'Jurriaan' Throws His Toys Out Of the Pram

Debating with Dialectical Mystics is boringly repetitive and highly predictable; the latest example is no different. A rather emotional character, who says 'he' is "Jurriaan Bendien", has taken it upon 'himself' to put me in my place. Readers can check out the original debate here.

There I noted the following:

How Not To Argue 101

Notice that once verbally abused, I invariably go for the jugular. No less so here.

And what do we find in this sad mystic's attempt to kick some life into 'his' few remaining brain cells? Yes, you guessed it once again: yet more abuse, but little else (if we ignore the waffle):

Rosa Lichtenstein, Whoever you are, it's fine if you want to vent bile about dialectics behind the safety of a pseudonym (your "post office box socialism" is rather cowardly though, to say the least, particularly when you boast about your Phd thesis without anybody being able to refer to it), but I never gave you permission to publish my text on your website, and I think you should at least do me the courtesy of asking me for approval. If you are going to publish my stuff, then at least do me the courtesy of publishing the complete text of what I wrote, or alternatively, provide a link to where the complete text is available and was originally published.

Of course, we all know that 'Jurriaan' did not complete his PhD thesis, so that chip on 'his' shoulder is understandable.

'He' complains, however, that I did not ask permission to publish 'his' sacred words -- and yet 'he' was happy to post them on the internet, where all is fair game. And for some reason 'he' thinks I failed to publish 'his' entire missive, but 'he' neglected to say which bits I left out. [None at all, in fact -- but we already know that 'Jurriaan' cannot cope with detail.] And, of course, I did provide a link. [Perhaps, as a result of this latest tantrum, 'Jurriaan' forgot to put 'his' glasses on?]

I regret to say I cannot help you with your quest to define the meaning of dialectics out of existence, since, I think, as long as people find utility in the notion, they will continue to use it anyway. You'd be better off studying philosophers such as Charles Taylor, Kozo Uno, William Stace or Mario Bunge who explored the notion of dialectics in some depth, with a more profound knowledge of this intellectual tradition. I'm not saying BTW I necessarily agree with any or all of what these authors argue, but at least they grappled with dialectical ideas in a more serious manner than most Marxist-Leninist bureaucrats did.
 

Well, we already knew that! In fact, as my last reply to 'him' revealed, since 'Jurriaan' seems not to understand his own 'theory', 'he' is the last person one should look to for help in this regard.

But wait, where have I tried to do this?

define the meaning of dialectics out of existence

Nowhere, in fact, and that is why 'Jurriaan' does not quote me to that effect. Again, we already know 'he' likes to make stuff up. The Enid Blyton of dialectics? Seems so.

But, we ought to thank 'him' for listing what must almost be 'his' entire reading list in philosophy:

I think, as long as people find utility in the notion, they will continue to use it anyway. You'd be better off studying philosophers such as Charles Taylor, Kozo Uno, William Stace or Mario Bunge who explored the notion of dialectics in some depth, with a more profound knowledge of this intellectual tradition.

And yet, not one of these characters could tell us what a 'dialectical contradiction' is -- or if they could, they kept that secret remarkably well hidden. And, it's no use looking to this irascible expert, for 'Jurriaan' does not know either. So, all 'his' 'in depth' reading was to no avail.  No big surprise that!

If you are wondering about the meaning of "tautology", I use it in the basic sense of a proposition which is true by definition, in virtue of the meanings of terms. Stating a tautology means stating something which must be true by definition (under all conditions and valuations). I am of course aware that more technical definitions are mooted in propositional logic by various philosophers, and that the tautological nature of certain kinds of logical propositions is contested, but anyway the universe of tautologies is potentially infinite. The real point of me mentioning this is in what I wrote, that if something is true by the definition of terms used, then everything depends on whether discussants accept the terms used. If discussants don't accept the terms, then asserting a tautology in a discussion is merely a petitio principii, a question-begging statement which already assumes which has to be proved or demonstrated.

Readers can check, but I expressed no worries about not understanding what a tautology is, so much of the above was yet more wasted effort.

I did, however, query the phrase "tautological definition", but 'Jurriaan' chose not to address this -- so, 'he' is no help even with his own 'ideas'!

Wittgenstein, in the tradition of analytical philosophy, seems to have believed that he could devise logical demarcation criteria which could rule in or rule out statements as meaningful or meaningless. But this idea assumes that something can be meaningful only if it satisfies certain preferred logical criteria. In reality, however, meaningfulness does not even absolutely require logicality, however defined, since something can be meaningful simply in virtue of a non-logical association, which could in fact be very vague (as is evident from the use of language and linguistic symbols).

Once more, 'Jurriaan's' weekend 'research' on Wittgenstein has led him to confuse Wittgenstein's discussion (in his early work) of nonsensical (Unsinnig) pseudo-propositions with senseless (Sinnloss) propositions, and then with the meaning (Bedeutung) of sentences in his later work. And, readers can check, Wittgenstein offered no "logical" criteria that would or could demarcate or "rule in or rule out statements as meaningful or meaningless". Once more 'Jurriaan' seems to have confused Wittgenstein with the Logical Positivists. The other things 'he' says, however, are too vague to do anything with -- except ignore.

Despite this, what if anything has the above got to do with my reply to 'him'? Nothing, it seems, but here is yet more of it:

The basic, most elementary associative processes used by sentient organisms for creating meaningful significance are those of identifying, distinguishing and generalising stimuli in some way. These are abilities which exist in a variety of living organisms to some or other degree, and what (mainly) humans add to this, almost from birth or perhaps even before it, is the capacity to reflect consciously on these meanings, create new meanings and objectify (objectively express) those meanings to a far greater extent than any animal can, and consequently with a much greater behavioural flexibility. Indeed, Viktor Frankl, the inventor of logotherapy, regarded the ability of humans to create their own meanings as being essential to human nature, and to human freedom and dignity. But this does not require by necessity that those meanings are logical, merely the detection of a "pattern" of some kind.

Readers who made it to the end of this passage without dropping off can comfort themselves with the thought that 'Jurriaan' mercifully did not go on at greater length, even as they ask themselves "But how does this help us understand what a 'dialectical contradiction' is?"

Well, you tell me!

Perhaps this is all an elaborate smokescreen to hide the fact that this 'expert' logician does not know? Reluctant as I am to draw this increasingly obvious conclusion, it seems inescapable. After several attempts, all we have received in response is a meandering reply about the 'logotherapy' of Viktor Frankl. What next? The thoughts of Sarah Palin?

Oh dear, I was wrong! There is more. The waffle-meister strikes back:

One may for example attach a meaning to a certain work of art, or a location, or a person, without the association being "logical" in any sense, merely associative. Indeed the utility of logical thought is partly to help clarify the meaning of something which is part of a semantic universe containing both logical and non-logical meanings, as well as meaningless utterances. Part of dialectical thought is the idea that something can be positively defined only by showing both what it is and what it is not (the synthesized meaning of something then contains both its affirmation and its negation). By exploring this, we deepen our understanding of what something identifies and means. That is why I think your assumption that dialectics is meaningless nonsense cannot be proved conclusively, since it would require a proof both of what it means and what it doesn't mean.

And yet, for all this verbiage, we still do not know what a 'dialectical contradiction' is! Someone should perhaps advise 'Jurriaan' to look up the meaning of 'relevant', or even 'stick to the point'. However, I fear that if they did, they'd only receive a response that banged on about the demise of Myan culture or the median price of beef in Spain in 1487.

Stay awake at the back, there! The prophet is speaking!

Some People Have No Respect!

And here are yet more wise words for the uninitiated:

But -- leaving aside that your focus is entirely on what it cannot mean - such an absolute proof cannot be provided, because a naive concept of meaning is being used according to which meaningfulness can be definitively demarcated from meaninglessness once and for all, in virtue of certain logical rules -- analogous to a computer which converts observations into binary code. Since however meaning is context-dependent, often reflexive and need not display logicality, the most you can achieve is a proof that some statements are meaningful or meaningless in a limited number of contexts. You are just left with Popperian skepticism to the effect that there are always more illusions that you can ever hope to demolish. Unfortunately skepticism provides little positive orientation for behaviour, and is therefore ultimately debilitating and demeaning for a human being. One ought to be able to have one's doubts about matters, sure, but not to the extent that the meaning of everything at issue is put in question, since this only adds creates confusion rather than clear it up. You do not, in other words, clear up confusions about dialectics simply by ostentating endlessly that dialectics is meaningless. From a dialectician's point of view, the very fact that there are confusions and controversies about dialectics is itself significant, and can be viewed as a determinate symptom if viewed in a broader context.

Now, I noted this in Essay One:

Apart from those listed in Note 01, above, the most common reactions to my work (from comrades who have 'debated' this with me on the internet, or elsewhere) are the following...

(7) The attribution to me of ideas I do not hold, and which could not reasonably have been inferred from anything I have said or written -- e.g., that I am a "postmodernist" (which I am not), an "empiricist" (same comment), a "Popperian" (I am in fact an anti-Popperian), that I am a "sceptic" (and this, just because I challenge accepted dogma, when Marx himself said he doubted all things and Lenin declared that all knowledge is provisional), that I am an "anti-realist" (when I am in fact neither a realist nor an anti-realist --, I am indeed a "nothing-at-all-ist" with respect to philosophical theory -- this must not be confused with Nihilism!), that I am a "reformist" (when I am the opposite), or that I am a "revisionist" (when Lenin enjoined us all to question accepted theory).

Once more, these are often advanced by comrades who have not read a single one of my Essays (but this does not prevent them from being experts in this area, or from making things up about me), or they have merely skim-read parts of my work. Naturally, they would be the first to complain if anyone else did this with the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. [This is just one of the latest examples.]

Indeed, Engels himself waxed indignant with Dühring over precisely this point:

In connection with Herr Dühring's examination of the Darwin case, we have already got to know his habit, 'in the interests of complete truth' and because of his "duty to the public which is free from the bonds of the guilds", of quoting incorrectly. It becomes more and more evident that this habit is an inner necessity of the philosophy of reality, and it is certainly a very 'summary treatment'. Not to mention the fact that Herr Dühring further makes Marx speak of any kind of 'advance' whatsoever, whereas Marx only refers to an advance made in the form of raw materials, instruments of labour, and wages; and that in doing this Herr Dühring succeeds in making Marx speak pure nonsense. And then he has the cheek to describe as comic the nonsense which he himself has fabricated. Just as he built up a Darwin of his own fantasy in order to try out his strength against him, so here he builds up a fantastic Marx. 'Historical depiction in the grand style', indeed! [Engels (1976), p.159. Bold emphases added Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

Dühring is not allowed to do this, but apparently it's OK for dialecticians to do it to my work!

So, it's nice to see 'Jurriaan' fall into the same fabulist category.

Mercifully, we are nearing the end:

There is a sense in which Wittgenstein is just as tyrannical and totalitarian as a Stalinist bureaucrat, insofar as he seeks to impose criteria for meaningfulness, ruling out vast swathes of meaning and ruling in others, according to the logical rules, he, Wittgenstein, has devised for it. In contrast, the root meaning of dialectics is dialogue (Greek: dialogos). If you enter into dialogue about the meaning of dialectics, you have already conceded that dialectics is meaningful in some way, and therefore can be meaningfully questioned, and in that sense you have lost your argument about the claim that it is meaningless already at the start. But if you simultaneously deny dialectics can be meaningful under any conditions, i.e. you accept this proposition explicitly or implicitly as a tautology, you simultaneously rule out any genuine dialogue about it. That is an eminently "dialectical" contradiction of your own thinking: your attempt at "dialogue" consists of denying the validity and meaningfulness of what your partner in dialogue about dialectics has to say, generating mere irritation.

1) We have already seen that the 'Wittgenstein' 'Jurriaan' refers to is a figment of 'his' Hermetically-compromised 'brain'.

2) I have nowhere said that dialectics is 'meaningless' (although I have asserted it contains meaningless terms) -- what I have alleged is that it makes no sense at all, and what 'Jurriaan' has posted in return merely conforms that judgement -- for not even 'he' can tell us what the phrase "dialectical contradiction" means -- and neither can anyone else!

'Jurriaan's' confusion clearly arises from the fact that, all along, 'he' has run together "meaningless", "nonsensical" and "senseless", compounded by the fact that 'he' won't be told -- 'he' is too busy waffling.

But, what about this?

you have already conceded that dialectics is meaningful in some way, and therefore can be meaningfully questioned,

Well, the word "meaning" itself has many meanings. Here are a few:

(1) Personal Significance: as in "His Teddy Bear means a lot to him."

(2) Evaluative import: as in "May Day means different things to different classes."

(3) Point or purpose: as in "Life has no meaning."

(4) Linguistic meaning: as in "'Vixen' means 'female fox'", "'Chien' means 'dog'", or "Recidivist" means someone who has resumed their criminal career.

(5) Aim or intention: as in "They mean to win this strike."

(6) Implication: as in "Winning this dispute means that management won't try another wage cut again in a hurry."

(7) Indicate, point to, or presage: as in "Those clouds mean rain", or "Those spots mean you have measles."

(8) Reference: as in "I meant him over there", or "'The current president of the USA' means somebody different at least once every eight years."

(9)  Artistic or literary import: as in "The meaning of this novel is to examine political integrity."

(10) An indication of conversational focus: as in "I mean, why do we have to accept a measly 1% rise in the first place?"

(11)  An expression of sincerity or determination: as in "I mean it, I really do want to go on the march!", or "The demonstrators really mean to stop this war."

(12) The content of a message, or the import of a sign: as in "It means the strike starts on Monday", or "It means you have to queue here."

(13) Interpretation: as in "You will need to read the author's novels if you want to give a new meaning to her latest play", or "That gesture means those pickets think you are a scab."

(14) Import or significance: as in "Part of the meaning of this play is to change our view of drama", or "The real meaning of the agreement is that the bosses have at last learnt their lesson."

(15) Speakers' meaning: as in "When you trod on her foot and she said 'Well done!' she in fact meant the exact opposite."

(16) Communicative meaning: as in "You get my meaning", or "My last letter should tell you what I meant", or "We have just broken their secret code; the last message meant this..."

(17) Explanation: as in "When the comrade said the strike isn't over what she meant was that we can still win!"

[The above comes from here. This is not to suggest that several of these do not overlap, either.]

Now I am prepared to admit that dialectics has meaning in sense 1), and perhaps 2), but that is all. [The reason why this is so is explained in detail in Essay Nine Part Two.] But, I have never said this to 'Jurriaan', so where 'he' got the above idea from beats me. Except 'he' adds this:

i.e. you accept this proposition explicitly or implicitly as a tautology, you simultaneously rule out any genuine dialogue about it.

Well, no, I accepted no such thing; it was 'Jurriaan' who introduced the word "tautology" here, not me.

And where have I "ruled out and genuine dialogue"? Nowhere, that's where. Indeed, over the last four years, at RevLeft alone, I have engaged in dialogue with countless Dialectical Mystics, in over 11,000 posts. And I have engaged with others at the MHI site. A list of some of these debates (at RevLeft and elsewhere) can be found here.

That is an eminently "dialectical" contradiction of your own thinking: your attempt at "dialogue" consists of denying the validity and meaningfulness of what your partner in dialogue about dialectics has to say, generating mere irritation.

Well, I'd like to agree with 'Jurriaan', but we do not as yet understand the phrase "dialectical contradiction", so I can't.

At last, the end!

A dialogue with Rosa Lichtenstein about dialectics is thus a fruitless pseudo-dialogue, because there isn't any shared premiss in the dialogue about dialectics, and there is evidently nothing that would shift Rosa's opinion in any way. At best one could say, "well I find dialectics a meaningful concept, although Rosa doesn't" but since we already knew this, the dialogue adds nothing new, and is a complete waste of time. I do not hope to persuade you in saying this, that it is a waste of time, but merely that I find it a waste of time, and therefore do not intend to pursue it, it would just be a useless distraction from constructive activities in which, as I mentioned, creative dialectical insights are a normal everyday occurrence.

Well, no one asked 'Jurriaan' to stick 'his' waffling face in here; if 'he' can't hack it, that's 'his' problem.

I do not hope to persuade you in saying this, that it is a waste of time, but merely that I find it a waste of time, and therefore do not intend to pursue it, it would just be a useless distraction from constructive activities in which, as I mentioned, creative dialectical insights are a normal everyday occurrence.

I respectfully accept your capitulation.

Next dialectical numpty, please...!

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