A Rather Weak 'Attempt' To Defend The Indefensible

 

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The difference between Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained here.

 

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At RevLeft, a character called 'Vogelman' has posted a rather weak attempt to defend Engels's so-called 'Laws' of dialectics:

 

In this part Rosa Liechtenstein (sic) claims that the laws of dialectics are imposed on nature and that most of evidence (sic) for these laws are (sic) over used "clichés". She reproduces one of these often used examples of water boiling by presenting us a quote from the book "Reason in Revolt" by Ted Grant and Alan Woods. (Which is a rather incorrect description of boiling actually).

 

The passage to which the above was a reply in fact came from an Introductory Essay (link above) I wrote a few years ago that was only published on the Internet because several comrades found my main Essays either too long or too difficult, to which I added the following warning at the beginning:

 

Please note that this Essay deals with very basic issues, even at the risk of over-simplification.

 

It has only been ventured upon because a handful of comrades (who were not well-versed in Philosophy) wanted a very simple guide to my principle arguments against DM.

 

In that case, it is not aimed at experts!

 

Anyone who objects to the apparently superficial nature of the material below must take these caveats into account or navigate away from this page. It is not intended for them.

 

It is worth underlining this last point since I still encounter comrades on internet discussion boards who, despite the above warning, still think this Essay is a definitive statement of my ideas.

 

I even posted the following at RevLeft, at the beginning of the essay in question:

 

Comrades need to make note of the fact that this was written in response to a request from RevLefters who were not well-versed in philosophy, but who wanted to read a summary of my main objections, so it is aimed at novices, not experts. Hence, it greatly simplifies the issues. Critics have pointed this out, but when I go on at greater length, and in more detail, they then moan about the length of my replies!
 

Vogelman completely ignored this warning that my arguments had been deliberately simplified, which is partly why Woods and Grant were quoted. [The other reason these two were referenced is that several comrades at RevLeft thought highly of their book, so it was important to challenge that belief.]

 

Anyway, Vogelman begins with the following observation:

 

She then states that in most cases there aren't even nodal points and gives some examples (Melting: Metal, rock, butter and plastic) which she claims are simply ignored by people who adhere dialectics. Well, let's see if there are any nodal points to find here.

First of all let us look at what a solid is. At a molecular level a solid is characterised by molecules that are bonded together by inter or intra molecular forces which causes the molecules to be very static compared to molecules in the gas or water phase. The only motion these molecules are able to make are oscillations. Because of the different kind of forces between the molecules and because of the different ways they can be orientated, there are different classes of solids: metals, various kinds of crystals, glasses,.... All these classes have there own distinct qualities and quantities.

 

In fact, I have covered these rather obvious objections in several places at my site (for example, here, here, but mainly here).

 

The first point that needs making once again is that the vast majority of DM-fans invariably fail to tell us what a 'quality' is. Indeed, I even pointed this out in the Essay in question at RevLeft:

 

Moreover, this 'Law' only appears to work because of the vague way that "quantity", "quality" and "node" (or even "leap") have been defined by DM-theorists -- that is, if they ever bother to do so. Indeed, after 25 years of searching, I have been able to find only three DM-texts (out of the scores I have studied) that attempt even superficially to do this: Kuusinen (1961), Yurkovets (1984), and Gollobin (1986)! [Once more, their arguments have been taken apart in Essay Seven.] And, in nearly 200 years (if we include Hegel here), not one single DM-theorist has even thought to tell us how long a "node" is supposed to last!

 

Well, does Vogelman even attempt to tell us what a 'quality' is or even how long a 'node' lasts?

 

True to form, he does not.

 

Now, this prime example of Mickey Mouse Science 'allows' dialecticians like Vogelman to see 'qualitative changes' when and where it suits them, just as it also 'allows' them to dismiss counter-examples that don't fit their vague, subjective and imprecise 'law' whenever that is convenient, too.

 

Second, while it is certainly true that there are many rapid changes in 'quality' in nature (where did I deny that?), it is also true that there are equally many, if not more, which aren't. For example, metals change slowly from liquid to solid when heated, as I have also argued elsewhere:

 

But is it true that "each metal has a unique quantitative threshold at which melting begins"? Sure, each metal has a defined melting point at which juncture it will have melted, but despite this, at lower temperatures that metal will soften, and that softening is gradual. Human beings have known this for thousands of years -- this is what makes metals malleable, and formable. So, the "qualitative" transition of metals from solid to liquid is slow, not rapid. At the melting point, the transition ends, but the lead up to it is slow. The qualitative change (solid-to-liquid) here is typically non-'nodal'. The same is true of the other examples I gave. Who does not know that glass and plastic melt slowly?

 

Now, if Vogelman wants to redefine "quality" and "node" so that this 'law' now applies to clearly defined thermodynamic phase changes, fine, but even then he will find that, in the examples mentioned, the 'qualitative' changes (from solid to liquid, hard to soft) will still take place slowly, and non-'nodally'.

 

[There are scores of videos on YouTube that show metal and glass melting slowly for anyone who doubts this -- for example, here, here and here. This is, of course, what has allowed metals to be forged for millennia. It is also worth reminding ourselves that one of the reasons why the Twin Towers (belonging to the Trade Centre in New York) collapsed in 2001 was that the intense fire softened the supporting steel columns so that they lost their capacity to hold the buildings up. Sure, the collapse was relatively sudden, but the softening wasn't -- the South Tower took 56 minutes to collapse after being hit, the North Tower 102 minutes.]

 

This is quite apart from the fact that Hegel and Engels didn't mention these 'new definitions', which means, naturally, that they read this 'law' into nature at the time -- not from nature --, contrary to what Engels told us he would never do.

 

How is that any different from imposing these 'laws' on the world, as I alleged?

 

Add to that the following points I made in Essay Seven Part One (which Vogelman also failed to consult):

 

To be sure, the picture nature presents us with in this regard is highly complex, which is one of the reasons why Engels's 'Laws' can't possibly capture its complexity, regardless of the other fatal defects they contain.

 

However, it is worth emphasising at this point that the nature of state of matter transitions isn't being questioned in this Essay, only whether all of them are sudden/'nodal'.

 

Consequently, either the 'nodal' aspect of the First 'Law' is defective, or it only works in some cases, not others -- in which case, it can't be a law.

 

In fact, Physicists tell us that what they call "second-order" Phase Transitions can proceed smoothly. As one online source says:

 

"Second-order phase transitions, on the other hand, proceed smoothly. The old phase transforms itself into the new phase in a continuous manner."

 

[See also Note 9 -- where we will find that "first order" phase changes aren't straight-forward, either.]

 

Moreover, under certain conditions it is possible to by-pass phase transformations altogether. [More on that later.]

 

Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between states of matter, and phases (a distinction DM-fans in general appear to ignore):

 

"Phases are sometimes confused with states of matter, but there are significant differences. States of matter refers to the differences between gases, liquids, solids, etc. If there are two regions in a chemical system that are in different states of matter, then they must be different phases. However, the reverse is not true -- a system can have multiple phases which are in equilibrium with each other and also in the same state of matter. For example, diamond and graphite are both solids but they are different phases, even though their composition may be identical. A system with oil and water at room temperature will be two different phases of differing composition, but both will be the liquid state of matter." [Wikipedia.]

 

On another page we find the following:

 

"States of matter are sometimes confused with phases. This is likely due to the fact that in many example systems, the familiar phase transitions are also transformations of the state of matter. In the example of water, the phases of ice, liquid water, and water vapour are commonly recognized. The common phase transitions observed in a one component system containing only water are melting/solidification (liquid/solid), evaporation/condensation (liquid/gas) and sublimation/deposition (solid/gas).

 

"Transitions between different states of matter of the same chemical component are necessarily a phase transformation, but not all phase transformations involve a change in the state of matter. For example, there are 14 different forms of ice, all of which are the solid state of matter. When one form of ice transforms into another, the crystal structure, density, and a number of physical properties change, but it remains a solid." [Wikipedia. Bold emphasis added. This article has been substantially altered since it was first accessed. Parts of it can be found here, others here.]

 

Here is a slightly clearer explanation of the difference:

 

"Basic physics simply tells us about the primary states of matter, namely; solid, liquid, gas, and plasma. In many occasions, the term 'phase' is also used similarly as the word 'state.' However, the phases of matter and states of matter are two different things as they are used in different contexts. Phases of matter can be described depending on either the region of space to which there are uniform physical properties or the types of molecular movements observed at dissimilar temperatures.
 

"As mentioned, there are four basic states; solid, liquid, gas, and then plasma. In some resources there are even more. The solid state of matter has its molecules tightly vibrating onto each other that they seem to be in a fixed state. Because of this, solid matter is described as rigid and takes a specific form or shape. For the liquid state of matter, the molecules are looser as compared to the molecules of solid matter. The molecules are just far enough apart that they slide against each other. This is the reason why liquids, although not having a definite shape, still take the form of its holding container. And so they have a specific volume. Gaseous matter has more loose molecules that are freely spread apart from each other. That's why their volume and shape are not that specific. The newer state -- plasma, is said to be situated only at the core and outer galactic atmospheres of the stars.

"The phase of matter with respect to molecular motion, temperature or heat plays an integral role. For example, an ice cube (in its solid state) undergoes a phase change/transition as it melts and becomes liquid water. The molecules of the ice cube were heated enough to the point where their bonded position has been overcome thereby making it looser. Hence, it is now in its liquid phase. When more heat is present to evaporate the water, then it goes into its gaseous state as its molecules move more liberally.

"The phase of matter can also be its region of space in a physical system. Let's say there is a sealed plastic container with ice and water inside. This is a simple physical system wherein three phases are present: the cubes belong to one phase, water is the second phase, and then water vapour settling on top of liquid water is the third phase. The same is true with water and oil. These two substances have different degrees of solubility specifically broken further into the hydrophobic (non-polar) substance and the hydrophilic (polar) substance. Water is the polar substance that will immediately separate itself from oil (a non-polar substance). Both liquids have weak solubilities against each other placing them in different phases.

"Summary:

 

"1. 'States of matter' is a more specific and precise term than 'phases of matter.'


"2. State of matter is the state of a particular compound in a physical system whereas phase is a set of states within such a system.


"3. Phases of matter can refer to the types of molecular motion.


"4. Phases of matter can refer to a certain region in space." [Quoted from here. Accessed 10/10/2016. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links in the original; some links removed, some added. Spelling modified in line with UK English.]

 

From this it is plain that there can be phase changes while the supposed "quality" (solidity) remains the same! It isn't easy to see how this can be made consistent with the First 'Law'.

 

Another Wikipedia article points the following out:

 

"In general, two different states of a system are in different phases if there is an abrupt change in their physical properties while transforming from one state to the other. Conversely, two states are in the same phase if they can be transformed into one another without any abrupt changes." [Wikipedia. Bold emphasis added. Again, this page has been altered since it was first accessed.]

 

However, a Harvard University source says more-or-less the same:

 

"In the physical sciences, a phase is a set of states of a macroscopic physical system that have relatively uniform chemical composition and physical properties. A straightforward way to describe phase is 'a state of matter which is chemically uniform, physically distinct, and (often) mechanically separable.' Ice cubes floating on water are a clear example of two phases of water at equilibrium. In general, two different states of a system are in different phases if there is an abrupt change in their physical properties while transforming from one state to the other. Conversely, two states are in the same phase if they can be transformed into one another without any abrupt changes. There are, however, exceptions to this statement, such as the liquid-gas critical point. Moreover, a phase diagram is a type of graph used to show the equilibrium conditions between the thermodynamically-distinct phases. Common components of a phase diagram are lines of equilibrium or phase boundaries, which refer to the lines that demarcate where phase transitions occur. A triple point is, in a pressure-temperature phase diagram, the unique intersection of the lines of equilibrium between three states of matter, usually solid, liquid, and gas." [Quoted from here; accessed 10/10/2016. Bold emphasis added. Spelling modified in line with UK English. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

So, here it is plain that some "qualitative" changes are non-"nodal": "two states are in the same phase if they can be transformed into one another without any abrupt changes." [Emphasis added.]

 

Indeed, the situation is even more complicated still:

 

"In the diagram, the phase boundary between liquid and gas does not continue indefinitely. Instead, it terminates at a point on the phase diagram called the critical point. At temperatures and pressure above the critical point, the physical property differences that differentiate the liquid phase from the gas phase become less defined. This reflects the fact that, at extremely high temperatures and pressures, the liquid and gaseous phases become indistinguishable. In water, the critical point occurs at around 647K (374°C or 705°F) and 22.064 MPa." [Wikipedia. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"In physical chemistry, thermodynamics, chemistry and condensed matter physics, a critical point, also called a critical state, specifies the conditions (temperature, pressure) at which the liquid state of the matter ceases to exist. As a liquid is heated, its density decreases while the pressure and density of the vapour being formed increases. The liquid and vapour densities become closer and closer to each other until the critical temperature is reached where the two densities are equal and the liquid-gas line or phase boundary disappears. Additionally, as the equilibrium between liquid and gas approaches the critical point, heat of vaporization approaches zero, becoming zero at and beyond the critical point. More generally, the critical point is the point of termination of a phase equilibrium curve, which separates two distinct phases. At this point, the phases are no longer distinguishable." [Wikipedia. Bold emphasis added. Spelling modified to conform with UK English.]

 

Again, the second of the above pages has been altered since I originally consulted it. However, what the latter had to say is conformed by this comment from a specialist site:

 

"At T6 the two phases cannot be distinguished any more. This point in the p-T-diagram is called the critical point. The distinction between gas and liquid cannot be made any more. From the critical point on we call both phases together the liquid phase in contrast to the solid phase." [Quoted from here; accessed 23/02/2015. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

This can only mean that qualitative differences between the liquid and gaseous phases of water are energy-neutral beyond this "critical point", contradicting Engels.

 

And, here is what a standard Physical Chemistry textbook had to say:

 

"[W]e must distinguish the thermodynamic description of a phase transition and the rate at which the transition occurs. A transition that is predicted from thermodynamics to be spontaneous may occur too slowly to be significant in practice. For instance, at normal temperatures and pressures the molar Gibbs energy of graphite is lower than that of diamond, so there is a thermodynamic tendency for diamond to change into graphite. However, for this transformation to take place, the C[arbon] atoms must change their locations, which is an immeasurably slow process in a solid except at high temperatures." [Atkins and de Paula (2006), p.118. Bold emphases added.]

 

In that case, nature (i.e., the real material world, not the Ideal world Hegel and Engels dreamt up) is far more complex than Engels's Mickey Mouse 'Law' would have us believe.

 

Once more, not every change is "nodal".

 

Nevertheless, it is entirely unclear whether the term "quality" -- as it is used by dialecticians -- means the same as "state of matter" and/or "phase". Either way, the substance involved, whether or not it is in a different phase or state, remains the same substance. So, in that sense, if "quality" is defined in terms of the nature of substances (as was the case with Hegel and Aristotle -- on that, see below), it is clear that even though there are phase/state of matter changes, they can't count as qualitative changes of the right sort, since these substances remain the same throughout. Howsoever slowly or quickly iron melts or solidifies, for example, it remains iron.

 

Now, has a single DM-fan ever given any thought to that awkward fact?

 

Are you serious?

 

Recall, this is Mickey Mouse Science we are dealing with here!

 

What about the following?

 

Now let us return to water, this time in its solid form: ice. When we heat up ice the molecules in the crystal structure gain more energy and begin to oscillate more and more. At a certain point the heat added gives the individual water molecules enough energy to overcome the bonds between themselves and the other molecules (In this case hydrogen bonds) so they can now move freely around (or more scientifically: translate), in other words the solid became a liquid. Everyone knows that relatively pure water melts at 0°C. Before this temperature we don't see any change, ice doesn't become more and more liquid, on the contrary it changes immediately.

 

But, I nowhere denied this.

 

My point isn't that there are no 'nodal' changes in nature (that is, if we are ever told how long a 'node' is supposed to last -- no good asking Vogelman!), only that not every 'qualitative' change in nature is 'nodal'.

 

Now, in relation to water, what I have said is that there is no change of 'quality' in the Hegelian/Aristotelian sense of the word (used by Engels). Once again, here is how I tackled this topic in Essay Seven Part One:

 

Qualities, as characterised by dialecticians -- or, rather, by those that bother to say what they mean by this word -- are the properties of bodies/processes that make them what they are, alteration to which will change that body/process into something else:

 

"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity and measure.

 

"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975), p.124, §85.]

 

As the Glossary at the Marxist Internet Archive notes:

 

"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby becoming something else.

 

"Thus, if something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative change'.

 

"In Hegel's Logic, Quality is the first division of Being, when the world is just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from here. Accessed August 2007.]

 

This is an Aristotelian notion.

 

But, as a solid (ice), liquid, or a gas (steam), water remains H2O; no new "kind of thing" has emerged. Iron is still iron as a solid or a liquid. Oxygen is still oxygen in its liquid or gaseous state. The same can be said of all substances that undergo state of matter changes and which don't breakdown on heating or cooling.

 

"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else..." [Ibid.]

 

Moreover, countless substances exist as solids, liquids, or gases, so this can't be what makes each of them "what it is and not something else". What makes iron, for example, iron is its atomic structure, and that remains the same in all three states of matter.
 

However, Cornforth tries gamely to tell us what a 'dialectical quality' is:

 

"For instance, if a piece of iron is painted black and instead we paint it red, that is merely an external alteration..., but it is not a qualitative change in the sense we are here defining. On the other hand, if the iron is heated to melting point, then this is such a qualitative change. And it comes about precisely as a change in the attraction-repulsion relationship characteristic of the internal molecular state of the metal. The metal passes from the solid to liquid state, its internal character and laws of motion become different in certain ways, it undergoes a qualitative change." [Cornforth (1976), p.99.]

 

And yet, as we have seen, no new substance emerges as a result; liquid iron, gold and aluminium are still gold, iron and aluminium. Worse still: as we have seen, metals melt slowly, not nodally!

 

Of course, it could be argued that liquid and solid states of matter are, as Cornforth seems to think, different kinds of things, as required by the definition. But, to describe something as a liquid isn't to present a kind of thing, since liquids comprise many different kinds of things, as noted above. The same is true of gases and solids. So, a state of matter isn't a "kind of thing", but a state possessed by kinds of things -- so we speak of liquid iron, liquid mercury, gaseous oxygen, gaseous nitrogen; and if that state changes, the "kind of thing" that a particular substance is does not (in general) change. To be sure, some substances do change when heat is added -- for example, solid Ammonium Chloride sublimates into Ammonia gas and Hydrochloric Acid when heated, but this isn't typical. [In fact, DM-theorists would be on firmer ground in this case (no pun intended) than they are with their clichéd water as a liquid, solid or gas example.] Again, liquid mercury is still mercury, just as solid mercury is. Melted sugar is still sugar. The same is true of plastics, and all the metals. Liquid chocolate is still chocolate. The elements aren't situated where they are in the Periodic Table because they are solid, liquid or gas, but because of their Atomic Number. This shows that states of matter aren't "kinds of things"; if they were, solid mercury would no longer be mercury, and cooling liquid mercury would move it around the Periodic Table!8b1

 

But, the volunteered DM-objection at the beginning of the previous paragraph (that different states of matter are different "kinds of things") -- should it ever be advanced by a dialectician -- only goes to show just how vague these 'definitions' of "quality" are. Indeed, it allows DM-fans to count different states of matter as different "kind of things", but they don't regard shape, colour, heat, or motion as different "kinds of things". Hence, for example, an object in motion isn't counted as a different "kind of thing" from the same object at rest (both relative to some inertial frame). Spherical ingots of iron aren't regarded as different "kinds of thing" from cylindrical ingots of iron. A red box isn't a different "kind of thing" from a green box. Sure, gases, liquids and solids have different physical properties, but so do moving and stationary bodies, and so do spherical and cylindrical objects. So do differently coloured objects. It isn't easy to see why green and red objects aren't different "kinds of things" if liquids and solids are allowed to be. And, it is no use pointing to the "objective" nature of states of matter as opposed to the "subjective" nature of colour, since shape and motion are just as "objective".

 

[Anyway, the "subjective" nature of colour will be questioned in Essay Thirteen Part One -- as will the philosophical use of the terms "subjective" and "objective".]

 

But what about this?

 

"And it comes about precisely as a change in the attraction-repulsion relationship characteristic of the internal molecular state of the metal. The metal passes from the solid to liquid state, its internal character and laws of motion become different in certain ways, it undergoes a qualitative change." [Ibid.]

 

Are these "laws of motion" what make iron what it is and not another thing, so that it is "no longer the same kind of thing"? As we have just seen, even if Cornforth is right about these new "laws of motion", that doesn't re-classify iron and place it in a new location in the Periodic Table. This doesn't make iron a "new kind of thing". Furthermore, we have already seen that rapid changes to sub-atomic or inter-molecular forces (of the sort that Cornforth envisages) cannot be recruited to this 'Law', either.

 

Be this as it may, we have just seen in relation to the 'definition' found at the Marxist Internet Archive:

 

"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else..." [Ibid.]

 

As noted earlier, countless substances exist as solids, liquids, or gases, so this cannot be what makes each of them "what it is and not something else". Again, what makes lead, for example, lead is its atomic structure, and that remains the same whether or not that metal is in its solid or its liquid state. As such, it remains "the same kind of thing".

 

Once more, if we appeal to this notion of 'quality', the boiling or freezing of water can't be an example of 'qualitative' change, since, either side of this phase change the substance in question is still H2O, just as Iron, as a solid or a liquid is still Iron. Once more, it is only because dialecticians like Vogelman are operating with a loose and ill-defined notion of "quality" that they think they can claim otherwise.

 

Here is what I added to Essay Seven Part One on this:

 

The boiling water example is one of the most overworked clichés in the dialectical box of tricks. Hardly a single DM-fan fails to mention it, so mantra-like has dialectics become.

 

Nevertheless, it is worth reminding ourselves that as water is heated up steam increasingly leaves the surface in a non-"nodal" fashion. [The sudden breaking of inter-molecular, or even inter-atomic, bonds will be considered presently.] The rate at which water vapour leaves the surface increases gradually as the temperature rises. There is no sudden 'leap', here. So, even here we have a smooth transition from liquid to gas; indeed, if a pan of water is kept at 99oC for long enough, all of the water will slowly disappear as steam. And, who doesn't know that water evaporates slowly at room temperature? Who has never dried clothes on a line, crockery or cooking utensils on a drainer? Who on earth doesn't know that some rivers, ponds and lakes dry up in hot weather? Where is the "leap", in such cases? Examples like these illustrate a well-known fact: many, if not most processes in nature run smoothly, and are non-"nodal".

 

Returning to the over-used DM-cliché: at 100oC events accelerate dramatically; but even then they do so non-"nodally". Some might find that assertion hard to believe, but a few tenths of a degree below the critical point, depending on the purity of the water, surrounding conditions and how the liquid is being heated (etc.), bubbles begin to form more rapidly in the liquid. This process accelerates increasingly quickly as the boiling point is approached. What we see, therefore, is a non-"nodal" change of phase/state of matter, even here. The phase or state of matter change in this case isn't sudden -- like the snapping of a rubber band, or the breaking of glass. We don't see no bubbles one second and then a microsecond later a frothing mass, which we would do if this were a "nodal" change.

 

Of course, dialecticians could concede the truth of the above observation -- i.e., that before the liquid reaches 100oC water molecules leave the surface all the time --, but they might still reject the above assertion that this isn't an example of "nodal" change. They might even add that when a water molecule changes from its liquid to its gaseous state certain chemical bonds are broken, and that this happens suddenly, and "nodally". But, even this is not as clear-cut as it might seem. Certainly, when a bond is broken, that will be sudden, but there is no "break in gradualness" (required by this 'Law'), in this case. Bonds don't gradually break, and then suddenly break. They just break. There are only "nodes" in this instance.

 

[On this, see the quotations a few paragraphs down.]

 

So, this hyper-vague 'Law' doesn't even apply to the breaking of chemical bonds!

 

Naturally, "nodal"-points could be re-defined thermodynamically, in terms of latent heat (enthalpy of vaporisation/condensation), etc. But, latent heat is involved throughout the evaporating process, not just at 100oC. What happens at the boiling point is that the vapour pressure of the liquid equals that of the surrounding medium. In fact, it is possible to induce boiling (in many liquids, and not just water) by lowering the surrounding pressure sufficiently. This can also take place without any obvious addition/subtraction of any matter or energy to/from the liquid concerned.

 

[Raising or lowering the pressure in the surrounding medium isn't to add or subtract anything to/from the liquid concerned. It might result in matter leaving the surface of that liquid, but lowering pressure removes matter from the surrounding atmosphere, not the liquid itself. The questions is:  Is this what Engels meant by the addition/subtraction of matter or energy? As with many other things connected with this hopelessly vague 'Law', who can say for sure?]

 

"What about latent heat?", someone might object:

 

"Latent heat is the heat released or absorbed by a chemical substance or a thermodynamic system during a process that occurs without a change in temperature." [Quoted from here; accessed 04/11/2011.]

 

Of course, the idea that the temperature of the water stays the same as it boils is an abstraction, since, unless every molecule of water is being heated alike, and at the same time, the convection currents induced in the liquid will mean that there are micro-differences in temperature throughout that liquid. We have what is called a "mixed-phase" system here. [On that, see below.]

 

As suggested above, this objection seems to depend on the idea that latent heat is only involved at the boiling point (or, at the phase/state of matter change). If so, this will have nothing to do with the events in the lead up to that point (the alleged "gradualness" that is finally broken, resulting in a "leap"), as this 'Law' requires:

 

"This is precisely the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain definite nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap; for example, in the case of heated or cooled water, where boiling-point and freezing-point are the nodes at which -- under normal pressure -- the leap to a new state of aggregation takes place, and where consequently quantity is transformed into quality." [Engels (1976), p.56. I have used the online version here, but quoted the page numbers for the Foreign Languages edition. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state." [Hegel (1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that] quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…." [Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphasis alone added. (Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed directly here. I have informed the editors of this error. Added June 2015: they have now corrected it!)]

 

"The 'nodal line of measure relations' ... -- transitions of quantity into quality... Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing without leaps." [Lenin (1961), p.123.  Bold emphases alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]

 

"What distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity) of Being and not-Being." [Ibid., p.282. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality. Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is transformed into something new." [Rees (2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis added.]

 

So, once again, we see this shaky 'Law' doesn't easily accommodate to this hackneyed example, even if we throw in latent heat.

 

Anyway, the volunteered DM-reply from earlier itself depends on how a "nodal point" is defined.

 

As we have seen, since the length of a dialectical "node" has been left hopelessly vague, dialecticians can only challenge the above assertions if they are prepared to define precisely the length of a DM-"node". Otherwise, my opinion is as good as theirs -- which is why I earlier labelled this 'Law' subjective in the extreme.

 

Is there a DM-Standards Authority to which we can appeal? Genuine scientists use this system; that is, of course, why their results can be checked, and are often described as "objective". But, are there any standards at all in the DM-wing of Mickey-Mouse Science?

 

The answer is pretty clear: no, there aren't.

 

On the other hand, if dialecticians take the trouble to re-define the word "node" just to accommodate these awkward non-dialectical facts (we noted earlier that in certain circumstances this is called a "persuasive definition"), it would become increasingly difficult to distinguish DM from stipulative conventionalism.

 

However, it is worth pointing out that -- as we will see in later Essays -- there isn't in fact a problem with this approach, since scientists do this sort of thing all the time. Unfortunately, though, this means that if they were to do this, dialecticians would have to abandon their claim that DM is 'objective', and admit that their 'theory' is merely conventional, after all -- and fourth-rate conventionalised boss-class 'wisdom', to boot.

 

To this end, DM-theorists could get their act together and specify a minimum time interval during which a phase or state of matter transition must take place for it to be counted as "nodal". In relation to boiling water, say, they could decide that if the transition from water to steam (or vice versa) takes place in an interval lasting less than or equal to k seconds/minutes (for some Real Number, k), then it is indeed "nodal". Thus, by dint of just such a stipulation, their 'Law' could be made to work (at least in this respect) in this instance. But, there is nothing in nature that forces any of this on us -- the reverse is, if anything, the case. Phase/state of matter changes, and changes in general take different lengths of time. Moreover, under differing circumstances even these intervals can alter, too. If so, as noted above, this 'Law' would become 'valid' only because of yet another stipulation, or imposition, which would make it eminently 'subjective', and conventionally dogmatic.

 

However, given the strife-riven and sectarian nature of dialectical politics, any attempt to define a DM-"node" could lead to yet more factions. Thus, we are sure to see emerge the rightist "Nanosecond Tendency" -- sworn enemies of the "Picosecond Left Opposition" -- who will both take up arms with the 'eclectic' wing at the "it depends on the circumstances" 'clique' at the 'centrist' "Femtosecond League".

 

If such phase/state-of-matter changes were to be defined thermodynamically, then many would appear to abrupt. But, even this isn't as clear-cut as it might at first sight seem:

 

"The first-order phase transitions are those that involve a latent heat. During such a transition, a system either absorbs or releases a fixed (and typically large) amount of energy. Because energy can't be instantaneously transferred between the system and its environment, first-order transitions are associated with 'mixed-phase regimes' in which some parts of the system have completed the transition and others have not. This phenomenon is familiar to anyone who has boiled a pot of water: the water does not instantly turn into gas, but forms a turbulent mixture of water and water vapour bubbles. Mixed-phase systems are difficult to study, because their dynamics are violent and hard to control. However, many important phase transitions fall in this category, including the solid/liquid/gas transitions and Bose-Einstein condensation.

 

"The second class of phase transitions are the 'continuous phase transitions', also called second-order phase transitions. These have no associated latent heat. Examples of second-order phase transitions are the ferromagnetic transition and the superfluid transition.

 

"Several transitions are known as the infinite-order phase transitions. They are continuous but break no symmetries.... The most famous example is the Kosterlitz-Thouless transition in the two-dimensional XY model. Many quantum phase transitions in two-dimensional electron gases belong to this class." [Wikipedia. Bold emphases added.]

 

Unfortunately, the above article has since been changed somewhat since I first consulted it; here is a later version:

 

"First-order phase transitions are those that involve a latent heat. During such a transition, a system either absorbs or releases a fixed (and typically large) amount of energy. During this process, the temperature of the system will stay constant as heat is added: the system is in a 'mixed-phase regime' in which some parts of the system have completed the transition and others have not. Familiar examples are the melting of ice or the boiling of water (the water does not instantly turn into vapour, but forms a turbulent mixture of liquid water and vapour bubbles). Imry and Wortis showed that quenched disorder can broaden a first-order transition in that the transformation is completed over a finite range of temperatures, but phenomena like supercooling and superheating survive and hysteresis is observed on thermal cycling.

 

"Second-order phase transitions are also called continuous phase transitions. They are characterized by a divergent susceptibility, an infinite correlation length, and a power-law decay of correlations near criticality. Examples of second-order phase transitions are the ferromagnetic transition, superconducting transition (for a Type-I superconductor the phase transition is second-order at zero external field and for a Type-II superconductor the phase transition is second-order for both normal state-mixed state and mixed state-superconducting state transitions) and the superfluid transition. In contrast to viscosity, thermal expansion and heat capacity of amorphous materials show a relatively sudden change at the glass transition temperature which enable quite exactly to detect it using differential scanning calorimetry measurements....

 

"Several transitions are known as the infinite-order phase transitions. They are continuous but break no symmetries. The most famous example is the Kosterlitz–Thouless transition in the two-dimensional XY model. Many quantum phase transitions, e.g., in two-dimensional electron gases, belong to this class." [Quoted from here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis and one link added. Italic emphases in the original. Spelling adapted to UK English; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Another source had this to say:

 

"Discontinuous phase transitions are characterised by a discontinuous change in entropy at a fixed temperature. The change in entropy corresponds to latent heat L = TΔS. Examples are solid-liquid and liquid-gas transitions at temperatures below the critical temperature.

 

"Continuous phase transitions involve a continuous change in entropy, which means there is no latent heat. Examples are liquid-gas transitions at temperatures above the critical temperature, metal-superconductor transitions and many magnetic ordering transitions." [Quoted from here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis added.]

 

A second added:

 

"Since the entropy is continuous at the phase transition, the latent heat is zero. The latent heat is always zero for a second order phase transition." [Quoted from here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis added.]

 

A third concurs:

 

"'Discontinuities' at continuous phase changes (2nd order or higher): For continuous transitions, the entropy is continuous crossing the phase boundary and so there is no latent heat." [Quoted from here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis added.]

 

[Both of which agree with the earlier Wikipedia article before it was changed.]

 

Which is, of course, just another way of making the same point that was made earlier: not all changes are unambiguously 'nodal' (that is, once more, if we are ever told how long one of these 'nodes' is supposed to last).

 

 Vogelman continues:

 

This is the case for any more or less pure substance. It happens so sudden at a given temperature which is specific for every material, in the past the determination of the melting temperature was often used to identify a compound. (Today more easy and accurate methods are used.) If the substance is diluted this melting point can lower or even not happen at all, we will than find an interval (mostly a couple of degrees) at which the substance melts. This is because of the fact that the different compounds in the substance start to at a different temperature instantly (sic). Therefore this method is often used to see how pure a certain substance is.

 

I have already dealt with much of this above, but the concessions Vogelman makes simply underline the point that nature is far too complex to be squeezed into a dialectical boot it won't fit. This shouldn't surprise us; science has progressed dramatically since Hegel first dreamt this 'Law' up (and which he based on very little evidence, just a few trite anecdotes), and a long way, too, since Engels unwisely attempted to import these ideas from that Christian Mystic and then impose them on nature in like manner.

 

What about these claims, though?

 

Now let's continue and take a look at the examples that were given by Rosa. Let us start with metal. For some reason Rosa claims that metals don't melt like ice does, that it becomes gradually a liquid. First of all this shows she has little knowledge of science and confuses different phenomena.

Melting a metal is quite the same as melting ice, at a certain temperature the metal ions gains (sic) enough energy to escape from the crystal structure. What she probably confuses with the process of melting is the fact that metals can be bend (sic) and manipulated more easily at higher temperatures. The fact that metals are easier to deform at higher temperatures is a direct consequence of the nature of the metal bonding. In a metal the individual atom has released some of its outer shell electrons. These positive charged atoms are called ions and are organised in a crystal structure, around these ions the electrons they gave away move freely. One of the effects is that this kind of bond is extremely durable, but also can be bended because the space and orientation of the metal ions can change without breaking the bond.

 

If we heat up the metal the bonds become less strong and so we are able to change the place the ions more simply. However, this doesn't make the metal a liquid. The ions are still firmly on their place and if we don't exert any force will stay there.

 

Again I have covered much of this above. However, is Vogelman trying to deny that when heated, metals soften gradually and slowly turn into a liquid (i.e., flow readily)? If he is, then this more accurately applies to him:

 

[he] has little knowledge of science and confuses different phenomena.

 

If not, then he agrees with me: the actual melting of metals is slow and non-'nodal'.

 

Once more, Vogelman's argument only 'seems' to work since he steadfastly refuses to tell us a what he means by "quality", despite the fact that the Essay he is criticising challenged dialecticians to come clean on this very point.

 

But, there is more:

 

Now lets look at glass. Glasses are class of solid on there own, they're characterised by an amorphous structure. (They aren't arranged in a crystal structure.) Rosa confused in this case the same phenomena. This time the flexibility of the product to bending at higher temperatures is a consequence of the structure and not the type of bonding. A crystal would mostly brake if we tried to bend it, even at higher temperatures. The fact it is amorphous makes it possible for the molecules in the solid to change place when bend without necessarily breaking the bond. It's kind of analogue to the metal.

 

Once again, I covered this in detail in Essay Seven Part One:

 

A few years back, a UK comrade also raised several legitimate points about glass, arguing (at first) that it is a liquid, not a solid. In which case, he claimed that the assertions advanced in the main body of this Essay (that this particular phase transition is slow, not rapid) are incorrect.

 

However, scientists aren't quite so sure about glass. Here is what one online source tells us about it:

 

"It is sometimes said that glass in very old churches is thicker at the bottom than at the top because glass is a liquid, and so over several centuries it has flowed towards the bottom.  This is not true.  In Mediaeval times panes of glass were often made by the Crown glass process.  A lump of molten glass was rolled, blown, expanded, flattened and finally spun into a disc before being cut into panes.  The sheets were thicker towards the edge of the disc and were usually installed with the heavier side at the bottom.  Other techniques of forming glass panes have been used but it is only the relatively recent float glass processes which have produced good quality flat sheets of glass.

 

"To answer the question 'Is glass liquid or solid?" we have to understand its thermodynamic and material properties.'...

 

"Some people claim that glass is actually a supercooled liquid because there is no first order phase transition as it cools. In fact, there is a second order transition between the supercooled liquid state and the glass state, so a distinction can still be drawn. The transition is not as dramatic as the phase change that takes you from liquid to crystalline solids. There is no discontinuous change of density and no latent heat of fusion. The transition can be detected as a marked change in the thermal expansivity and heat capacity of the material....

 

[The author of this article now goes into considerable detail, which I won't quote -- RL]

 

"There is no clear answer to the question 'Is glass solid or liquid?'.  In terms of molecular dynamics and thermodynamics it is possible to justify various different views that it is a highly viscous liquid, an amorphous solid, or simply that glass is another state of matter which is neither liquid nor solid. The difference is semantic.  In terms of its material properties we can do little better.  There is no clear definition of the distinction between solids and highly viscous liquids.  All such phases or states of matter are idealisations of real material properties.  Nevertheless, from a more common sense point of view, glass should be considered a solid since it is rigid according to everyday experience.  The use of the term 'supercooled liquid' to describe glass still persists, but is considered by many to be an unfortunate misnomer that should be avoided.  In any case, claims that glass panes in old windows have deformed due to glass flow have never been substantiated.  Examples of Roman glassware and calculations based on measurements of glass visco-properties indicate that these claims can't be true.  The observed features are more easily explained as a result of the imperfect methods used to make glass window panes before the float glass process was invented...." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis alone added. Accessed 10/11/2008. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Some links also added.]

 

In that case, according to the criteria we ordinarily apply to other substances, glass is a solid, and when heated it loses its solid properties gradually, and non-'nodally'.

 

This is confirmed by the Wikipedia article on Glass:

 

"Glass in the common sense refers to a hard, brittle, transparent amorphous solid, such as that used for windows, many bottles, or eyewear, including, but not limited to, soda-lime glass, borosilicate glass, acrylic glass, sugar glass, isinglass (Muscovy-glass), or aluminium oxynitride....

 

"In the scientific sense the term glass is often extended to all amorphous solids (and melts that easily form amorphous solids), including plastics, resins, or other silica-free amorphous solids....

 

"Glass is generally classed as an amorphous solid rather than a liquid. Glass displays all the mechanical properties of a solid. The notion that glass flows to an appreciable extent over extended periods of time is not supported by empirical research or theoretical analysis. From a more commonsense point of view, glass should be considered a solid since it is rigid according to everyday experience." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis alone added. Accessed 10/11/2008. This Wikipedia page has changed considerably since it was first accessed, although none of the above substantive points seem to have been qualified.]

 

Compare the above with the following New York Times article:

 

"'It surprises most people that we still don't understand this,' said David R. Reichman, a professor of chemistry at Columbia, who takes yet another approach to the glass problem. 'We don't understand why glass should be a solid and how it forms.'...

 

"Scientists are slowly accumulating more clues. A few years ago, experiments and computer simulations revealed something unexpected: as molten glass cools, the molecules do not slow down uniformly. Some areas jam rigid first while in other regions the molecules continue to skitter around in a liquid-like fashion. More strangely, the fast-moving regions look no different from the slow-moving ones....

 

"For scientists, glass is not just the glass of windows and jars, made of silica, sodium carbonate and calcium oxide. Rather, a glass is any solid in which the molecules are jumbled randomly. Many plastics like polycarbonate are glasses, as are many ceramics....

 

"In freezing to a conventional solid, a liquid undergoes a so-called phase transition; the molecules line up next to and on top of one another in a simple, neat crystal pattern. When a liquid solidifies into a glass, this organized stacking is nowhere to be found. Instead, the molecules just move slower and slower and slower, until they are effectively not moving at all, trapped in a strange state between liquid and solid.

 

"The glass transition differs from a usual phase transition in several other key ways. Energy, what is called latent heat, is released when water molecules line up into ice. There is no latent heat in the formation of glass.

 

"The glass transition does not occur at a single, well-defined temperature; the slower the cooling, the lower the transition temperature. Even the definition of glass is arbitrary -- basically a rate of flow so slow that it is too boring and time-consuming to watch. The final structure of the glass also depends on how slowly it has been cooled." [New York Times, 29/07/2008. Accessed 10/11/2008. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Notice the following points:

 

"Scientists are slowly accumulating more clues. A few years ago, experiments and computer simulations revealed something unexpected: as molten glass cools, the molecules do not slow down uniformly. Some areas jam rigid first while in other regions the molecules continue to skitter around in a liquid-like fashion. More strangely, the fast-moving regions look no different from the slow-moving ones....

 

"In freezing to a conventional solid, a liquid undergoes a so-called phase transition; the molecules line up next to and on top of one another in a simple, neat crystal pattern. When a liquid solidifies into a glass, this organized stacking is nowhere to be found. Instead, the molecules just move slower and slower and slower, until they are effectively not moving at all, trapped in a strange state between liquid and solid.

 

"The glass transition differs from a usual phase transition in several other key ways. Energy, what is called latent heat, is released when water molecules line up into ice. There is no latent heat in the formation of glass.

 

"The glass transition does not occur at a single, well-defined temperature; the slower the cooling, the lower the transition temperature. Even the definition of glass is arbitrary -- basically a rate of flow so slow that it is too boring and time-consuming to watch. The final structure of the glass also depends on how slowly it has been cooled." [Ibid. Bold emphases added.]

 

So, and once more, we have here a non-'nodal' change in 'quality'.

 

See also the following on-line article, 'Glass: Liquid Or Solid -- Science vs. An Urban Legend', where we find these comments (however, I have not yet been able to check these quotations):

 

"Glass is an amorphous solid. A material is amorphous when it has no long-range order, that is, when there is no regularity in the arrangement of its molecular constituents on a scale larger than a few times the size of these groups. [...] A solid is a rigid material; it does not flow when it is subjected to moderate forces [...]." [Doremus (1994), p.1.]

 

"Glass includes all materials which are structurally similar to a liquid. However, under ambient temperature they react to the impact of force with elastic deformation and therefore have to be considered as solids." [Pfaender (1996), p.17.]

 

"Amorphous substances, like crystalline solids, are usually characterized by certain areas of short-range order [...] A long-range order, as in crystals, does not exist in amorphous substances. The designations 'amorphous' and 'noncrystalline' describe the same fact [...].

 

"Glasses are noncrystalline or amorphous substances. Nevertheless, the term vitreous state is restricted to (i) solids obtained from melts, or (ii) solids produced by other methods and obtained in a compact form or as thin coherent films [...].

 

"Glasses have numerous properties in common with crystalline solids, such as hardness and elasticity of shape [...]. The term 'amorphous solid state' has a more comprehensive meaning broader than that of the 'vitreous state'. All glasses are amorphous, but not all amorphous substances are glasses." [Feltz (1993), pp.7-8. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

"As kinetically frozen forms of liquid, glasses are characterized by a complete lack of long-range crystalline order and are the most structurally disordered types of solid known." [Jeanloz and Williams (1991), p.659.]

 

Several more quotations along the same lines can be found at the above link (where a simple test to decide whether a substance is solid or liquid is outlined in the Appendix at the end).

 

And here is what we find in a recent article from Science Daily:

 

"Scientists fully understand the process of water turning to ice. As the temperature cools, the movement of the water molecules slows. At 32°F, the molecules form crystal lattices, solidifying into ice. In contrast, the molecules of glasses do not crystallize. The movement of the glass molecules slows as temperature cools, but they never lock into crystal patterns. Instead, they jumble up and gradually become glassier, or more viscous. No one understands exactly why." [Science Daily, 13/08/07. Bold emphasis added.]

 

So, I wasn't wrong to call glass a solid, nor allege that the phase change here is slow, and not the least bit 'nodal'.

 

However, all this was unknown in Engels's day, but he surely can't have been ignorant of the fact that glass melts slowly. Why then did he "foist" this 'Law' on the facts?

 

This shows that I was well aware that glass is an amorphous solid, contrary to what Vogelman suggested. Why does Vogelman unwisely compound his error by repeating it?

 

And, as far as amorphous solids are concerned, we read this:

 

"Amorphous solids do not have a sharp melting point; they are softened in a range of temperature. [Quoted from here; accessed 03/05/2015. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Amorphous solids tend to soften slowly over a wide temperature range rather than having a well-defined melting point like a crystalline solid." [Quoted from here; accessed 08/04/2015. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Moreover:

 

"Almost any substance can solidify in amorphous form if the liquid phase is cooled rapidly enough...." [Ibid.]

 

This must mean that "almost any substance" will lack a melting point if it has been cooled in the above way. In turn, this implies that there are countless non-'nodal' (non-"leap"-like) changes in nature.

 

[Notice once more: I am not arguing that there are no sudden changes, only that not everything behaves this way.]

 

However, Vogelman was forced to make the following grudging, half-concession:

 

The rock and the butter are more difficult to explain. Rock seems to melt gradually, however this is not the case. Rock consists of a range of different kinds of crystals and the composition differs from rock to rock. The melting of a rock is difficult process. To put it most simple: different crystals melt at their own melting temperature. When a rock melts it is thus a mixture of solids and liquids.

 

So, even though rock does melt slowly, Vogelman says it doesn't! A nice unity of opposites, and no mistake! [The other points he makes have been dealt with above.]

 

Butter is a water in oil emulsion. In other words, very tiny bubbles of water which are enclosed by the milk proteins are spread through the solid oil. These bubbles are one of the reasons why butter is as easily spread if we exert force on it. However, this doesn't make it a liquid yet. If you put the butter in the pan and heat it you'll see the oil melt, the water boil away and the proteins will probably disintegrate because of the heat. Though a multitude of reactions happen, both chemical and physical, the melting itself stills happens nodal[ly].

 

Ok, let's imagine a simple experiment: put a slab of butter in the deep freeze (at about -30°C) until it is almost rock hard. Take it out and allow it to warm up in an oven whose temperature is slowly raised from zero to 40°C. Even the most short-sighted dialectician will then see that slab of butter slowly soften and melt. Or, is Vogelman going to deny what his eyes will tell him?

 

So, no 'nodal' point here, either.

 

And it is worth emphasising yet again: Vogelman is only able to get away with what he says because he has yet to tell us how long a 'nodal' point is supposed to last, or what a 'quality' is.

 

But this is Mickey Mouse Science after all and we would be foolish to expect attention to detail or precision.

 

For plastics I cannot provide an answer, simply because this term is far too vague and covers a wide range of materials.

 

Vogelman is being a little disingenuous here, since it is pretty clear that the majority of plastics melt slowly (as several of the quotations above argued). Here are a few videos of this phenomenon if he doubts this well-known fact. [Moreover, we have just seen that plastics are amorphous solids, which have no precise melting point.]

 

The conclusion?

 

In all the above examples, we can clearly see that the quantitative addition of heat results in a qualitative sudden change: melting.

 

But, we are still waiting for a clear definition of "quality" and "node". Moreover, Vogelman has completely ignored the following examples of 'qualitative' change which aren't the least bit 'nodal' (again, this has been taken from Essay Seven Part One):

 

The difficulties the First 'Law' faces do not stop there. When heated, objects/bodies change in quality from cold to warm and then to hot with no "nodal" point separating these particular "qualitative" stages -- hot water is significantly "qualitatively" different from cold water. The same happens in reverse when they cool. Moving bodies similarly speed up from slow to fast (and vice versa) without any "nodal" punctuation marks affecting this qualitative transition. Bodies with a high relative velocity are "qualitatively" different from those with a low relative velocity -- any who doubt this should stand in front of a stationary bus, and then in front of one moving at top speed. [Only joking!] In like manner, the change from one colour to the next in the normal colour spectrum is continuous, with no "nodal" points evident anywhere at all -- and this is also the case with the colour changes that bodies experience when they are heated until they are red-, or white-hot. Sounds, too, change smoothly from soft to loud, and in pitch from low to high, and then back again in a "node"-free environment. In fact, with respect to wave-governed phenomena in general, change seems to be continuous rather than discrete, which means that since the majority of particles/objects in nature move in such a manner, most things in reality seem to disobey this aspect of Engels's rather unimpressive 'Law' -- at least, at the macroscopic level. Hence, here we have countless changes in "quality" that are non-"nodal".

 

To be sure, some wave-like changes are said to occur discontinuously (indeed, the word "node" is used precisely here by Physicists), but this isn't the result of continuous background changes. For example, quantum phenomena are notoriously discontinuous, and such changes are not preceded by continual or gradual quantitative increases, as this 'Law' demands.

 

"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state." [Hegel (1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

"With this assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state, and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. -- Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels (1976), pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that] quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…." [Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

"The 'nodal line of measure relations' ... -- transitions of quantity into quality... Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing without leaps." [Lenin (1961), p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]

 

"What distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity) of Being and not-Being." [Ibid., p.282. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' -- although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

 

"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self'-movement.

 

"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new." [Ibid., pp.357-58. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

The argument here is plainly: (1) Quantitative increase in matter or energy results in gradual change, and hence (2) At a certain point, further increase breaks this "gradualness" inducing a "leap", a sudden "qualitative" change. But, sub-atomic, quantum changes occur suddenly with no "gradual" build-up. For example, electrons in an atom do not "gradually" absorb energy and then "leap" to an new orbital. The same can be said when inter-atomic or inter-molecular forces break. They do not slowly or gradually break and then suddenly do so; there is no change in "gradualness", even here.

 

"Changes of energy, such as the transition of an electron from one orbit to another around the nucleus of an atom, is done in discrete quanta. Quanta are not divisible. The term quantum leap refers to the abrupt movement from one discrete energy level to another, with no smooth transition. There is no 'inbetween'.

 

"The quantization, or 'jumpiness' of action as depicted in quantum physics differs sharply from classical physics which represented motion as smooth, continuous change. Quantization limits the energy to be transferred to photons and resolves the UV catastrophe problem." [Quoted from here; accessed 15/12/2015. Quotations altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected.]

 

Hence, discontinuous quantum, sub-atomic or inter-molecular phenomena cannot be recruited to fit, or illustrate, this 'Law'....

 

But, this doesn't happen in the Periodic Table! Between each element there is no gradual increase in protons and electrons leading to a sudden change -- there are only sudden changes as these 'particles' are added! For example, as one proton and one electron are added to Hydrogen, it suddenly changes into Helium. Hydrogen doesn't slowly alter and then suddenly "leap" and become Helium. The same is true of every other element in the Table. In that case, one of the 'best' examples dialecticians use to 'illustrate' this 'Law' in fact refutes it! There is no "interruption" in gradualness.

 

That disposes of two more classic and over-used examples to which DM-fans appeal to illustrate this hopeless 'Law'.

 

This is a more honest reading from the extant data, is it not? And not a single foisting anywhere in sight!

 

Some might want to argue that in relation to the above there are, indeed, sudden changes. For example, at some point a speeding car will be deemed to be travelling fast (for instance, when it exceeds local speed limits, or is in excess of, say, 50 mph). However, this response drives a gaping hole through this 'law' (n pun intended), for it will be a human observer who will decide in each case that a car is travelling fast, or that a lump of metal is hot, or a sound is loud.

 

There are several problems with this reply: (1) It will be the human observer that undergoes a supposed nodal-change here, not the objects in question. There is no objective point at which a car is travelling fast, or a sound is loud. So, in this case, a qualitative change will have taken place in the human observer, not the object (the car) in question. While the latter will have had energy added to it, it hasn't changed in the required manner, the observer has -- but that observer has had no energy added to her. (2) It is even less clear what a 'quality' is supposed to be in such cases. Are there objective laws in nature that decide when a lump of iron is hot and when it is not? Is that lump objectively hot at, say, 99oC, but not objectively hot at 98oC? As we will see below, given the DM-definition of 'quality' there is in fact no DM-'quality' here. In relation to hotness, there is no point at which a lump of metal "is what it is and not something substantially new", as the definition requires.

 

[It could be objected that a human observer will have had energy added to her, the light energy that enters her eyes. I have dealt with objection in extensive detail here, here and here; sceptical readers are directed there for more details.]

 

At this point, it is worth reminding ourselves what Lenin had to say:

 

"What distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity) of Being and not-Being." [Lenin (1961), p.282. Bold emphasis added.]

 

So, this isn't a minor point; according to Lenin, it is "what distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition...." Perhaps Vogelman should pick a fight with Lenin, not me.

 

We come now to the last few points Vogelman makes (in this case, in response to my argument about stereoisomers):

 

Here Rosa shows she even manages to confuse between on the one hand change and on the other difference. Not any sane dialectician [sic] would claim that things can't differ even though they have the same material and energetic properties. Rosa proves this in the quote above. However, the first law of dialectics is not about difference but about how things become something different, in other words: how the change [sic].

For a certain stereoisomers to change in another one [sic], we would still have to add energy to break bonds before the atoms of this molecule could get a different spacing. Ironically Rosa [sic] her own example turns against her.

 

And yet Engels himself appealed to isomers, allotropes and similar "differences" to illustrate his 'Law'!

 

Does this mean that Vogelman thinks Engels isn't sane?

 

Here is what I have argued on this in Essay Seven Part One, again:

 

However, Engels and other DM-fans appeal to various co-existent organic molecules and elements in the Periodic Table to illustrate the First 'Law' (on this, see Note 9 below), produced by parallel chemical reactions. In that case, if they can appeal to examples like this to support their 'Law', they can hardly complain when examples of the very same sort are used against them.

 

[It could be objected that the elements in the Periodic Table have all been produced from one another, or at least from other simpler atoms, in what is now known as Stellar Nucleosynthesis, so there is development here. In response, it is worth noting that (1) This was unknown in Engels day (so, he was using examples where there was no development), and (2) This isn't true of Hydrogen itself -- it didn't develop from simpler atoms, and (3) Despite what we are constantly told by DM-fans, this effete 'Law' doesn't even apply to the Periodic Table!]

 

Here is Engels:

 

"All qualitative differences in nature rest on differences of chemical composition or on different quantities or forms of motion (energy) or, as is almost always the case, on both. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned. In this form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite rational but even rather obvious.

 

"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that the various allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because they depend on various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser quantities of motion communicated to the bodies.

 

"But what is the position in regard to change of form of motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the same? Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion as with Heine's vices; anyone can be virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore, quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Engels (1954), pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]

 

Indeed, Woods and Grant list several molecules from Organic Chemistry (but they merely lifted this material from Engels). Here, the qualitative differences between the organic compounds they mention are independent of whether or not they have been derived from one another. They patently exist side-by-side:

 

"Chemistry involves changes of both a quantitative and qualitative character, both changes of degree and of state. This can clearly be seen in the change of state from gas to liquid or solid, which is usually related to variations of temperature and pressure. In Anti Dühring, Engels gives a series of examples of how, in chemistry, the simple quantitative addition of elements creates qualitatively different bodies. Since Engels' time the naming system used in chemistry has been changed. However, the change of quantity into quality is accurately expressed in the following example:

 

'CH2O2 -- formic acid         boiling point 100o melting point 1o
C2H4O2 -- acetic acid        ".............." 118o  "..............." 17o
C3H6O2 -- propionic acid   "..............." 140o  "..............." —
C4H8O2 -- butyric acid      "..............." 162o  "..............." —
C5H10O2-- valerianic acid  "..............." 175o  "................" —

 

and so on to C30H20O2, melissic acid, which melts only at 80o and has no boiling point at all, because it does not evaporate without disintegrating.'" [Woods and Grant (1995), p.52, quoting Engels (1976), p.163.]

 

Moreover, as noted above, Engels himself used the example of isomers to illustrate this 'Law':

 

"In these series we encounter the Hegelian law in yet another form. The lower members permit only of a single mutual arrangement of the atoms. If, however, the number of atoms united into a molecule attains a size definitely fixed for each series, the grouping of the atoms in the molecule can take place in more than one way; so that two or more isomeric substances can be formed, having equal numbers of C, H, and 0 atoms in the molecule but nevertheless qualitatively distinct from one another. We can even calculate how many such isomers are possible for each member of the series. Thus, in the paraffin series, for C4H10 there are two, for C5H12 there are three; among the higher members the number of possible isomers mounts very rapidly. Hence once again it is the quantitative number of atoms in the molecule that determines the possibility and, in so far as it has been proved, also the actual existence of such qualitatively distinct isomers." [Engels (1954), p.67. Bold emphases added.]

 

But, there is no "development" here! Engels notes that there are qualitative differences between already present molecules, so these cannot have been produced from one another. He says they are "qualitatively distinct" from each other as they now stand, so not only are they "qualitatively distinct" from any they have been developed from, they are "qualitatively distinct" from those they haven't, and cannot have been developed from.

 

Again, if Engels is allowed to refer to examples where there is no "development", or to qualitative differences that don't depend on development, to illustrate his 'Law', dialecticians cannot legitimately complain if similar examples are used to refute it.

 

Anyway, it is quite clear that Engels failed to appreciate how this radically compromised his claim that:

 

"It is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Ibid., p.63. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Once more: here we have change in geometry "passing over" into a qualitative change, refuting this 'Law'. This is a point that at least one dialectician has in fact already conceded:

 

"However, do all qualitative changes arise from the 'addition or subtraction of matter or motion'? Engels points to another factor that is sometimes involved: 'by means of a change of position and of connection with neighbouring molecules it ["the molecule" -- Cameron's insertion] can change the body into an allotrope or a different state of aggregation'.... Engels then is arguing that qualitative change can come about by means of 'change of position' or as he put it in another passage, 'various groupings of the molecules'...." [Cameron (1995), pp.66-67. Quotation marks altered to conform to the convention adopted here.]

 

Plainly, Vogelman needs to catch up!

 

But, what about the following point?

 

For a certain stereoisomers to change in another one, we would still have to add energy to break bonds before the atoms of this molecule could get a different spacing. Ironically Rosa her own example turns against her.
 

Once more, I covered this obvious objection in Essay Seven Part One. Vogelman's point depends on another idea Engels left rather vague: What exactly constitutes an 'addition' of energy and matter? No one doubts that bonds will have to be broken and then re-formed, but is that an addition of energy to the molecules in question? Vogelman is silent on this issue. Here is how I made this point in Essay Seven Part One:

 

In response, it could be argued that Engels had already anticipated the above objection:

 

"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that the various allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because they depend on various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser quantities of motion communicated to the bodies.

 

"But what is the position in regard to change of form of motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the same? Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion...; anyone can be virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore, quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Engels (1954), pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]

 

However, Engels slides between two different senses of "motion" here: (1) Change of place, and (2) Energy added or subtracted. In this way, he is able to argue that any change in the relation between bodies always amounts to a change in energy. But, this depends on the nature of the field in which these bodies are embedded. [On this, see below, and Note 4a); Engels's profound lack of mathematical knowledge clearly let him down here.

 

Independently of this, Engels also confused the expenditure of energy with energy added to a system. The difference between the two is easy to see. Imagine someone pushing a heavy packing case along a level floor. In order to overcome friction energy will have to be expended. But that energy has not been put into the packing case (as it were). Now, if the same case is pushed up a hill, Physicists tell us that recoverable energy has been put into the case in the form of Potential Energy.

 

Now, as far as can be ascertained in the examples of interest to dialecticians (but again, they aren't at all clear on this), it is the latter form of energy (but not necessarily always Potential Energy) that is relevant to this 'Law', not the former. The first does not really change the quality of any bodies concerned; the second does. [Although, of course, in the limit, the first can. Enough friction will often melt a body or set it on fire, for example. I will consider this option presently.]

 

If so, then the above counter-examples (e.g., involving Enantiomers) will still apply, for the energy expended in order to change one isomer into another is generally of the first sort, not the second.

 

To be sure, some of the energy in the packing case example will appear as heat (and/or perhaps sound), and will warm that case slightly. But this energy won't be stored in the case as chemically recoverable (i.e., structural, or new bond) energy.

 

Despite this, a few die-hard dialecticians could be found who might want to argue that any expenditure of energy is relevant to this 'Law'. That would be an unfortunate move since it would trivialise it, for in that case it would amount to the belief that any change at all (no matter how remote), since it involves the expenditure of some form of energy somewhere (but not necessarily energy put 'into' the bodies concerned), is the cause of qualitative change to other bodies somewhere else. This would make a mockery of Engels's claim that only energy added to the bodies concerned is relevant to this 'Law'.

 

"Change of form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition)." [Ibid. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Several examples of this sort of (remote) change are given below. The problems they create are discussed at length in Note 5 and Note 6a, where attempts to delineate the thermodynamic boundaries of the local energy budget involved -- which would have to be specified in order to prevent remote objects/energy expenditure being allowed to cause proximate change -- are all shown to fail.

 

It rather looks like Vogelman is guilty of the same sort of equivocation.

 

I hope I was able to show in this post that Rosa Liechtenstein (sic) in order to show that the laws of dialectics were imposed upon nature, she made grave scientific errors. In the end it even turns out that the dialectic law was observed after all.

 

But, as we have seen, this isn't even remotely correct; so my criticisms still stand.

 

And finally, we have this:

 

In her essays many more of these scientific errors can be found. I'm willing to post them and correct them if people are interested.

 

Brave words from someone who can't be bothered to read my arguments in their entirety, but has to rely on a summary written specifically for novices!

 

Added on edit: Vogelman has disappeared into the mists of non-dialectical time, so we will just have to wonder what these many 'errors' of mine are. Perhaps he had second thoughts now we know that in relation to the issues he raised, it was his good self, not me, who screwed up.

 

 

References

 

Atkins, P., and de Paula, J., (2006), Physical Chemistry (Oxford University Press).

 

Cameron, N. (1995), Dialectical Materialism And Modern Science (International Publishers).

 

Cornforth, M. (1976), Materialism And The Dialectical Method (Lawrence & Wishart, 5th ed.).

 

Doremus, R. (1994), Glass Science (John Wiley & Sons, 2nd ed.)

 

Engels, F. (1954), Dialectics Of Nature (Progress Publishers).

 

--------, (1976), Anti-Dühring (Foreign Languages Press).

 

Feltz, A. (1993), Amorphous Inorganic Materials And Glasses (Weinheim/VCH Publishers).

 

Gollobin, I. (1986), Dialectical Materialism. Its Laws, Categories And Practice (Petras Press).

 

Hegel, G. (1975), Logic, translated by William Wallace (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed.).

 

--------, (1999), Science Of Logic (Humanity Books).

 

Jeanloz, R., and Williams, Q. (1991), 'Solid-State Physics: Glasses Come To Order', Nature, 350, pp.659-60.

 

Kuusinen, O. (1961) (ed.), Fundamentals Of Marxism-Leninism (Lawrence & Wishart).

 

Lenin, V. (1961), Philosophical Notebooks, Collected Works, Volume 38 (Progress Publishers).

 

Pfaender, H. (1996), Schott Guide To Glass (Chapman & Hall, 2nd ed.).

 

Plekhanov, G. (1956), The Development Of The Monist View Of History (Progress Publishers). This is reprinted in Plekhanov (1974), pp.480-737. [Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed directly here. I have informed the editors of this error. Added June 2015: they have now corrected it!]

 

--------, (1974), Selected Philosophical Works, Volume One (Progress Publishers).

 

Rees, J. (2008), 'Q Is For Quantity And Quality', Socialist Review 330, November 2008, p.24.

 

Woods, A., and Grant, T. (1995), Reason In Revolt. Marxism And Modern Science (Wellred Publications).

 

Yurkovets, I. (1984), The Philosophy Of Dialectical Materialism (Progress Publishers).

 

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