of which
everyday thought is capable. Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are
stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'. And, within strict limits, these
are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the fundamental discovery of
Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change…. And they change
because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is to this end that
Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic processes…. It is the
search to resolve…contradictions that pushes thought past commonsense
definitions which see only separate stable entities." [Rees (1998), pp.41-50. Bold
emphasis added.]
Contrary
to what Rees asserts, ordinary
language not only doesn't, it can't, assume anything. Plainly, it is human beings who assume
things, and they do so by means of the language they use. Unless language had the
capacity to allow for the possible truth or the possible falsehood of
these assumptions, and that of their negations, no assuming could even begin. That is, of course,
because assumptions can be correct as well as incorrect. [Of course, it could be
argued that Rees was employing
metonymy here. Maybe so, but the point still stands. Language isn't an
autonomous system; it takes human beings to give it life.]
Moreover,
the rich and diverse vocabulary available to ordinary speakers also allows for the assumption
(but it is far more than this)
that objects can and do change -- and in complex ways, too. Indeed, ordinary
language enables its users to speak about and study a wide variety of changes in seemingly limitless detail. A long list of just some of the words
available in the vernacular that enable this was given
earlier.
Hence, and despite what Rees says, the sophisticated nature of ordinary
language permits the formation of the following sentences that depict
change with ease:
H78:
This protest is increasing in size as we watch.
H79: That case is becoming
too heavy for the children to carry.
H80: This venue is now
too small for our meetings.
H81: This spider's web
is beginning to disintegrate.
H82: This train
is being re-painted.
H83: That light over there is
defective; it keeps flickering.
H84: This is how to
lose members rapidly: spout dialectics at them.
H85: This dispute is
no longer about working conditions.
H86: This entire continent is
moving closer to Asia.
H87: That is how to
break an egg.
H88: This is how to
change workers' minds.
H89: This
π-bond breaks
in less than 5 nanoseconds if the molecule is rapidly heated.
H90: In an instant the
pickets had re-grouped ready for the next police charge.
Many of the above sentences are somewhat stilted because they have been
deliberately tailored to use the words "this" and "that" (i.e., the form of
words that Rees employed to caricature the vernacular), in order to show that
"things and ideas" aren't "assumed" to be stable -- contrary to his assertion.
However, the above list of examples at least demonstrates that even using Rees's
implausible and highly restricted phraseology, ordinary language
is capable of expressing material changes (especially if it is augmented
with words drawn from science and mathematics), something Hegel's tortured prose
can't emulate -- that is, not without raiding the vernacular, or aping the
protocols of ordinary discourse, to assist it do just that.
Even given this highly limited and constrained form of language, the above list
of sentences can easily be extended. Of course, if the full range of words and
phrases available to ordinary speakers were called upon (H90 being just one
example of such), it would be possible to form an indefinitely large set of
sentences of far greater sophistication than anything dreamt of in Hegel's work,
picturing changes of every imaginable type.
This shows that ordinary language is capable of depicting (and thus permitting
the explanation of) change in the real world far better than any philosophical
theory yet devised.
Now, this isn't
something that a sophisticated user of English (like John Rees) should have to
have pointed out to him -- even though my having to do so is a sad reflection of
the intellectual decay that 'dialectical thought' induces in those held in its
thrall.
Hence, it is a little rich of Rees
proclaiming the superiority over the vernacular
of the language
employed in Hegel's work, and, indeed, in DM -- since, if 'true', DM would make change impossible.
[These allegations will be examined in greater detail in Essay Twelve Part Seven; as
noted above, some of that material has already been posted
here.]
Furthermore, and following on from what
Rees says about science, it could be argued
that because appearances can be, and often are, deceptive, scientific knowledge
has to be based on theories that go beyond, or even behind, the phenomenal world in
order to reveal its underlying "essence". These 'deeper realities' must be
capable of explaining not only why appearances are what they are but also why
they look the way they do.
Despite this, it is plain that
scientists have to rely on their
activity in this world -- the world of 'appearances' -- to test, refine
and advance their hypotheses, or improve their theories. No matter how sophisticated, technical or
"elegant" a given theory is, at some point
researchers will have to interface with the ordinary world in order to test, or
modify, it. To that end, scientists have to do
one or more (possibly even most) of the following: check some dials, read
several meters, mix
substances, carry out a number of measurements, record and check some data,
design, handle or calibrate instruments, conduct surveys, look down microscopes,
telescopes or other optical devices, collect samples, consult computer screens, construct models,
research the relevant literature, speak to colleagues, write reports, formulate
equations, attend conferences, publish papers, articles and books, apply for
grants, etc., etc. Most of these must be carried out if a theory is to
become anything other than speculative, tentative or merely hypothetical, let
alone established fact. Clearly, all
of these activities and performances take place in the ordinaryphenomenal world, and have to be carried out by ordinary (albeit highly
qualified and trained) human beings.
Socially-conditioned and socially-sanctioned practices that take place in this world of phenomena are what enable the
intelligent and efficient advancement of scientific research and then scientific knowledge. In addition, the
vernacular not only enables the education and socialisation of aspiring
scientists, it underpins the skills necessary for the comprehension and
performance of standard laboratory, fieldwork and research techniques,
as well as the design of surveys, expeditions, and experiments (etc.), and even
the application for jobs and grants. Moreover, while on the one hand
mundane aspects of our material and social existence like these facilitate
successful inter-communication between scientists, on the other they provide a
handy source of the many
metaphors, analogies, other figures of speech and
models that breathe life into the vast majority of scientific hypotheses, theories and
papers.
[On
this see, Arib and Hesse (1986), Baake (2003), Brown (2003), Cantor (1987),
Fahnestock (2002), Gould (1988), Griffiths (2001), Gross (1996), Guttenplan
(2005), Hesse (1966), Keller (1995, 2002), Kuhn (1993), Leatherdale (1974),
Lynch (1996), MacCormac (1976), Polanyi (1962), Ravetz (1996), pp.69-244, Way (1994), White
(1996b), and Young (1985).]
Every single
one of the above routines is regulated by the same conventions that govern
everyday behaviour, speech, reasoning, and which, in turn, are mediated by
familiar, mundane physical skills and practices, all of which are
once again materially-, socially-, and historically-conditioned and constrained.
In which
case, scientists can't risk undermining the deliverances of either the
phenomenal or the social world, just as they can't afford to depreciate
ordinary language and everyday practice for fear that by sawing away at the branches
upon which they are collectively sat, they risk a catastrophic fall.
Figure Two: I Came, I Saw, I...
It
could be argued at this point that Rees's account doesn't imply that
appearances can't be trusted; indeed, as noted above, he actually argued that
his own analysis:
"…does not mean that surface appearances
can simply be dismissed as ephemeral events of no consequence. In revealing the
essential relations in society, it is also possible to explain more fully than
before why they appear in a form different to their real nature.
To explain, for instance, why it is that the exploitative class relations at the
point of production appear as the exchange of 'a fair day's work for a fair
day's pay' in the polished surface of the labour market." [Rees (1998), p.187.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
But,
as was pointed out in more detail
earlier, the highlighted clause
above implies that
the surface phenomena in Capitalist society are
different from their underlying form -– which, of course, means appearances
can't
be relied upon. That accounts for the author's use of the word "real".
Consequently, to return to earlier examples, the idea that appearances aren't
"real" (or "fully real") might motivate the belief that just as, say, the Sun
appears to rise in the morning (but doesn't really do so), and
just as sticks, for instance, look as if they bend when partially
immersed in water (but they aren't
really deformed in this way), and just as objects, for example, seem
to shrink in size when they recede from us (when they don't really grow
smaller), and just as tables and floors, say, give the impression that
they are solid (when they are really 'composed' mostly of 'empty space'),
so the surface
appearance of Capitalism only seems to be fair when 'underneath' it
really isn't fair at all. In that case, it is clear that, for anyone
who thinks like this,appearances can't deliver a true picture of reality.
That
is why no one believes that deep down objects change their shape as we
walk round them, that the Sun is really the same size as the Moon, or that ships
slowly sink below the waves when they sail over the horizon. And, presumably, it
is also why only deeply confused (reformist?) socialists believe Capitalism
reallyis fair.
[Note
that I am not committed to the idea that appearances are deceptive, since only
human beings (or what they produce -- in writing, speech or art, for example)
can literally be deceptive. Quite the opposite, in fact. I'm merely drawing out the
consequences of this family of confused ideas, metaphors, analogies, and metaphysical
fairy tales that DM-fans have unwisely imported in Marxism. However, further
consideration of this would take us too far into
HM, an area largely
avoided in these Essays -- for reasons outlined in
Essay One.]
Moreover, the objection that Rees doesn't really believe that appearances are
deceptive implies that his own distinction between surface phenomena and
underlying, 'real essences' is pointless; his arguments would make no sense
unless he believed that appearances were
deceptive-in-themselves. Otherwise, why try to isolate or identify
underlying "essences" if surface phenomena have never, or won't ever, mislead
anybody? Why delve deeper if Capitalism not only looks fair, it can also
be regarded as
essentially fair (given this way of talking)? And, why try to explain to
workers that their wages represent only a fraction of the value they produce if
what they are actually paid does in fact represent a fair 'slice of the
cake'?
Doubtless, several of the above assertions might still attract criticism.
However, any such critics can console themselves with the thought that the
resolution of these issues may only take place in the
phenomenal world -– that is, in this world of appearances, ordinary
language, written documents and everyday computer screens. Hence, if the superiority of
science and/or dialectics may only be established by a defence located
precisely here, in the world of 'unreliable' appearances and
'untrustworthy' ordinary language -- using the printed page, books, articles,
spoken and written words, argumentation, observation, experiment, and the like
--, then any criticisms of the points made above must self-destruct. If
those advancing such criticisms are only able to convince others of the
correctness of what they say by arguing that no one can really trust what they
read, see or hear -- except, of course, they can trust the material form of the
argument that had just been used to express those very doubts, and which has just
been given a convenient exemption certificate --, then
self-destruct they must.
If phenomena are untrustworthy, then any
phenomenal statement of that 'fact' must be unreliable, too.
And,
it is little use referring sceptical onlookers to the 'dialectical' interplay
between "appearance" and underlying "essence" (as we saw
Novack attempt to do earlier),
since the first half of that alleged "interplay" is defective; and that is
because it is
predicated on a
series of
logical blunders -- while the
second half self-destruct no less readily.
That
is quite apart from the fact that this alleged 'dialectical interplay' also
takes place in the world of appearances, which means that it can't turn
phenomenological dust into epistemological gold simply because its fans merely
think it
can.
[It
is worth recalling at this point that I am using the words like "phenomena" and
"phenomenological" to refer to the deliverances of the senses; I do not prefer
this way a talking, and, once more, it is only being used in order to hasten its own demise.
They do not, and nor should they be taken to imply I am promoting, advocating
or recommending
Phenomenalism, directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly.]
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~
Returning
now to the main theme of this section: if scientists themselves understand the
meaning of the word "rise" (in S1, for example), then they can't simply
re-define it to suite themselves -- perhaps under the mistaken impression that
such a revision would help uncover its 'real' meaning. To see this, consider again
the following:
"As we know appearances can be deceptive. Each day the sun
appears to circumnavigate the earth, when the reality is that the earth travels
around the sun. We therefore need to penetrate the veil of appearance in order
to reveal the reality that is disguised within." [Quoted from
here.]
As well as this pair of sentences:
S1: The Sun rises in the morning.
S2: It isn't the case that the Sun rises
in the morning.
If
the word "rises" in S1 or S2 doesn't mean what we ordinarily take it to mean,
then any scientist or philosopher using sentences like these wouldn't in fact be
clarifying or correcting
ordinary language; he or she would be attempting to change or even
replace
it.
Worse
still, if the word "rises" in S1 or S2 doesn't mean what we ordinarily take it
to mean, then those two sentences would be incomprehensible since they would now
contain at least one word ("rise") that no one seems to understand in this
context.
It
might be wondered how it can be true that "no one seems to understand" the verb
"to rise"? Of course, every competent speaker of English (or, indeed, other
languages that possess an equivalent verb) knows how to use this word and hence
understands it. What is being claimed here isn't that no one understands this
word, only that in this case, with specific reference to S1 and S2
(but, not in relation to other, unrelated sentences),
if "rises" doesn't mean what we ordinarily take it to meanhere (and no one informs us what its 'alternative meaning' is in these two
sentences), then S1 and S2 must be incomprehensible, since, in this specific
case, these two sentences would contain at least one word ("rises") that no
one understands in this context. In that case, S1 and S2 might just as
well have been:
S2a: It isn't the case that the Sun
schmises in the morning.
On
the other hand, if the word "rises" in S2 is to be understood in a new and
as-yet-unspecified, or even in a technical, sense, then S2 would no
longer be the contradictory of S1, and so it couldn't be used to 'clarify' or
'correct' S1. Either way, it isn't possible to correct ordinary language in this
way. [Why this tactic will always fail, no matter how it is
re-packaged, is explained in detail,
here.]
S1: The Sun rises in the morning.
S2: It isn't the case that the Sun rises
in the morning.
It
could be argued that it is perfectly clear what "rises" means in this context:
it refers to what we see in the morning, on a cloudless day, if we look to the
east.
But what we see is consistent with the earth being stationary, too.
Again, it
could be countered that the point is that post-Renaissance science teaches us that the Sun doesn't
actually rise; the horizon falls as the Earth rotates.
In that case,
this use of "rise" doesn't mean what we take it to mean after all -- and we
are back where we were a few paragraphs ago.
Rees
also claimed that underlying reality
contradicts appearances:
"There is a deeper reality, but it must
be able to account for the contradiction between it and the way it appears."
[Rees (1998), p.188.]
Perhaps giving echo to this famous comment of Marx's:
"Vulgar economy actually does no more than interpret, systematise and defend in
doctrinaire fashion the conceptions of the agents of bourgeois production who
are entrapped in bourgeois production relations. It should not astonish us,
then, that vulgar economy feels particularly at home in the estranged outward
appearances of economic relations in which these prima facie absurd and
perfect contradictions appear and that these relations seem the more
self-evident the more their internal relationships are concealed from it,
although they are understandable to the popular mind. But all science would
be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly
coincided." [Marx
(1981), p.956; Marx (1998), p.804. Bold emphasis
alone added.]
Although Rees doesn't himself use
S1 or S2 [repeated below], they might nevertheless serve to
illustrate the alleged conflict he seems to have in mind. If so, it could be
argued that these two sentences reveal that the apparent motion of the Sun was in fact
contradicted by later developments in science, which also demonstrate the
limitations of 'commonsense'.
The problem
with this reading of S1 and S2, expressed in S3 and S4, is that (as noted several
times already) these two don't contradict one another; nor do they even depict a
contradictory state of affairs. That is because, given such an interpretation, S3 reports that the Sun
appears to rise. But, if appearances were deceptive, and it appears
to be the case that the Sun rises (even if it doesn't), then both of the
following could
be true:
Perhaps the worry exercising DM-theorists might be brought out by means of the
following 'argument':
S5: The Sun appears to rise.
S6: Therefore, the Sun does rise.
S7: But, modern science shows that the
Sun does not rise.
S8: Therefore, the Sun does not rise.
S9: Hence, the Sun both rises and does
not rise.
S10: S9 is a contradiction, and so it is
false.
S11: If S8 is still held true, then
based on the falsehood of S9, S6 is also false.
It
looks like S9 is the contradiction DM-theorists are looking for. The idea
appears to be that while phenomena might lead us to accept one set of beliefs,
the development of science has forced us to adopt an 'opposite', or
even 'contradictory' set. Once again, the conclusion seems to be that scientific
knowledge contradicts 'commonsense' and ordinary language.
Of
course, DM-theorists -- if they accept this line of reasoning -- must abandon
one or both of the following theses:
(1)
Contradictions are true, or they reflect contradictory states of affair that coexist. [The opposite of this was used in S10 to
derive the falsehood of S6.]
(2)
Reality itself is contradictory.
The
continued acceptance of (1) would mean that while it is still held true that scientific knowledge
contradicts 'commonsense',
'incorrect'
and 'correct' beliefs would both be true. Clearly, this would
completely undermine the advance of scientific knowledge. If mythical tales and
allegedly erroneous 'folk' theories were all true (even though they
'contradict' fact and/or theory), then there would seem to be no point bothering
with scientific research. On that basis, we would have to accept as true the
'fact' that the Earth sits stationary at the centre of the Universe and the
fact that it is in motion on the periphery of the Galaxy. Naturally, it would
then prove impossible to agree that science provides an 'objective' account of
reality if the
opposite of what scientists believe to be true is
also the case.
Some
might respond here by pointing out that
earlier it was argued that the
Ptolemaic view of the universe is just as valid as the Copernican. But, the
above comment seems to suggest the opposite. Which is it to be?
In
reply, it is worth adding that wherever the truth lies, no one would hold
both of these beliefs true at the same time. If a scientist wants to use or
accept one approach, he or she will not use or accept the other at the same
time, otherwise irredeemable confusion would result. Anyway, the above
example is somewhat unique; we certainly wouldn't be this accommodating with
other scientific theories in competition with ancient beliefs/dogmas. For
example, no one -- it is to be hoped(!) -- accepts the literal
truth of the Biblical account of creation
and Darwin's theory of descent through modification and natural
selection, or the
Humoral Theory
and the Germ Theory of disease, and so on.
Finally, it
should to be recalled that I am not airing my views here, merely
highlighting the insurmountable obstacles that face DM-theorists if they insist
on sticking to the theory they inherited from Hegel (upside down or 'the right
way up').
Despite these problems, S5-S11 present serious problems of their own:
S5: The Sun appears to rise.
S6: Therefore, the Sun does rise.
S7: But, modern science shows that the
Sun does not rise.
S8: Therefore, the Sun does not rise.
S9: Hence, the Sun both rises and does
not rise.
S10: S9 is a contradiction, and so it is
false.
S11: If S8 is still held true, then
based on the falsehood of S9, S6 is also false.
There are at
least three serious problems with the above 'argument':
[1]
Plainly, S5 does not imply S6, which means that S9 can't be derived from S5-S8.
[2]
S9 isn't a contradiction -- it is far too
ambiguous. [We encountered similar ambiguities
here.]
[3]
If all phenomenal reports are to be subjected to this sort of test or this level
of scrutiny, then it might prove impossible to show
that S7, for instance, is true. That is because the validation of S7 would
require extensive reliance on other phenomenological reports, all of which would be
susceptible to the same sort of destructive, sceptical analysis.
This
is quite apart from the fact that S7, for example, is a phenomenal object itself
(it is after all a physical object on your screen), and is therefore
'untrustworthy' -- or what it says is unreliable, given this theory.
In
which case, S9-S11 can't be derived from these premisses; this putative
reductio is defective from start to finish.
It could be objected that in a perfectly
ordinary sense the following two sentences are contradictory:
Z1: It appears to be φ-ing.
Z2: No, it isn't φ-ing.
[Where
"φ"stands for a verb clause or phrase.]
Consider this ordinary language
interpretation of C1 and C2:
Z1a: "It appears to be
raining."
Z2a: "No, you're mistaken, it
isn't raining."
Or, consider this example:
Z3: "The Sun appears to be
moving."
Z4: "No, you're mistaken, the
Sun isn't moving."
Anyone who uttered
Z2a (or, indeed, Z4) would be
correcting (gain-saying -- speaking against) anyone who uttered Z1a (or Z3), thus contradicting them.
This shows that the
earlier claim that "It
isn't possible to form a contradiction
from a
proposition that expresses matters of fact with one that reports an appearance"
is false.
Or, so it could be argued.
Of course, Z4 is
false anyway, since the
Sun is moving relative to the Galaxy; so it isn't too clear that Z3 and Z4
will be of much use to DM-apologists, especially since the obvious reply to
anyone who tried to correct Z3 by means of Z4 would be:
Z5: "Well, I didn't say it
was moving, only that it appears to be -- and it still appears
to be moving, despite what you say."
So, Z3 and Z4 aren't contradictories since
they can both be true (and can both be false). This is, of course, because
of the equivocal nature of the verbs "move" and "appear". [In
Essay Five we saw that the word
"move" was rather complex and had many different meanings.]
The same sort of response applies to
Z1a and
Z2a:
Z6: "Well, I didn't say it
was raining, only that it appears to be -- and it still
appears to be raining, despite what you say."
[Z1a: "It appears to be
raining."
Z2a: "No, you're mistaken, it
isn't raining."]
In
which case, this is still the case:
It
isn't possible to form a contradiction
from a
proposition that expresses matters of fact with one that reports an appearance.
[Anyone who
thinks differently is invited to e-mail
me with their best shot.]
Putting the natural sciences to one side for
the moment, Rees and other DM-theorists cite examples drawn from
HM to illustrate the
alleged clash between "essence" and "appearance".
[Several other
such examples are
considered at length in Essay Eight Part Two,
here,
here and
here.]
Perhaps an examination of the
cases they cite might help establish the point DM-theorists wish to make?
Rees's argument, for instance, proceeds as
follows:
"The important thing about a
Marxist understanding of the distinction between the appearance of things and
their essence is twofold: 1) by delving beneath the mass of surface
phenomena, it is possible to see the essential relations governing historical
change -– thus beneath the appearance of a free and fair market transaction
it is possible to see the exploitative relations of class society, but, 2) this
does not mean that surface appearances can simply be dismissed as ephemeral
events of no consequence. In revealing the essential relations in society, it is
also possible to explain more fully than before why they appear in a form
different to their real nature. To explain, for instance, why it is that the
exploitative class relations at the point of production appear as the exchange
of 'a fair day's work for a fair day's pay' in the polished surface of the
labour market." [Rees (1998), p.187. Bold emphases added.]
This passage makes it plain that while
Capitalism appears on the surface to be fair, its underlying 'essence' is
thoroughly exploitative, or its 'essential relations' are. Hence, in that sense it could be claimed that
appearances contradict reality.
Unfortunately, Rees's example isn't even
a contradiction, howsoever much we might deplore what it expresses. [Why
that is so is explained more fully
here. On
the highly misleading metaphor that certain truths, or even "essences",
lie somehow "below the surface", see
here.]
Perhaps this is too hasty? Maybe we can
rephrase Rees's claim so that the alleged contradiction becomes a little more obvious:
R17: Capitalism appears to be
fair.
R18: It isn't the case that
Capitalism appears to be fair.
This pair of sentences certainly looks
contradictory, but as we saw above, because both sentences are about
appearances, they aren't what Rees intended.34
Well, maybe then the following are?
R19: Capitalism is
exploitative.
R20: It isn't the case that
Capitalism is exploitative.
This
pair certainly seems contradictory, too, but once again, since these two
sentences fail to contrast appearance with
reality they won't do either.
A more
perspicuous representation of Rees's intentions is
perhaps to be found in the relation he says exists between (i) "essence and
appearance" and (ii) "subjective and objective" views of the world:
"[F]or Lenin practice
overcomes the distinction between subjective and objective and the gap between
essence and appearance." [Ibid., pp.190-91.]
This could mean that these
hard-to-pin-down DM-'contradictions' actually arise between a "subjective" and
"objective" view of the world. But, even if what Rees says were the case, what
precisely is the
contradiction here?
Perhaps the following 'argument' might help
bring that out:
R21: Capitalism appears to be
fair.
R22: That appearance leads
people (including workers) to think it is fair.
R23: Hence, Capitalism is
fair. [Or, so they conclude.]
R24: But, revolutionary
theory and practice convince some that Capitalism isn't fair.
R25: Therefore, Capitalism
isn't fair. [Or, so some others conclude.]
R26: Consequently, Capitalism
is both fair and not fair.
R27: But, the contradiction
in R26 implies that R23 can't be true (based on the truth of R25).
Ignoring the fact that the above argument is
hopelessly invalid, its message looks reasonably clear: the 'objectivity' of
revolutionary theory (expressed in R24) makes plain the
