Interview With Rosa Lichtenstein

[This was originally published at Libcom, 28/12/2018. Re-written 24/09/24.]

It's not a secret that Dialectics holds a kind of sacred place in the world of the Marxist tradition. However, there have been those Marxists who have questioned the logic and the utility of it. One of them is Rosa Lichtenstein, a philosopher and mathematician who runs the website Anti-dialectics. Since the 1970's, she has accumulated a rich experience in dealing with Dialectics as a theory through reading Analytical Philosophy and Marxists such as Gerry Cohen, but also as a form of politics within parties such as the UK-SWP, which she was a part of for a while. The goal of this interview is both to go deeper into that experience and to give a summed up presentation of her views for those who are not familiar with anti-dialectics.

Question One: Can you outline the main problems in Engels's dialectics and trace its relationship to Hegel's dialectics?

Before I begin it is important to add that nothing said here should be read as an attack either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept --, or, indeed, on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary over thirty-five years ago.

However, to answer your question: Engels's version of 'dialectics' isn't easy to summarise since he never published a clear or definitive account of it. He confined most of his comments to a polemic against Dühring in addition to a series of unpublished notes of varying quality. He wasn't a systematic thinker, and that is unfortunately the case with all subsequent Marxist dialecticians. (That isn't true of Marx's work on economics, of course, or, indeed, work devoted to HM by others -- the difference between Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM as I see it is explained here.) This means that much of Engels's work (and that of later dialecticians) is, at best, vague and confused, at worst, incoherent.

That is perhaps one of the main problems with Engels's version of DM (i.e., it is, at best, vague and confused, at worst, incoherent). Another is his dogmatism. Needless to say, dialecticians find accusations like this totally unacceptable, but they are relatively easy to confirm. [In fact, they have been fully substantiated at my site; for example, here and here.] Plainly, in an interview like this, I can only concentrate on a handful of examples.

Taking the second of the above two allegations first; Engels was at pains to deny he was a dogmatist who imposed his ideas on the world:

"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature...." [Engels, Anti-Dühring. Bold emphasis added.]

But he then says things like this:

"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels, Dialectics of Nature. Bold emphases added.]

"Dialectics as the science of universal interconnection…. The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa…[operates] in nature, in a manner fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or quantitative subtraction of matter or motion…. Hence, it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion…." [Ibid. Bold added.]

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy...expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted…. A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels, Anti-Dühring. Bold emphases alone added.]

Now, there is no body of evidence (certainly none available in Engels's day) that could possibly substantiate dogmatic claims like these. Nevertheless, Engels seemed happy to impose them on nature in defiance of his declaration that he would never do this. And, it isn't as if we don't know where he obtained these super-scientific 'facts'; he appropriated them from Hegel and other Mystics, who were also happy to impose them on the facts no less dogmatically -- since, in their case, they imagined they were reproducing the thoughts of the 'deity'.

The first of the two problems mentioned above concerned the allegation that Engels's theory, and that of subsequent dialecticians, is, at best, vague and confused, at worst, incoherent. Again, I can only consider one example of this, his assertion that motion is a 'contradiction' (a theory he also imported from Hegel):

"Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body being both in one place and in another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continual assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels, Anti-Dühring.]

There are several serious problems with this passage -- not the least of which is exactly who is doing all that "asserting" and "solving" --, but this is yet another example of Engels's dogmatism. Based solely on an extremely brief consideration of what he took to be the meaning of a handful of words (such as "place" "moment" and "motion"), he thought he could assert what was true of every example of motion in the entire universe, for all of time! He offered absolutely no evidence in support of this assertion, and no dialectician since has even so much as thought to offer any, either. Indeed, it is impossible to think of any physical evidence that could confirm the claim that moving objects are in two places at once, in one of them and not in it, at the same time.

Moreover, none of those who look to Engels for inspiration have noticed how vague and imprecise this 'theory' of motion actually is. For example, we are never told how far apart the two proposed places are that a moving object is supposed to occupy while at the same time not occupying one of them. The answer can't be "It doesn't matter; any distance will do." That is because if a moving object is in two places at once, then it can't truly be said to be in the first of these before it is in the second since it is in both of them at the same time. So, if it doesn't matter how far apart these "two places" are, it would imply, for example, that the aeroplane that takes you on your holidays must land at the same time as it takes off! If any distance will do, then the distance between the two airports involved is as good as any other. That is a direct result of Engels's careless use of language. Furthermore, if there is no before or after here, there can be no during, either. This means, for instance, that while you are waiting for a bus, it doesn't leave the depot before it gets to your stop, it arrives at your stop at the same time as it leaves the depot; and while the passengers might think they were on this bus during this journey, the advanced logic Hegel inflicted on humanity tells them they were sadly mistaken! Both of these ridiculous conclusions follow from his failure to specify how far apart the two aforementioned locations are, coupled with the claim that moving between them took no time at all!

On the other hand, if just any distance won't do, then the question remains: how far apart are the two locations a moving object occupies at the same time? In the many centuries since this conundrum was first aired (one of Zeno's Paradoxes), no one -- not one single person -- has even so much as attempted to say, nor have they even asked this question! And it is reasonably clear that no one could say, either. So, the classical theory is just as vague and confused as Engels's re-vamped, superficial version. He simply appropriated it uncritically, as have subsequent dialecticians.

However, the serious problems this ill-considered theory faces don't stop there: Also worth asking is the following: Do these 'contradictions' increase in number or stay the same if an object speeds up? Or, are the two locations depicted by Engels just further apart? That is, are the two points that an accelerating body occupies at the same 'moment in time' further apart? If they aren't, and if that body occupies them at the same time, it can't have accelerated. That is because speeding up involves covering the same distance in less time, but that isn't allowed here -- since, and once more, such a body is in both places at the same time. On the other hand, if they are further apart, the theory faces the ridiculous consequences outlined in sentences E1-E14, below.

[I am of course using "accelerate" here as it is employed in everyday speech, not as it is used in Physics or Applied Mathematics.]

Have subsequent dialecticians even so much as noticed these 'difficulties', which are, once more, a direct result of vagueness and confusion? Of course they haven't. They have always been far too eager repeating these 'cosmic verities' than they should have been subjecting them to careful scrutiny. That can be seen from the fact that when they are presented with these obvious absurdities -- after initial expressions of surprise -- they respond in one of two ways: either:

(i) They reject them out-of-hand as just so much 'pedantry' -- can you imagine a genuine scientist reacting this way to serious problems in her theory?; or,

(ii) They display clear signs of 'cognitive dissonance', which means they can then file such 'difficulties' at the back of their minds and think no more about them.

[There are in fact HM reasons why they do one or other of the above, but we can leave discussion of that to another time.]

The next (perhaps even more serious) problem with this 'theory' is that it is completely incoherent.

[I have set out the following argument in a series of steps since it is rather complicated. I have then summarised it in more ordinary terms so that those who don't find such complications easy to process can follow the argument.]

Underlying the following inferences is this uncontroversial assumption (one that dialectician themselves also accept):

E1: If an object is located in one place during two contiguous moments in time, it must be at rest there. So, no moving body can be in one and only one location during two such moments.

With that in mind we can now proceed:

E2: Assume body, B, is moving between points p(1) and p(n), an arbitrary distance apart.

E3: If Engels is to be believed, B will initially be in two places at the same 'moment in time' -- in this case, p(1) and p(2), at t(1).

E4: Assume B is still moving at the second of these two places, p(2), and that it is next located at p(3), then p(4), and so on.

E5: But, if B is still moving when it is at p(2), it must also be at p(3), at t(1).

E6: If that weren't the case, B would be located at p(2) at t(1) and p(3) at t(2), two different 'moments in time'.

E7: But, that would mean Engels was wrong, since, according to him B has to be in two places at the same time; but it is now in two places, p(2) and p(3), at different times, t(1) and t(2).

E8: Moreover, it can't now be argued that when B is at p(2) a new 'moment in time', t(2), begins, implying B is at p(2) and p(3) at t(2), not t(1).

E9: But, that would mean B was in p(2) at two 'moments in time' -- t(1) and t(2) -- which, according to E1, would imply B was stationary at p(2).

E10: Hence, B must be in three places, p(1), p(2) and p(3), at t(1).

E11: But, if B is still moving when it occupies p(3), the same considerations still apply. B must be in p(3) and p(4), at t(1), since, according to Engels, B has to be in two places at the same time.

E12: Hence, B must be in p(1), p(2), p(3) and p(4) at the same time, t(1).

E13: It takes very little 'dialectical logic' to see where this is going (no pun intended): if Engels is to be believed, B will be in p(1), p(2), p(3), p(4),..., p(k-1), p(k), p(k+1),..., p(n-2), p(n-1), and p(n), all at t(1)!

E14: So, the 'world-view of the proletariat' would have us believe that a moving object occupies every point along its trajectory at the same time!

For those who might find the above argument a little too abstract (or complicated), here it is again in more ordinary terms:

According to Engels, a moving object has to be in two places at the same time. Call that moment, t(1). But, if it is still moving at the second of these two locations, it must be there and in a third place at the same moment in time, t(1). If that weren't the case, and it was there at a later moment, t(2), that would imply it was in that second location during two moments, t(1) and t(2), not one moment (contradicting Engels). That in turn would mean it was at rest there, contrary to the supposition that it was moving. So, if this object is still moving, it must be in this third place at t(1). Similarly, if it is still moving, the same considerations will apply in relation to the third and fourth places occupied, as well as the fourth and fifth, the fifth and sixth, and so on.... They must all be occupied at the same time.

Hence, if Engels is to be believed, a moving object must be located at every point along is path at the same moment, t(1)!

[I have responded to every conceivable objection to the above in Essay Five at my site.]

Returning to a point made earlier: assume the two places an accelerating body, B, occupies at the 'same moment in time' are further apart. Label these two points p(i) and p(ii). But, between any two points there is a potentially infinite number of intermediate points. Call these intermediate points, p(1)-p(n) (from earlier). If so, we have already established that B will be in p(1) at the same time as it is in p(2). That isn't affected by the fact that B is accelerating since B is in p(i) and p(ii) at the same time, and p(1) and p(2) lie between p(i) and p(ii). So B has to be in all four locations at the same time. But that is also true if B isn't accelerating (since B is in all the points along its trajectory if it is moving, and accelerating bodies are certainly moving).

So, this theory can't distinguish an accelerating body from one travelling at a constant speed. In which case, it is difficult to see how, in a DM-universe, moving bodies can possibly accelerate if, as we have just seen, they are in all these points at the same time whether or not they are accelerating.

But, worse: No (moving) 'dialectical object' can occupy more points in a given time, and it matters not whether they are the same distance apart or are further apart -- since, in all cases, they occupy all of them at the 'same moment in time'. If, as we have established, a moving object occupies all the points along its trajectory at the same time, then that isn't affected by whether these points are a nanometre or a thousand kilometres apart. That being the case, there can be no acceleration in a 'dialectical universe'!

Is it any wonder that this incoherent 'theory' has presided over little other than failure for the last hundred or so years?

Motion might or might not be paradoxical (we can put that knotty question to one side for now), but whatever the answer turns out to be, Engels 'solution' is even more paradoxical than the phenomena it was meant to explain!

[I have exposed, in much greater detail, these and other absurdities implied by Engels's vague and confused ideas, here and here.]

Question Two: Engels defines metaphysics as something rigid and one-dimensional and claims Heraclitus as one of the progenitors of dialectics. It seems to me that Vedic metaphysics, and indeed later Jainism, for example, doesn't quite fit the Engels's mold. To what extent is Engels's definition of metaphysics correct?

I agree. Engels's knowledge was decidedly parochial (and 'dialectical concepts' abound in mystical systems the world over -- on that, see here, here and here), but he copied this 'persuasive definition' of metaphysics from Hegel. That is, it wasn't a 'definition' as such, it was an attempt to persuade the reader to accept a favoured idea disguised as a definition. This revisionary 'definition' was neatly summarised for us by Hegel scholar, Stephen Houlgate:

"Metaphysics is characterised in the Encyclopedia first and foremost by the belief that the categories of thought constitute 'the fundamental determinations of things'.... The method of metaphysical philosophy, Hegel maintains, involves attributing predicates to given subjects, in judgements. Moreover just as the subject-matter of metaphysics consists of distinct entities, so the qualities to be predicated of those entities are held to be valid by themselves.... Of any two opposing predicates, therefore, metaphysics assumes that one must be false if the other is true. Metaphysical philosophy is thus described by Hegel as 'either/or' thinking because it treats predicates or determinations of thought as mutually exclusive, 'as if each of the two terms in an anti-thesis...has an independent, isolated existence as something substantial and true by itself.' The world either has a beginning and end in time or it does not; matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not; man is either a rigidly determined being or he is not. In this mutual exclusivity, Hegel believes, lies the dogmatism of metaphysics. In spite of the fact that metaphysics deals with infinite objects, therefore, these objects are rendered finite by the employment of mutually exclusive, one-sided determinations -- 'categories the limits of which are believed to be permanently fixed, and not subject to any further negation.'" [Houlgate (2004), pp.100-01. Bold emphases added.]

This is plainly a revisionary definition of "metaphysics" that doesn't make sense even in its own terms. That is because it puts Hegel himself in something of a bind, for he certainly believed that metaphysics was this but not that (i.e., it was either this or it was that, but not both) -- meaning that even he had to apply the very principle he anathematised to make his point. He had to use the dread 'Law of Excluded Middle' [LEM] in order to criticise it! He divided thought into his own "rigid" dichotomies to advance the argument, fatally undermining it. So the choice here is: "metaphysical philosophy is...described by Hegel as 'either/or' thinking" -- or it isn't. According to Houlgate, Hegel drew a rigid dichotomy here between "metaphysical" and "dialectical" philosophy! I am sure Houlgate concluded this inadvertently, but his attempt to 'sanitise' Hegel's thought only succeeded in torpedoing it.

Of course, it could be countered that the above observations aren't "judgements" about the 'fundamental nature of things', but that objection itself must use the LEM to make its point, for it takes for granted that the above paragraph is saying this, but not that, about the 'fundamental nature of things'. Indeed, even Hegel's conclusions about the content of any metaphysical 'judgement' (i.e., that it says either this or that, not both) would also require an implicit use of the LEM.

We can go further: any 'leap' into higher forms of 'speculative thought', to the effect that this or that, or whatever, has been 'negated', must implicate the LEM, too; for it will either be the case, or it will not, that for any randomly-selected dialectical 'negation', it will either have taken place or it won't. Naturally, this would imply that if we were to accept the above revisionary definition, Hegel's thought (as well as the thought of anyone who agreed with him) is just as 'metaphysical' as anything Parmenides or Plato ever promulgated.

In fact, any attempt to say something definite or determinate (about anything) involves an implicit, or an explicit, use of the LEM. Not even a 'genius' like Hegel could find a way to by-pass it, even while he was attempting to criticise it.

So, and ironically, it turns out that Hegel and Engels's 'definition' isn't either correct or incorrect; it is far too confused to be elevated into either category.

Question Three: Although Marx criticised Hegel, we often hear that reading Marx without Hegel is impossible and that Marx didn't break from Hegel despite his criticisms. How would you respond to that? What was Marx's reaction to Engels's dialectics?

This is one area of my work that has perhaps been more heavily attacked than any other since it strikes at the heart of the Engels/Plekhanov/Lenin tradition of interpreting Das Kapital -- and therefore much of the work, and hence the intellectual standing, of 'Academic Marxists' and their cottage industry that has for several generations churned out ever more complicated and obscure 'reconfigurations' of the 'dialectic of Capital' alongside increasingly baroque ruminations concerning the (alleged) Hegel-Marx connection.

[Incidentally, the sanitised version of dialectics that academic dialecticians inflict on their readers -- purged of all those 'Engelsian crudities' -- plainly isn't an "abomination" in the eyes of those sections of the bourgeoisie that administer Colleges and Universities, or, indeed, who publish academic books and journals.]

Marx began his drift away from Hegel and philosophy in the 1840s (the textual evidence for that allegation has been posted here). My contention is that by the time he came to write Das Kapital Marx had abandoned Hegel, root-and-branch.

On what do I base that highly controversial allegation?

I base it on the only summary of 'the dialectic method' Marx published and endorsed in his entire life. This he did when he added a summary of that 'method' (written by a reviewer of his earlier work) to the Postface to the second edition of Das Kapital (because of considerations of space, I have only quoted a third of it):

"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence.... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx, Das Kapital. Bold emphases added.]

In the above passage, not one single Hegelian concept is to be found -- no "contradictions", no change of "quantity into quality", no "negation of the negation", no "unity and identity of opposites", no "interconnected Totality", no "universal change", etc., etc. -- and yet Marx still calls this the "dialectic method", and says of it that it is "my method". So, Marx's "method" has had Hegel completely excised --, except for the odd phrase or two, "here and there", with which he merely "coquetted" (as he later notes).

In that case, Marx's "dialectic method" more closely resembles that of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical School (of Ferguson, Millar, Robertson, Smith, Hume and Steuart), the very first historical materialists.

[Marxist Dialecticians have raised several objections to this interpretation; I have answered them all at my site. Once again, for reasons of space I won't reproduce that material here.]

Now, I don't think Marx was an enthusiastic supporter of Engels's dalliance with Hegelian Mysticism -- to put it mildly! Some of my critics point to passages in Das Kapital where Marx appears to use concepts drawn from DM in his analysis of Capitalism, but as I have shown at my site, that isn't so (again, on this, see here and here). Others refer to Anti-Dühring [AD] and the fact that Marx contributed a chapter to it. But, there is no evidence that Marx read that book, or even endorsed it. Indeed, Engels tells us he read this book to Marx:

"I must note in passing that inasmuch as the mode of outlook expounded in this book was founded and developed in far greater measure by Marx, and only to an insignificant degree by myself, it was self-understood between us that this exposition of mine should not be issued without his knowledge. I read the whole manuscript to him before it was printed...." [Engels, Anti-Dühring. Bold emphasis added.]

However, if Engels did read this to Marx (a claim, it is worth noting, he only made after Marx's death), it would have taken at least two-and-half days to complete.

I have based the above conclusion on the following calculations: I estimate AD is slightly under 130,000 words long. [In the version I have, the Peking Edition, there are approximately 300 words per page. If we omit the Prefaces and the Notes, there are just over 430 pages; so 430 x 300 = 129,000.]

I timed myself reading several pages of the above Edition, and doing so fairly rapidly, it took me on average 1 minute 50 seconds to complete each page. So, reading non-stop, the entire book would take approximately 13 hours 10 minutes to finish. [When I slowed down slightly, that added 20 seconds per page on average, adding 2 hours 20 minutes to the total; which means it would then take 15 hours 30 minutes to read the entire book.] If we now add a 10 minute break every hour to the faster of these two reading times (e.g., for toilet or smoke breaks -- also taking into consideration the fact that Engels was a smoker, so he would have been slowed down somewhat by puffing away on several cigars, coughing regularly, stopping to light up again from time-to-time -- but allowing no time for discussion, drinks, food or sleep), the entire manuscript would have taken and extra 2 hours 10 minutes, which means the grand total would now be 15 hours 20 minutes.

[As noted above, when I slowed down slightly that added twenty seconds per page on average  -- increasing the total time by 2 hours 20 minutes -- bringing the overall time to 17 hours 40 minutes. Adding the aforementioned breaks would increase that total itself to 19 hours 50 minutes, for the slower read.]

In relation to the faster read, if we now allow for an eight-hour day, with a couple of hours for food breaks every eight hours, etc., that would add at least 4 more hours to the total -- now at just under 20 hours --, or, two-and-half days (for an eight-hour day), of Engels banging on, and on...

[Incidentally, if we omit the Prefaces and the Notes, there are 293 pages in the MECW edition (Volume 25), with approximately 450 words per page -- 293 x 450 = 131,850 words. Each of these pages took me on average 2 minutes 30 seconds to read (fairly rapidly) and then on average 2 minute 45 seconds (reading slightly slower). The faster read time would mean that the book could be completed (non-stop) in just over 12 hours 10 minutes; the slower in 13 hours 25 minutes. So the two approximations agree reasonably closely. Faster reading: 13 hours 10 minutes vs 12 hours 10 minutes; Slower: 15 hours 30 minutes vs 13 hours 25 minutes; that is, in both cases omitting all the breaks and stops mentioned earlier.]

Can you imagine it! If we are prepared to accept Engels's story, one wonders how often the rapidly ageing Marx will have nodded off, perhaps not fully realising the nature of whatever it was that some would later claim he fully agreed with or accepted!

But, why on earth read it to Marx? Were his eyes and brain failing him? Was he no longer capable of reading the book for himself? As far as I can determine, there is no evidence Engels had ever done this before (i.e., read a book to Marx). Why this time?

Moreover, since Marx contributed a chapter, why didn't Engels simply ask him to check the proofs?

Furthermore, AD contains several sections on mathematics (which few other than die-hard-DM-fans -- who apparently know little mathematics --, will now defend). Unlike Marx, Engels was neither knowledgeable nor competent in mathematics (as is relatively easy to demonstrate -- on that see here and here). If we insist that Marx agreed with every single line read to him from AD, then we are also forced to conclude that Marx, too, was an incompetent mathematician. Are DM-fans who are competent in this area -- the opinions of those who aren't are surely irrelevant in this respect -- are they prepared to admit this? If not, then the claim that Marx had this book read to him, and that he agreed with every word, can no longer be sustained.

In which case, if that particular idea is abandoned, a major plank in the claim that Marx and Engels saw eye-to-eye about DM, or, indeed, about everything, will have been broken in pieces. If Marx didn't agree with these 'mathematical' passages, but said nothing about them in his letters to Engels, then Marx's almost total silence about other DM-ideas that Engels was cooking-up in AD (and in several letters and Notebooks) assumes an entirely new light.

Many have wondered why, if Marx didn't accept DM, he failed to express any open disagreement with Engels on this topic. Some have suggested that Marx didn't do so because he looked to Engels for financial support, which meant he kept quiet to avoid jeopardising that support. I think that 'explanation' demeans Marx, so, I, for one, reject it.

However, it isn't true that Marx failed to express any rejection of DM. Above I have quoted a long passage that Marx added to the Afterword to the Second Edition of Das Kapital, which did just this. That passage contains absolutely no trace of DM (or Hegel) and yet Marx still called it "my method" and "the dialectic method". It is also worth emphasising once again that this passage is the only summary of "the dialectic method" Marx published and endorsed in his entire life.

By that time in his life Marx had much bigger fish to fry than initiate an arcane and pointless argument with Engels, in relation to which I am sure he could see no practical or political upside. He didn't live to see the truly disastrous effect this ramshackle theory would later have on those who claimed to be his successors (laid out in extensive detail in Part Two of Essay Nine, at my site). Had he lived to witness the ruinous influence DM had on revolutionary theory and practice in, say, the forty or fifty years following on from WW1, I suspect he'd have been far more forthright in his opposition to DM, whatever Engels might have thought about it.

Finally, some point to unpublished letters where Marx speaks highly of 'dialectics', but we already know he meant something different by that word compared with the way it has been understood by the tradition that has descended from Engels -- the long passage above confirms this. So, there is no convincing evidence Marx agreed with Engels about DM, and much that suggests he didn't.

Question Four: Can you provide an account of the "rational core" of Hegelian dialectics, in particular with reference to historical materialism and its corresponding methods of investigation and argumentation?

In the space available to me, it really isn't possible to provide an account of the 'rational core' you mention. However, Hegel himself was heavily influenced by Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical School (mentioned earlier). He took these ideas and thoroughly soaked them in Christian and Hermetic Mysticism. So, in order to extract the 'rational core' before Hegel had thrown countless mystical smoke bombs at it, we need to go back to those earlier theorists, by-passing Hegel, and read Marx afresh in that light. Several theorists have (partially) attempted to do this, the most important being the late Gerry Cohen, whose book -- Karl Marx's Theory of History. A Defence -- is, in my view, a modern classic (providing its technological determinism and functionalism are ignored). Fortunately, Alex Callinicos's book -- Making History -- has plugged most of the holes in Cohen's theory.

The methods used? Those of any other historiographical study -- but, of course, free of any appeal to methodological individualism. I hope to say more about this when my current project is complete.

Question Five: What Marxist anti-dialecticians do you agree with the most and why?

Unfortunately, there are very few who fit that category, and what few there are only go as far as questioning the application of dialectics to nature, restricting it to human social development and the class war. And of those few, the vast majority steer far too close to Traditional Philosophy (or, rather, too close to Hegel and 'Continental Philosophy'), which unfortunately means that only those with a PhD can even try to understand what they have to say. That is quite apart from the easily confirmed fact that much of what they do say turns out to be as obscure as anything Hegel published. Any who doubt this should check out two of Slavoj Žižek's latest books, Less Than Nothing. Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, and Absolute Recoil. Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism. Only those fluent in post-Hegelian, academic gobbledygook will feel confident they understand more than a few pages of either tome.

However, there are two Marxist dialecticians whose work I largely agree with, and which is definitely worth mentioning. The first is by the late Guy Robinson. I have posted Guy's unpublished book -- Philosophy and Demystification -- at my site, where I also added these thoughts:

The other author alluded to above is Eric Peterson whose book, The Poverty of Dialectical Materialism, is the best -- and, as far as I know, the only -- published work that is wholly devoted to criticising the application of DM to nature written by a revolutionary Marxist. Several years ago, Eric promised a second edition; if and when it comes out I hope he deletes the comments he made about Formal Logic in one of the Appendices, which were, alas, ill-informed and only detracted from his overall argument. While I don't agree with everything Petersen says (for example, concerning the nature of Philosophy and the application of 'the dialectic' to human development and the class war), his book is easily the closest to my own work, and I have learnt much from it.

Question Six: Analytical philosophy's goal was to introduce clarity and precision to philosophy, as opposed to traditional philosophy, which tended to build philosophical systems trapped in thought and language, to paraphrase Bertrand Russell. He and G.E. Moore, for example, accused Hegel of being obscure. You seem to align yourself with at least some instances of analytical philosophy, but you warn that the newer analytical philosophy has "resiled from its earlier anti-metaphysical stance“. Do you think engaging in metaphysics is harmful or irrelevant, or both, and if so, how? What pitfalls are there if Marxists avoid metaphysics but still use techniques drawn from Analytic Philosophy?

I am a died-in-the-wool Analytic Philosopher, but in the Frege-Wittgenstein tradition. Wittgenstein's first book, The Tractatus, provided a dozen or so positivistically-inclined scientist-philosophers, the so-called Vienna Circle, with the analytic tools they sought in their endeavour to construct a comprehensive philosophy of science, free from metaphysics, among other things. However, they completely misconstrued Wittgenstein's book (as did Russell in his Introduction), but it is this interpretation that dominated Analytic Philosophy for the next few decades (and, in some respects, it still does), mis-characterising it as belonging to the Empiricist tradition, which it most definitely does not -- even while it sets its face against Metaphysics. Rightly or wrongly this meant that Analytic Philosophy from the late 1920s through to the late 1960s was predominantly anti-metaphysical. The picture began to change dramatically with the work of Quine and Chomsky, followed by that of Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam and David Lewis, among several others. This now means that Analytic Philosophy, outside the Wittgensteinian tradition, has slipped back a whole century and is now dominated by theorists who think Philosophy is and should be a sort of Super-Science.

Despite this, Metaphysics has proved to be an almost total waste of time and effort, and that is because metaphysical theories are, quite simply, incoherent non-sense. None of the 'problems' that exercised Ancient Greek Philosophers (or, indeed, those in subsequent centuries) have been solved. We don't even know the right questions to ask, for goodness sake!

Despite this, Traditional Thinkers have routinely imposed their dogmatic theories on 'reality'. This ancient tradition taught that behind appearances there lies a hidden world populated by the 'gods', assorted 'spirits' and 'essences', which are more real than the material universe we see around us, and are accessible to thought alone. Theology was openly and proudly built on this premise; so was Traditional Philosophy. Indeed, as Marx noted:

"Philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [1844 Manuscripts.]

This way of viewing the world was concocted by ideologues of the ruling-class, which class ensured that others were educated, or, rather, were indoctrinated to see things the same way. They invented this approach to 'knowledge' because if you belong to, benefit from, or help run a society that is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you only can keep order in the following ways:

(i) The first and most obvious way is through violence. That will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

(ii) Another way is to persuade the majority -- or a significant section of "opinion formers" (philosophers, administrators, editors, bishops, educators, 'intellectuals', and the like) -- that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', defends 'civilised values', or is 'natural' and thus cannot be fought against, reformed or negotiated with.

These ideas were then imposed on reality -- plainly, since they can't be 'read' from it.

As Marx pointed out, members of the ruling-class often relied on these other layers in society to concoct and then propagate such ideas on their behalf, in order to persuade the rest of us that each successive system was 'rational', 'natural', or 'divinely ordained':

"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...." [The German Ideology. Bold emphases added.]

Notice that Marx says they do this "in its whole range", and that they "rule as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age." This must mean that Traditional Philosophy was, and still is, an integral part of ruling-class ideology.

In Ancient Greece, with the demise of the rule of Kings and Queens, the old myths and Theogonies were no longer relevant. So, in the newly emerging republics and quasi-democracies of the Sixth Century BC far more abstract, de-personalised ideas were required. Enter Philosophy and Metaphysics. It is no accident then that these disciplines emerged just as Greek society was changing in the above way.

Hence, a 'world-view' is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling "in the same old way". While the content of this ruling ideology has altered with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth can ascertained by thought alone, and may therefore be imposed on reality, dogmatically. Traditional Philosophy thus became a Super-Science.

Philosophers felt they could read their theories into nature, since, for them, nature was 'Mind' (or it was the product of 'Mind' -- i.e., the Universe was ultimately 'rational'). In that case, the human mind could safely concoct and then project its thoughts onto this 'rational' Universe, on a like-recognises-like basis.

But this is a quintessentially Idealist method, as US Trotskyist, George Novack, emphasised:

"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this." [The Origin of Materialism. Bold emphasis added.]

Of course, Metaphysics these days has largely been distanced from the rationalisation and justification of ruling-class power -- and, outside of the Church, from Theology, too -- but it still performs a useful (and largely 'inadvertent') function: since it is still based on the premise that the material world is insufficient to itself and has beneath it a 'rational' order accessible to thought alone. But, if there is a 'rational order' beneath 'appearances', then, ultimately the universe must be 'mind' or 'mind-like'. No wonder, then, that Marx wrote: "Philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought."

This interpretation of Metaphysics clearly re-positions it in the political sphere; it still represents a ruling-class view of 'reality', and so it is a legitimate target for Marxist criticism. It is harmful in this sense: Metaphysics is still the paradigm that dominates the thought of Marxist dialecticians. They, too, imagine they are engaged in developing a Super-Science. That is why they are happy to impose on nature and society ideas inherited from previous generations of Idealists and Mystics (with a perfunctory nod in the direction of genuine science, as a sort of fig-leaf).

What pitfalls are there for Marxists? Well, that depends on which strand of Analytic Philosophy a given theorist has been influenced by. As far as Marxism is concerned, if it is the strand mentioned above (that has retreated into producing yet more Metaphysics), then that theorist will waste their time in the production of what amounts to little other than self-important hot air, of no use to the workers' movement. But the techniques we use in the Frege-Wittgenstein tradition can only help promote the further development of Marxist theory.

On the other hand, it will at least stop some Marxists from thinking Formal Logic begins and ends with Aristotle!

Question Seven: How does Dialectical Materialism render Dialectical Marxists unable to understand the dynamics between the base and superstructure?

I'm not sure it does render them unable to do what you say, except perhaps when they speak about the 'contradiction' between the forces and relations of production, for instance. If that were the case, according to the DM-classics, the forces and relations of production would have to struggle with and then change into each other! Has anyone ever witnessed a transport system struggling with and then changing into the relations of ownership and control, for example? Sloppy thoughts like these that trip so easily off the tongues of dialecticians only succeed in undermining the scientific status of HM, alongside the credibility of Marxist who come out with this. Hence, they end up mystifying the relation between base and superstructure.

Question Eight: You say one of the reasons many Marxists do not reject dialectics is their perception of it as a kind of dogma, a sacred text. Marx was clearly against dogma, to which his "ruthless criticism of everything" testifies. Do you think that Dialectical Marxists, in your experience, are generally more prone to being dogmatic than those who reject dialectics?

In my experience they are all dogmatists when it comes to DM. And this carries across into Dialectical Marxism because those who founded our movement and invented DM weren't workers. They came from a class that educated their children to believe there really was a 'hidden world' lying behind 'appearances' that took precedence over and governed everything in existence. So, when they became revolutionaries they looked for 'logical' principles relating to this hidden, 'abstract world' that told them change was inevitable and part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of that ruling-class mystic, Hegel. Hence, the dialectical classicists latched onto this theory and were happy to impose it on the world (upside down or the "right way up"). As a result of their education, it seemed perfectly natural for them to do so -- since that is how 'genuine' philosophers ought to behave and have always behaved. Or so they had been socialised to believe.

That doesn't mean only workers can be good revolutionaries, but it does mean that Marxists should be alert to the class-compromised ideas that the DM-classicists brought with them into our movement -- that is, before the working class could provide them with an effective materialist counter-weight.

Today, a hundred and fifty years later, there is no longer any excuse for maintaining support for these doctrines, since that counter-weight now exists, and we now understand the role this theory has played in the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism.

Question Nine: In your experience with Dialectical Marxists, what role does dialectics play in their outlook? Also, you have stated that you would be an idealist if you'd harbour any hope that your work would positively influence Dialectical Marxists. Has anything changed since you've made that statement and has your work had a positive influence on other Marxists?

The problem here is that, just like Metaphysics, DM is incoherent non-sense, so it is physically impossible to put it into practice. Can you imagine anyone arguing that they should oppose, for instance, Donald Trump's abortion ban because the whole is greater than the sum of the parts? Or that since quantity turns into quality, we should resist the attack on pensions. Or even that the rise of the fascist right in the USA and across Europe should be resisted because Being is identical with but at the same time different from Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming (an 'argument' of Hegel's that was praised by Lenin and Trotsky as the work of genius)?

For more years than I care to mention I have been asking dialecticians in person and on the internet to provide examples of the (positive) application of dialectics in the class war, or even in the day-to-day practice of revolutionaries. I have yet to be given a single example -- except DM-supporters tend to present me with examples drawn from HM, instead. However, as is relatively easy to show, dialectics can be and has been used to rationalise and/or 'justify' anything a given party finds expedient and its opposite -- often this trick is pulled off by the very same individual, in the same book, article or speech. That is because DM glories in contradiction. Hence, they conclude that the party, its ideas and its practice should be no less contradictory. This is a characteristic that dialectics shares with no other theory -- except perhaps Zen Buddhism (if the latter can be called a theory) -- and it has had an extremely deleterious effect on Dialectical Marxism. [Dozens of examples of this have been itemised at my site.]

So, if the history of Dialectical Marxism is anything to go by, DM has had no positive practical applications, only negative. That is why I have argued that it is part of the reason for the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism. Of course, there are many complex contributory reasons for this failure -- but it is important to point out that I am not saying Marxism has failed; the non-dialectical version hasn't been road-tested yet --, but DM must some of the blame.

Or, are we supposed to conclude that the only two things in the entire universe that aren't interconnected are: (a) The long term failure of Dialectical Marxism and (b) Its core theory, DM?

Has anything changed? Not really, except dialecticians now either ban me or totally ignore me on-line. I think my reputation goes before me these days.